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THE

# BBERT JOURNAL

## A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY

113471

EDITED BY

P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., LL.D., D.Litt.

AND

DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., F.B.A.

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vailable from the work of Sir Charles Sherrington and others as to the characteristics of simple reflex action and of varied modes of the ombination of reflexes. He maintains that here also phenomena of the true image type are obvious and render mechanical explanations no account. He deals in turn with "spinal shock," inhibition, the rvous effects of strychnine, theories of preformism and epigenesis, e evolution of specialised tissue, growth patterns and the general velopment of the central nervous system. A further chapter sumrises all that he has discovered about physiological patterns, and of all a chapter of concluding remarks elaborates the pattern ory into a metaphysics of nature.

No brief notice can do anything like justice to the range and ne of this book. In theory it is admittedly highly speculative, in ninology it is often apparently needlessly cumbrous, but for all is new terms and usages MacCurdy is ready with definitions, and most of his abundant generalisations he offers a mass of very arefully sifted evidence. In style it could be made more concise with advantage, but every chapter is profoundly interesting, and the whole is an important contribution, not only to modes of explanation in psychology and physiology, but also towards a genuine philosophy of nature. For the mechanically-minded Englishman, if, as I doubt, he is as common as is supposed, the volume should be a tonic and a challenge. And all those who believe that a mechanistic explanation of life and matter rests upon a fast outwearing creed will find a great stimulus in these crowded pages.

F. C. Bartlett.

St. John's College, Cambridge.

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*The Church in the World:* Collected Essays by W. R. Inge, Dean of St Paul's.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927.—6*s.* net.—Pp. xii + 276.

The Dean of St Paul's, in this authoritative volume, leaving politics and sociology on one side, has concentrated himself on the Church. The title is significant. The Church is found in the world but does not embrace it. "To rescue a little flock here and there from materialism, selfishness and hatred, is the task of the Church in all ages, and there is no likelihood that it will ever be different" (p. 201). Such is the conclusion of one whose duties have called him to "the studies of classical scholarship, theology and philosophy" (p. 203). How far the Quakers have led the author to this conclusion is a pertinent question. "The crumbling of traditional theology has left the foundations of Quakerism untouched" (p. 57). Dean Inge regards Quakerism as an integral element in the development of the Church and traces it as far back as Tertullian (p. 60).

The historical note is sounded especially in the first essay on "the Condition of the Church of England." I cannot agree, however, with the opinion quoted from an ecclesiastical historian, that the average duration of a lurch or "movement" in the Church of England is about two generations. The Oxford Movement reaches back to Laud, and the tendencies of which Dean Inge is the spokesman are directed towards ideas which also have been found in the national Church since it broke off from the Roman allegiance. It might therefore be useful sometimes to set over against Oxford a "Cambridge Movement" of which the history is indicated in this first essay, and to regard Dean Inge against such a background. His work on Plotinus reaches back to the Cambridge Platonists. The later Cambridge mystic, William Law, "bridges over the gap between the Cambridge school and the Romantics of the early nineteenth century" (p. 8), that is, to Coleridge, the Gothic revival, and the later Oxford Movement. Eighteenth century rationalism regarded thus is an offspring of mysticism, and a continuous causal relation is suggested.

The author rises to first principles in the later essays, and again vindicates with some emphasis his claim to be a theologian. A conventional reference to the Good, the True and the Beautiful leads on to the unconventional conclusion that "there are three paths up the hill of the Lord which we may suppose meet and unite near the top." The conflict between religion and science, we are told, is likely to continue. A similar discussion is desirable about the not less real conflict between art and science in the first place, and art and religion in the second. The Quaker tradition, which is estranged from music, has been followed, so I am told on Quaker authority, by a lack of musical endowment in that society. Puritan hostility to plastic art seems to have led, on a larger scale, to similar consequences. At any rate Alfred Stevens, of whose masterpiece the Dean is the custodian, did not arrive until the Victorian age, and remains our greatest English artist. On the principles of this attractive book, such a figure is comparable in importance to a great prophet. Art, not science, is the true critic of the opening verses of Genesis. For after all, Genesis, according to Onkelos and other ancient Jewish commentators, begins with a phrase of art that might almost be found in the Timaeus: *in æternitate sculpsit Deus cœlum et terram* (God in eternity was the sculptor of heaven and earth), the Platonists' Demiurge.

FRANK GRANGER.

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# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

FIDEM RECTUMQUE COLENDO.

## A STUDY OF PARADOX.[1]

**WILLIAM KILBORNE STEWART,**

Professor of Comparative Literature, Dartmouth College, U.S.A.

The dictionaries are all agreed in distinguishing two meanings of the word "paradox"—meanings which are closely related indeed, but which diverge sufficiently to give rise to different if not quite separate problems. I quote, in abbreviated form and in reverse order, the two definitions given in the *New English Dictionary:* (1) "A statement or proposition which on the face of it is self-contradictory, absurd, or at variance with common sense"; (2) "A statement or tenet contrary to received opinion or belief; often with the implication that it is marvellous or incredible."

Now there is also, I maintain, a third kind of paradox which the lexicographers ought to take cognisance of, namely, a statement which reverses or twists, or otherwise alters, a common proverb or a familiar quotation. This might, of course, be regarded as a variety of the second kind of paradox, since the familiar saying, before it is altered, is invested with the validity of an accepted opinion; but at any rate this particular type of paradox has been sufficiently cultivated in the last generation or so to be accorded separate recognition. As examples of it I may mention Oscar Wilde's *mot*, "Work is the curse of our drinking classes"; G. K. Chesterton's phrase, "Praise with faint damns"; Bernard Shaw's alteration of St Paul's dictum, "To the pure all things are pure" into "To the pure all things are impure." Dean Inge, in one of his essays, remarks: "One may almost say 'An honest God is the noblest work of man.'" The Dean is evidently unaware that Robert G. Ingersoll used those very words some forty years ago. Further instances of this sort are Swinburne's "Glory to man in the highest" and Richard Le Gallienne's adjuration to youth, "Leap before you look." "Nothing succeeds like excess," said Oscar Wilde. "In religion nothing fails like success," remarks Dean Inge. This is a fairly cheap and obvious device; but it is possible to achieve a more delicate effect, as in this little epigrammatic poem by Miss Edna St Vincent Millay, with its pert inversion of the Gospel parable:

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[1] An article on "Christianity as Paradox," by Professor Stewart, will appear in the next number.—Editor.

> "Safe upon the solid rock
> The ugly houses stand.
> Come and see my shining palace,
> Built upon the sand."

Returning to our two main definitions—the paradox as self-contradiction and the paradox as contradiction of generally received opinion: the opposite of the paradox in the first sense would be a truism; the opposite of it in the second sense would be a platitude. The two definitions might be connected by saying that a paradox is any statement which contradicts what has been taken for granted. The second is the true etymological meaning of the word, which signifies in Greek "contrary to opinion," and it is, furthermore, the sense in which the word was generally used in English until the eighteenth century, when it was gradually supplanted by the other meaning of self-contradiction which it prevailingly has to-day. (It is still largely used in the older sense in France.) It has been suggested that the word "paralogism" should be employed for the paradox of illogicality, but that word has won no vogue.

Obviously the paradox of self-contradiction is the easier to detect, since one has only to apply the ordinary standard of logic. It is also the kind which is employed for rhetorical effect. In every way it speaks for itself. On the other hand, the paradox which runs counter to general opinion may be subtle and of many guises and is thoroughly elusive. To detect it, one must assume a body of accepted beliefs, or posit a norm of common sense, or set up as criterion the views of an "*homme moyen sensuel*." But, alas for our endeavour! this very norm proves to be only relative, and what we are pleased to regard as the stable, unalterable body of common sense is, in reality, itself subject to change. Thus the sphericity of the earth, the existence of antipodes, the movement of the earth around the sun, were all once paradoxes. As Hamlet says, "This was some time a paradox, but now the time gives it proof." Hobbes even went so far as to define a paradox as an opinion not yet generally received. So, too, the simian descent of man, when mooted in the eighteenth century by Lord Monboddo, seemed a wanton absurdity. Berkeley's idealism, Rousseau's glorification of primitive man, Kant's doctrine of the subjectivity of time and space, Fechner's panpsychism, must all have appeared in this light. Did not Dr Johnson refute Berkeley by kicking his foot against a stone?

It may be that in time we shall accustom ourselves to the new concepts of Einstein, which are so disconcerting to us at present, such as the notion of a limited universe and the curvature of space-time. At least they seem to present no internal discrepancies. But what are we to say of the strange pronouncements of the new physics regarding the ultimate constitution of matter? Will our minds ever feel at home in these irrationalities? I quote from a recent book of H. G. Wells: "The analysis of matter, in the last quarter of a century has reached a point where it has ceased to be in any human sense wonderful. It is incomprehensible. Every statement is a paradox; every formula an outrage upon common sense." "Energy is and it is not, and then again it is, all Being flickers in and out of not-being, there is an irrational bound set to motion, there is a limit to the range of temperature." It was Vaihinger, I think, who spoke of the electron as "an hypostatised nothing." H. L. Mencken has called it "a speck of vacuum." Someone else has said that it is "motion plus mystery."

But many of the instances I have cited have been the fruitful, the significant paradoxes, rather than the glittering paralogisms of the phrase-makers. The real paradoxers in the history of thought have been such men as Socrates, Jesus, St Paul, Pascal, Rousseau, Tolstoy, Nietzsche: innovators who have transmuted human values and recast our entire ways of thinking. They may or may not have expressed themselves in aphorisms of self-contradiction; most of them have done so on occasion, but in that case the aphorism exists and is valuable only as the epigrammatic expression of the novel and marvellous insight.

The difference in meaning between the two kinds of paradox may be illustrated by taking a passage from Pope:

> "All nature is but art, unknown to thee;
> All chance, direction, which thou canst not see;
> All discord, harmony not understood;
> All partial evil, universal good;
> And spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
> One truth is clear, whatever is, is right."

Here the true import lies not in the coruscating contrasts which Pope displays to our admiring gaze—nature, art, chance, direction, discord-harmony, evil-good, but in the paradox of the last statement, "Whatever is, is right"—a paradox which slaps experience and common sense in the face.

This whole point regarding the superior importance of the paradox of opinion requires emphasis, so that the true proportion of things may be kept in mind. There is a natural tendency to concentrate attention on the paralogism as the most striking concrete expression of the paradoxical mood—a tendency of which indeed these pages will furnish an example. The prevalence of this type of consciously clever, "smart" self-contradiction, these "quick turns of self-applauding intellect," in the literature of the last generation has provoked the inevitable reaction and led to a rather sweeping disparagement of the paradox as something tawdry and specious, bringing chaos into language and confusion into thought. Thus a contemporary critic, Edwin Muir, is moved to ask whether the paradox is anything but the Irish bull raised to the literary level. Well, a good Hibernian, Professor Mahaffy, once said that an Irish bull differed from every other kind of bull by being a pregnant one. Mahaffy himself remarked on one occasion that Ireland was the country where the inevitable never happened, the impossible always—a good instance of the "bull-paradox." So, too, one must distinguish among paradoxes. If it is merely word-juggling that is involved, then the paradox is no better than the pun, the Spoonerism or any other sort of verbal play. Only when fraught with ideas does it become significant. For instance, when G. K. Chesterton defines a yawn as "a silent yell," the quip is amusing enough and perhaps makes a social appeal, but hardly advances us in thinking. James

Russell Lowell once said of Gladstone that he had a disconcerting habit of improvising lifelong opinions. Here a flashlight is turned on Gladstone's mentality and his faculty of self-persuasion, for Gladstone, like de Toqueville, "avait l'air de savoir de toute éternité ce qu'il venait d'apprendre." When Burke praised the English for "their unalterable perseverance in the wisdom of prejudice," he coined a phrase in those four words "the wisdom of prejudice" which may be said to sum up the philosophy of conservatism. And still higher in the scale of significance is St Augustine's dictum, "Vis fugere a Deo? Fuge ad Deum," or Pascal's famous saying: "Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas," or, again, Leopardi's "Tutto è nulla, solido nullo," each of which reveals a philosophy of life.

But one may even urge a defence of the irresponsible and the frivolous paradox as a game of having fun with one's own mind and as protection against excessive platitude and conventionality and stodginess. Wherever the wits are gathered together for converse there paradox irresistibly breaks out, especially to the humanising accompaniment of alcohol. It is like a wild protest against mechanisation. Accordingly we find that Diderot and his fellow encyclopædists, Charles Lamb and his group of friends, and the circle of the Goncourt Brothers, all indulged in it. Even in Samuel Johnson's Literary Club the talk was not free from it, the doughty Doctor himself giving it a qualified approval "when recommended," as he expressed it, "with spirit and elegance." Johnson's own statement that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel" is a paradox of a sort.

The objections of the narrow, dogmatic rationalist are of another order. He sees in the paradox a simple flouting of logic. The law of contradiction is openly contravened; there is no more to say. This is, of course, to be desperately literal-minded and reminds one of the editor who wished to amend the text of *As You Like it*, so as to read "Stones in the running brooks, sermons in books." For the matter-of-fact rationalist or philistine the paradox is a mere *reductio ad absurdum*, and it is sometimes so employed by writers who are anything but philistine or matter-of-fact. Thus George Santayana, whose Latin lucidity of mind makes him tend to distrust the paradox as sophistry, while his literary taste leads him to reject it as meretricious ornament, nevertheless uses it occasionally to render his opponent's position logically ridiculous. He disposes, for example, of a rather tortuous and turbid argument of Royce about the necessity of evil in the world in order that we may have something to combat with these words : " It is right that things should be wrong, but it is very wrong of us not to try to right them."

Or consider the case of the English metaphysician, the late F. H. Bradley. I suppose that his philosophy is long since out of fashion, but his chief work, *Appearance and Reality*, deserves to survive at least as a superb piece of sinewy reasoning, for Bradley took his stand upon logic and insisted at all times on the rigour of the game. Believing that the one infallible criterion of ultimate reality is that it does not contradict itself, he reaches the conclusion that the sole absolute reality is the unified whole, whose parts are unreal in so far as they are falsely viewed in detachment from the whole. He finds our notions of space, time, things, even self and nature riddled by contradiction. Our simplest judgments, such assertions as " here I am," " there is a wall," " sugar is sweet," involve paradoxical self-contradictions; and a paradox cannot be real, it is a false seeming. Now Bradley was particularly skilful in pillorying his philosophical opponents and making them vitiate their own causes. Those who denounce metaphysics out of hand are driven to the paradox of saying, " You may satisfy your instinctive longing to reflect, so long as you do it in a way that is unsatisfactory." Of Herbert Spencer's Unknowable he remarks, " It seems a proposal to take something for God simply and solely because we do not know what the devil it can be." Eclecticism he characterises in the words " Every truth is so true that any truth must be false " ; and pessimism, " Where everything is bad, it must be good to know the worst " ; or " Where all is rotten it is a man's work to cry stinking fish." But the surprising thing is that Bradley went much further. This rigid logician was human enough to unbend in paradox about his own or congenial points of view. Here are some of his epigrams, for which one may predict a modified immortality, no matter what may happen to his system. " Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct."

" The world is the best of all possible worlds and everything in it is a necessary evil."

" Short of the Absolute, God cannot rest, and having reached that goal he is lost and religion with him."

And finally his credo, as he calls it : " To love unsatisfied, the world is mystery, a mystery which love satisfied seems to understand. The latter is wrong only because it cannot be content without thinking itself right."

The most amusing thing in this whole connection is the way the paradoxers themselves often insist on regarding other people's paradoxes as logical absurdities. G. K. Chesterton is surely the most arrant paradoxer in recorded time; yet in his *Everlasting Man* he says:

> "Men have insensibly fallen into turning this entirely negative term [the Missing Link] into a positive image. They talk about searching for the habits and habitat of the Missing Link as if one were to talk about being on friendly terms with the gap in a narrative, or the hole in an argument, of taking a walk with a non-sequitur, or dining with an undistributed middle."

Elsewhere in his works a statement of like tenor may be found about the "unconscious," upon which the psychoanalyst draws so heavily. But if Chesterton were on the other side of the argument, one can readily imagine the quite ingenious paradoxes he would devise to prove that the unconscious was precisely what we knew most about, or that the Missing Link was the most glaringly obvious of all physical data! The contemporary Spanish writer, Unamuno, is another worker in paradox. Yet he exposes what he calls "the tremendous tragedy of Spinoza's ethics" in this fashion:

> "What is this intellectual love (*amor intellectualis Dei*)? Something of the nature of a red flavour or a bitter sound, or an aromatic colour; or rather, something of the same sort as a love-stricken triangle or an enraged ellipse—a pure metaphor, but a tragic one!"

In point of fact the sheer paradox, unless it is seen as an illumination, must appear an absurdity. The unimaginative rationalist will therefore continue to regard it, at its mildest, as an unnatural use of the mind, and, at its worst, as a deliberate falsifying of thought itself. It would be useless to remind him of the point so well stated by A. N. Whitehead in his *Science and the Modern World*: "In formal logic, a contradiction is the signal of defeat, but in the evolution of real knowledge it marks the first step in progress towards a victory." Fortunately not all rationalists are narrow-minded. And though I think it can be abundantly shown that intuitive minds, mystics, romanticists, poets, spiritual thinkers in general, are most inclined to paradoxes, yet rationalists of the higher kind have not disdained them. I mean by a rationalist of the higher kind one in whom imagination and a sense of humour soften, so to speak, the mechanism of the intellectual process. Lessing seems to me one of the finest specimens of this higher type of rationalist, and Lessing was the author of two celebrated statements which were regarded as paradoxical in their day. He said:

> "If God held all truth shut in his right hand, and in his left hand nothing but the ever restless striving for truth, though with the condition of forever and ever erring, and should say to me 'Choose!'—I should humbly bow to his left hand, and say, 'Father, give! pure truth is for Thee alone!'"

The paradox, which has seemed to many unacceptable, lies in the impossibility of desiring truth and at the same time of being willing to rest in a condition of unsatisfied desire. Lessing's real meaning, I presume, is that the active love of truth is far better than a torpid and indolent acquiescence in true propositions. He meant to call attention to the essential characteristic of the love of truth, which is not the wish to possess something that we can keep within ourselves, but a wish to be possessed by something greater and nobler than ourselves. Kestner said of the young Goethe, "He strives for truth, but attaches more importance to the feeling for it than to its proof." Lessing's famous statement may be viewed as the prototype of many other paradoxes, in which the means are exalted above the end, the quest treasured more than the goal. The oft-quoted aphorism of Holderlin is the same in spirit: 'Wir sind nichts, was wir suchen ist alles."

Lessing was also the first to make a distinction between the Christian religion and the religion of Christ (*i.e.* the religion of love). In his suggestion that after centuries of unsatisfactory experience with the former, we now give the latter a trial, he anticipated by nearly 150 years Bernard Shaw's Preface to *Androcles and the Lion*, in which the same idea is advanced with such a parade of original discovery.

A point of some interest which has apparently escaped notice, though it certainly requires no particular discernment to find it out, is that while the self-contradictory paradox involves a temporary rejection or a willing suspension of logic, the paradox of opinion may on the contrary spring from excessive logicality, from the relentless pursuit of a single line of reasoning to the neglect of all other lines. In the one case you have inconsequence, in the other a sort of Calvinistic consistency. Yet the second is frequently, in the larger logic of life, the more untenable. I cite as an example Joseph de Maistre. Imbued with the notion of the guilty nature of man through sin, he became the vehement defender of autocracy, intolerance, persecution, war, the inquisitor and the common hangman in this life, and of hell fire in the world to come. The outcome of such thinking is a tragic mutilation of the human spirit. Joseph de Maistre's is, of course, an extreme case. But I believe that a strain of this unreasonable rationalism, if I may so term it, of this intense but narrow logic, enters also into the paradoxes of Rousseau, Nietzsche, Tolstoy and many others.

The true purpose of the self-contradictory paradox is to bring out some hidden or neglected aspect of the question; to reveal a new facet of truth; to stimulate a fresh idea by touching the nerve of surprise; to challenge and provoke by contradiction and thereby arouse the sluggish mind; to clinch an argument by a memorable phrase. It is the legitimate weapon of the innovator, the iconoclast, the blazer of new paths. It is also the natural instrument of anyone who has a fresh spiritual insight. It should occasion no wonder, therefore, that poetry is full of it, and religion also; and of religions, Christianity especially, and most of all, it seems to me, Catholicism. But the history of philosophy also may be viewed as one long wrestle with paradox, now succumbing to it, now apparently triumphing over it. It has been stated that paradox arises whenever the unity of mental life is broken. But what is more fragile than this unity?

> " A man's mind is so compounded of beliefs and unbeliefs, of convictions, probabilities and uncertainties of every degree of assurance and doubt—and these are blended together so indissolubly oftentimes, like the lights and shadows in a painting, being different aspects of the same truth, that it is almost impossible to eliminate any single conviction or non-conviction without doing violence to the rest."

Not only does life seem irrational, but human nature is at variance with itself, and in the seething and multiple welter that we call existence all those things that the reason detects as opposites appear conjoined and are so expressed in the paradoxes of the poets and the philosophers—nature and art, chaos and coherency, freedom and bondage, wisdom and folly, society and solitude, victory and defeat, excess and moderation, awareness and preoccupation, detachment and desire, pleasure and pain, good and evil, light and darkness, life and death, heaven and hell. A study of the subject leaves no doubt in my mind that in paradox (*i.e.* self-contradiction) we come very close to the heart of life itself.

The question of the resolution of the paradox presents many complications, some of which are not easy to disentangle. However, the vast majority of paralogisms are self-explanatory or very nearly so. The self-contradiction merely piques the intellect without baffling it. This is true of all the paradoxes so far quoted; it is true of virtually all those which have found their way into poetry; and it is, of course, pre-eminently true of those proverbs or current expressions which are cast in paradoxical form. Of these last there are more than might be suspected; such as: a distinction without a difference, extremes meet (les extrèmes se touchent), the beginning of the end, not to see the woods for the trees, the classic maxim "the half is more than the whole" (found in Hesiod's *Works and Days*, and perhaps a current proverb), festina lente (make haste slowly, Eile mit Weile), to agree to disagree, be conspicuous by one's absence, the longest way around is the shortest way home (*cf.* Count Keyserling's "The shortest way to myself was a journey around the world"), cruel kindness, the bitter-sweet of life, corruptio optimi pessima, le mieux est l'ennemi du bien, avoir les défauts de ses qualités, plus ça change plus c'est la même chose, etc., etc. In all these the solution suggests itself with little or no effort of thought. It is a mere play at self-contradiction.

On the other hand, in the paradoxes of philosophy and religion a real antinomy is presented which at first seems insoluble. In philosophy the usual procedure is to make a higher synthesis, in which the discords are resolved into grander harmonies. This, as is well known, is the Hegelian method, and it does not stop short of the Absolute, where, as Schelling is reported to have said, all cats are grey. This procedure, it is worth noting, is purely rationalistic. To anyone using it, the paradox will not be logically shocking but will simply appear as some new aspect of the subject which has not yet been properly correlated with established principles. But in religion or theology the case is somewhat different. There the antinomy is adjudged to be insoluble in terms of reason; the paradox is called a mystery; and the solution is transferred to the transcendental world, to the bosom of God, which may be assumed to be as ample as Schelling's Absolute.

There is a small remnant of paradoxes in which no solution is vouchsafed or even dimly promised. Some of them are avowedly cryptic; others are the expression of a dualism which seems to their authors to be the ultimate reality. I quote as examples :—

*Tertullian :* " Certum est, quia impossible est."

*Lady Julian* (an English mystic of the fourteenth century) : " Sin shall be no shame to man, but worship."

*Browning's* " Paracelsus " :

" The sovereign proof
That we devote ourselves to God is seen
In living just as though no God there were."

*Blake :* " Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires."

*Havelock Ellis :* " Without an element of the obscene there can be no true and deep æsthetic or moral conception of life."

*Unamuno :* " We may say that everything vital is anti-rational, not merely irrational, and that everything rational is anti-vital. And this is the basis of the tragic sense of life."

Also from Friedrich Schlegel this paradox about paradox, which is a hard nut to crack: " Paradox ist alles, was zugleich gut und gross ist."

In general, it seems evident that the more dynamic paradoxes are those which do not yield their meaning at once, but which intrigue and tantalise as well as provoke and challenge. Nor should it be forgotten that life, which is the great producer of paradoxes, is also the great solver of them. *Solvitur ambulando.*

The stylistic possibilities of the paradox may be briefly considered. The commonest form in which it is used as a rhetorical ornament is the figure known to the ancient as oxymoron. The word " oxymoron " itself, like the American word " sophomore," is a contradiction in terms. It means " pointedly foolish." An oxymoron is a figure in which an epithet of a contrary signification is added to a word. It is thus an abbreviated verbal paradox. Incongruous terms are joined so as to give point to the statement. In its simplest form it appears as an adjective and noun—a veritable *contradictio in adjecto ;* as for example, laborious idleness, masterly inactivity, proud humility, divine discontent.

Among the ancients, Horace was the particular master of this figure. Many of his oxymora have remained famous : " insanientis sapiential," " magnas inter opes inops," " dulce periculum," " simplex munditiis," and neatest of all, " splendide mendax " ; with which last may be compared Seneca's "gloriosum scelus," Cicero's "mentiri gloriose," Ovid's "pia fraus," and many phrases of modern English writers like Shelley's "faithless faith," Ruskin's "splendid avarice," Tennyson's "bright dishonour," and especially his celebrated couplet:

> "His honor rooted in dishonor stood,
> And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true."

Here also belong the qualities which Machiavelli lauds in his Prince: "frode onorevoli" and "sceleratezze gloriose." Saint Augustine, who is full of oxymora, has "insatiable satiety." Scaliger speaks of "urbane rusticity." English and other modern verse is full of these oxymora, many of them sudden daring phrases that have the full perfume of poetry in them. One may instance out of the hundreds: Milton's "darkness visible" and "the human face divine," Boileau's "stérile abondance," Sir Henry Wotton's "the rich attendance of our poverty," Thomson's "When unadorned, adorned the most," Herrick's "wild civility," Pope's "bookful blockhead, ignorantly read," Wordsworth's "luxury in self-dispraise," Goethe's "unsichtbar sichtbar," Blake's "speak silence with thy glimmering eyes," Meredith's "shrill hush of quietude," and Tennyson's description of Maud's beauty, as it first impressed the hero of the poem:

> "Faultily faultless, icily regular, splendidly null,
> Dead perfection, no more."

It is manifest that poetry would be sadly impoverished if these phrases were banished.

Although antithesis as a figure of speech is theoretically at the opposite pole from the paradox, since in the former the contrasted or opposed ideas are set over against each other so as to bring out the contrast most forcibly, as black against white, whereas in the paradox they are joined or mingled or identified, yet in practical usage these two extremes do meet. Lovers and users of paradox have nearly always been fond of striking antitheses also. Nor should this occasion surprise. If reason distinguishes opposites, life combines them. Moreover in an antithesis the two opposed terms are juxtaposed, and from juxtaposition to blending and perhaps to eventual identification is only a step. Victor Hugo, who of all men seems to have had most the taste for antithesis, whose mind revelled in violent contrasts, offers many examples of the combination in question. One may illustrate the possibility of transition from antithesis to paradox by choosing a famous example of the former, Horace Walpole's dictum, "The world is a comedy to those that think, a tragedy to those who feel." The idea is probably true psychologically, while the antithetical expression is certainly perfect technically. But as all men both think and feel, it follows that life is a tragi-comedy to every one. Here, for example, is a statement from Havelock Ellis, not made *à propos* of Horace Walpole, but entirely to the point nevertheless :

> "Thus Absurdity and Reason are inextricably intertwined into the structure of what we call Life, while yet remaining eternally distinct, and each only to be clearly seen while the other remains dim or unseen. So there arises a problem for every one who desires to see the world truly and see it whole. That involves the harmonisation of two discordant attitudes, for he who takes up one alone of these attitudes, whichever it may be, remains only half a human being. If he is only able to enjoy the absurdity of the world as Spectacle, or if he is merely occupied in solemnly striving to mould and cement it by Reason ; he is, in either case, a good half-man, but only a half-man. . . . To be the serene Spectator of the Absurdity of the world, to be at the same time a strenuous worker in the Rationalisation of the world—that is the function of the complete man. But it remains a very difficult task, the supreme task in the Art of Living."

There is an intimate connection between paradox and irony. Irony consists in saying one thing and implying another, in expressing one's meaning by language of the opposite tendency. We have here, then, the same combination of contraries that makes up the paradox of contradiction. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of the masters of irony from Socrates and Jesus to Ernest Renan and Anatole France, have also been paradoxers. There is, conversely, something in the duplicity of irony which proves attractive to the lover of paradox. Friedrich Schlegel felt this strongly. In elaborating his theory of romantic irony, he found a place for the paradox, and also exemplified it in his practice. Both were for him manifestations of *Willkur*, of the sovereign caprice which alone should govern the poet. Both were for him also ways in which the poet could show his superiority to his subject and to his readers. The extreme of this type of irony is reached in Heine, where it amounts to self-parody, a sort of transcendental buffoonery. Many passages in Heine where he suddenly turns on what has been called the cold douche, that is, where he falls abruptly from the sublime to the ridiculous, from pathos to bathos, moving and mocking our sensibilities in a breath, produce the effect of grotesque paradox. He says in one of his prose writings, "Apple-tarts were then (*i.e.* in my boyhood) my passion; now it is love, truth, freedom—and crab-soup." A poem of sentimental reminiscence entitled "Altes Kaminstück," ends with the lines:

> "Ach! da kocht der Kessel über,
> Und das nasse Kätzchen heult."

The same thing appears in lesser degree in Byron, especially in *Don Juan* and some of the letters. We are not far here from the notion of *épater le bourgeois*, which is so prominent an element in the paradoxes of literary dandyism.

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# PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT METAPHYSICS.

## EDMOND HOLMES.

PHILOSOPHY is "love of wisdom." Wisdom is the guiding light which shows us how to make the best of life. The fountain-head of wisdom is knowledge of reality. It is through experience that we gain knowledge of reality, learning little by little to distinguish higher from lower realities; or, in the language of dualism, reality from illusion. The philosopher seeks to gain wisdom by extending and deepening his knowledge of reality. And he seeks to extend and deepen his knowledge of reality by turning to account the various lessons of experience, by widening its range, by exploring its highways and byways, by acting on its hints, by following it into the depths of his own inner life.

In this work intellect plays an important but subordinate part. Its function is to discover and formulate such truth as can be presented for acceptance or rejection to the conscious mind. Hence it is most at home when it is dealing either (as in mathematics) with pure abstractions, in regard to which acceptance of certain premises carries with it acceptance of derivative conclusions, provided that the procedure of passing from premises to conclusions is correct ; or (as in physical science) with material things, things which can be closely observed and freely experimented with, things which can be weighed and measured and otherwise accurately surveyed, and the relations of which to one another can therefore be determined with more or less precision.

It follows that if intellect is to achieve success it must be content to work within comparatively narrow limits. Its contributions to philosophy are of great value. By coordinating the data of experience and bringing order and unity into their chaos, it makes the demand of experience for philosophical interpretation more insistent than it would otherwise be. Through the agency of physical science in general, and applied science in particular, it progressively widens and deepens our conception of the material world, extends the range and makes more complex the subject-matter of experience, and so starts the mind on fresh adventures, provides fresh material for the exercise of its perceptive and critical powers, quickens its imagination and stimulates its desire for knowledge of reality, or, in other words, its love of wisdom. But the direct pursuit of wisdom is not for it.

The metaphysician is not content to seek wisdom through an ever widening and deepening experience. He wishes to present it to himself as formulated truth. The way of experience is too long and too circuitous for him, and there is in it no promise of finality. He demands " consummation and rest," and he believes that these can be achieved. In his attempt to get to the bedrock of thought and things he examines the credentials of experience and finds them, from his own point of view, unsatisfactory. He is therefore ready to believe that the way of experience can be dispensed with, that experience can be transcended, and that by dint of abstract thinking, by sheer force of intellect, he can win his way to his desired goal.

Is this belief justified ? Let us see what a typical metaphysician has to say about his subject. " Metaphysics," says Bradley in *Appearance and Reality; a Metaphysical Essay*, which has been hailed as a masterpiece, " is an attempt to know reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply, or by fragments, but somehow as a whole." This is a definition of philosophy, not of metaphysics. It is possible to try to know reality, to study first principles, to try to comprehend the universe as a whole, by methods which are anything but metaphysical. Our author admits that it is possible " to reflect and ponder on ultimate truth—perhaps most of us do this—without being a metaphysician."

What, then, is it that differentiates metaphysics from other branches of philosophy ? Not the desire " to think about and comprehend reality," but the desire to do the business of thinking " properly " and " strictly," in accordance with " the principles of thought's own distinctive working." The disbeliever in metaphysics, whose arguments Bradley is refuting, " permits the exercise of thought as long as it is entangled with other functions of our being, but as soon as it attempts a pure development of its own, he prohibits it forthwith." He does well to prohibit it when it undertakes to solve the riddle of the Universe. The word "thought" has a very wide range of meaning, and Bradley's restrictive use of the word is a potential begging of a very large question. Thought is nearly always "entangled with other functions of our being." We think feelingly, gropingly, broodingly, intuitively, imaginatively, subconsciously, practically. Except when our actions are purely automatic, there is something of thought, something of implicit reasoning, in each of them.

What, then, is the "pure development" of thought of which Bradley speaks? What does he mean by the words "properly" and "strictly"? I presume that by thinking properly or strictly he means thinking *logically*, and that "the principles of thought's own distinctive working," by which the metaphysician is to be guided, are those which are set forth in the authoritative treatises on *logic*. In other words, what Bradley has in mind is not thought, as such, but conscious, intellectual thought—the thought which can follow the steps in its own processes, criticise these by reference to certain acknowledged principles, and present the results of its activity to the mind for deliberate acceptance or rejection. On the next page to that which I have been studying he defines metaphysics as "the intellectual effort to understand the universe." This definition is as true as it is concise, and I propose to take my stand on it.

"Intellect" is a species of the genus "thought." What differentiates it from other species of that genus is the use that it makes of logic. What is logic? Before I begin to consider this question, let me call attention to a later passage in Bradley~~'s book~~ which throws a further light on the aim and method of metaphysics and which will play an important part in my attempt to interpret the principles and determine the limits of logic.

> "Thinking is the attempt to satisfy a special impulse and the attempt implies an assumption about reality. You may avoid the assumption so far as you decline to think, but if you sit down to the game there is only one way of playing."

Did Bradley realise that in this sentence he had undermined the very foundations of metaphysics? The object of thinking (in the metaphysical sense of the word) is "to know reality"; and if "thinking" implies an "assumption about reality," which is binding on all who think, it is obvious that the metaphysical adventure is a farce and its issue a foregone conclusion.

And if you think at all your thought *must* move in this vicious circle. "If you sit down to the game there is only one way of playing." Metaphysical thinking is a game. I welcome this admission. And if you sit down to a game you must abide by its rules. But the rules of a game are arbitrary and man-made and are binding only on those who consent to play. They are not universally valid. They have not even any general significance. In a game one plays as a rule against an adversary, for the pleasure of playing and in the hope of winning. In metaphysics one plays a game of logical fence in the hope of defeating antagonists, actual or possible. But victory over a rival metaphysician is not the same thing as victory over the Guardians of the secret of the Universe. And the conclusions which the victorious metaphysician—and every metaphysician is victorious in his own eyes—claims to have established are in no way binding on "whatever gods may be." The attempt to think implies an assumption about reality, and that assumption determines the rules of the game; but it does not follow that it is true to the essential nature of Reality.

And what do those who play the metaphysical game dispute about? That they do dispute is certain. The history of metaphysics is the history of never-ending controversy. Why should this be so? The game has its own rules which all the players are supposed to observe. And those rules are determined by the assumption about reality which the playing of the game implies. What, then, is the bone of contention? I can only suppose that the different schools differ in their interpretation of the initial assumption about reality and therefore in their interpretation of the rules of the game. But is not the assumption about reality "the conclusion," as well as the foundation, "of the whole matter"? And, if so, does not the game consist in the players trying to interpret its rules? But a game whose rules are necessarily and everlastingly in dispute is no game. It is a mere whirlpool of confusion and strife.

What is the "assumption about reality" which is implicit, according to Bradley, in the "attempt to think"? By thinking Bradley means *intellectual* thinking. We have seen that what differentiates *intellect* from other species of the genus *thought* is the use that it makes of *logic*. What is logic? I asked this question and then broke away from it. I will now try to answer it. Logic is the science or quasi-science which attempts to formulate and systematise the laws that govern the operations of intellectual thought.

There are two main branches of logic, corresponding roughly to the two fields of mental activity in which intellect is most at home. Intellect is most entirely at home in pure mathematics, where the objects of thought are abstractions, and symbols take the place of words. There it is at its best, or at least its purest. The corresponding branch of logic is known as *deductive*, the movements of thought which it surveys and directs being downward—from admitted or established premises of a general character to particular conclusions. Intellect is at its second best, so to speak, in physical science, where the objects of thought are material things which can be closely and accurately scrutinised, and where the terms used, though not mere symbols, are what is called *technical*, having as a rule a narrow and rigidly defined range of meaning, from which the emotional element is entirely excluded. The corresponding branch of logic is known as *inductive*.[1] In it the mind proceeds from particulars to generals, from facts to laws. Its rules are less amenable than those of deductive logic to systematic exposition and authoritative formulation.

This is one reason why the metaphysician has no use for inductive logic. But there is another reason which lies deeper and counts for more. In inductive logic we start with experience and we end with experience. Experience provides us with the premises from which we draw our conclusions; and experience provides us with the means of testing our conclusions. The validity of experience is (provisionally) taken for granted. No attempt is made to analyse it into its constituent elements or to ask it for its credentials. It is for "pure thought" to do this. To determine the meaning and value of experience is one of the problems which the metaphysician attempts to solve. In his attempt to solve it he cannot well make use of the branch of logic which takes the validity of experience for granted. If his thought is to be "pure," if he is to think "strictly," "properly," logically, he must use as his instrument the other branch of logic, the branch which is known variously as *deductive*, *syllogistic*, *scholastic*, *formal*; the logic which makes internal consistency, correctness of procedure, conformity to its own rules, not conformity to experience, not ratification by sense-perception or (when this is unavailable) by intuitive conviction, the test of truth.

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[1] Induction, of a special kind, plays an important part in mathematics, and deduction, of a more or less informal character, is freely resorted to in physical science; but on the whole there is more of deduction than of induction in mathematics, and more of induction than of deduction in physical science.

This branch of logic centres in certain (so-called) Laws of Thought. These laws are supposed to govern all intellectual processes. In inductive logic they remain in the background. In deductive logic they fill the greater part of the stage. They centre in what is called the Law of Contradiction. According to that law we cannot in the same breath both affirm and deny. The same thing cannot at the same time be both A and not–A. According to an associated law the thing in question must be either A or not–A. According to another associated law, there can be no middle term between A and not–A.

Where, if anywhere, does this triune law hold undisputed sway? In mathematics, where pure thought finds its most congenial field, the authority of the law is challenged and even undermined by the mysterious paradox of "Infinity." Parallel lines never meet. Parallel lines meet "at Infinity." These propositions seem to contradict each other; but both are true. In physical science the range of the law is so severely restricted by practical considerations of various kinds, by the need for accuracy in definition and measurement, by recognition of gradation in the processes and tendencies of Nature, by the operation of the law of relativity, by the counteracting influence of the logic of life and growth, that though there may be no overt rebellion against its authority its writ cannot be said to run far. In the ordinary everyday affairs of life the law holds good within limits, but as a harmless truism rather than a necessary truth. So far as it does receive conscious recognition, it is (as we shall see) in imminent and deadly danger of being dualistically misinterpreted by popular thought.

Does the Law of Contradiction hold good when we are attempting the solution of ultimate problems? Does it suddenly acquire an authority so indisputable and so all-controlling that in the bare statement of it the solution of those problems is to be found? Is self-consistency the final proof of reality and truth? Is self-contradiction the final proof of unreality and untruth? *That the Real does not and cannot contradict itself, that it always is itself*, is "the assumption about reality" which, according to metaphysicians of the "Absolute" school, "the attempt to think" implies. In this assumption logic sets metaphysics its master problem, and in setting it solves it. The paramount law of thought becomes the paramount law of things.

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Are we to accept as conclusive this sudden and simple solution of the greatest of all problems? The logic of pure thought, the logic which centres in the Law of Contradiction, is the logic of Being, the logic of a static world. It takes for granted that things are as stationary as they seem to be to the careless or uninstructed eye. It was evolved before the idea of evolution had begun to dawn on human thought. And it is specially applicable to the material world, in which many things seem to stand still for long periods of time. But the world of our experience is a world of Becoming, not of Being. Pure Being, perfect self-consistency, is an idea of the human mind, an idea which, as far as we know, has no counterpart in objective reality. It is the foil to the idea of Becoming, the background against which the latter stands out and reveals itself to our thought. Or, again, it is the ideal goal of Becoming, the goal which the world-wide stream of Becoming is ever striving to reach, a goal which eternally attracts and eternally eludes. Or, once more, it is the sea into which the stream of Becoming is ever widening, a sea which is ever giving back what it receives, and which is therefore, though it seems to promise consummation, never self-consistent, never at rest.

The more deeply science penetrates the secrets of the Universe the more successful is it in exposing the imposture of immobility, both as regards individual things and as regards the world as a whole. Things that seem, for years and even centuries, to be solid, stable, self-consistent, self-same, are found, when analysed, to be in a state of perpetual whirl and flux. Not a single atom in the outward world is at rest, in the sense of being free from internal commotion, even for the smallest imaginable fraction of a second. The electrons of which each atom is composed are ever revolving round the proton, their central orb, and the rapidity of their movements baffles imaginative thought. All living things come under the Law of Growth, and growth involves perpetual change. The material world as a whole seems to come under the Law of Evolution; and evolution is growth writ large. And under the stress and the control of the Law of Evolution the world seems to be gradually spiritualising itself; so that in the spiritual world, if we may provisionally distinguish it from the material, Becoming is not merely the paramount law of things, but the very essence of their being; for growth is of the essence of life, and it is through the further developments of growth that life rises to the level of spirituality.

What place is there for the Law of Contradiction in a world of Becoming? "The same thing cannot at the same time be both A and not–A." There is a pitfall in the words "at the same time." There is no self-sameness in time. Not for a millionth of a second does time stand still. Each millionth of a second is the negation of its predecessor and of all its predecessors. It is through perpetual self-negation that the course of things affirms itself. It is through perpetual self-negation that each living thing affirms itself. It is through perpetual change of identity that identity is established and preserved.

What is an oak tree? Is it the acorn? The first green shoot that breaks through the clay? The sapling? The full-grown tree? Who can say? The growing plant is ever transcending itself, ever losing its identity, ever finding it. In each successive stage in its development it is, and it is not—itself. If it did not constantly disown itself it could not remain true to itself. Its "ideality" is the mainspring of its life.

Bradley does not need to be reminded that we live in a world of Becoming. He goes out of his way to convince us that all the objects of our experience are

> "Shadow shapes that come and go."

In the earlier part of his book he examines many claimants to reality, and in each case the claim is summarily rejected, the claimant is turned down as an impostor, is told that it contradicts itself and that its boasted reality is therefore "mere appearance." There is no stability in the world, as Bradley sees it, no consistency, no self-sameness. Everywhere and in everything there is "ideality," a capacity for and tendency towards "self-transcendence"; and ideality is a conclusive proof of self-contradiction, unreality, untruth.

Where, then, is reality to be found? In the Absolute, in the world regarded as a self-contained "individuality," as a perfect, an infinite, an all-embracing, a self-consistent whole. This is "genuine reality." The phenomenal world, the world of Becoming, is "mere appearance." Because it is ever becoming, ever transcending itself, we know it to be unreal.

The dualism of the phenomenal world and the Absolute is, I think, the most false and futile that the mind of man has ever invented. And the most unpractical. Whenever a serious attempt is made to think it out it breaks down and contradicts itself. Even when it is handled by Bradley, its ardent advocate, it makes demands on his philosophy which (as we shall see) he cannot meet, except at the cost of disowning his own first principles.

Dualism, which ends by giving us two worlds instead of one, and transferring reality from each of the worlds to the gulf that separates them, is the Nemesis of exclusive devotion to the logic of Being. The first thing which the Law of Contradiction demands from him who professes to obey it is that he should distinguish between *negation* and *opposition*. The slightest departure from A is not–A. A book may cost 5*s*. or 4*s*. 11*d*., but the same book cannot at the same time and in the course of the same transaction cost both 5*s*. and 4*s*. 11*d*. 4*s*. 11*d*. is *not* the same as 5*s*., but it is in no way opposed to it. Negation in this case is entirely different from opposition.

Let us take another case. "The same statement cannot be both true and not-true." Here the Law of Contradiction may hold good; but it may not. If it is to hold good the meaning of the word "true" must be rigorously defined. The statement must either be one as to a matter of material fact or belong to an exact science. If it is a statement as to a matter of general interest—political, let us say, or ethical or æsthetic—the chances are that the Law of Contradiction does not apply to it. The chances are that the statement is both true and untrue, true from this point of view, untrue from that, true in some degree, untrue in some degree. When gradation and relativity come into play the Law of Contradiction retires into the background. Truth and untruth may be mutually exclusive alternatives; but in the spheres of opinion they are, as a rule, correlated or polar opposites, each implying the other and drawing its meaning, in part at least, from the other, the two varying together in inverse proportion, while neither is ever met with in its ideal purity.

Language, as we know to our cost, abounds in pairs of antithetical terms, each of which stands for two correlated opposites. *Good* and *bad*, *high* and *low*, *large* and *small*, *wide* and *narrow*, *swift* and *slow*, *beautiful* and *ugly*—their name is Legion. To apply the Law of Contradiction, or either of its other selves, to correlated opposites—to say, for example, that every man is either good or bad, that every mountain is either high or low, that every work of art is either beautiful or ugly—is to talk sheer nonsense. But the temptation to talk such nonsense is very strong, and most of us succumb to it. The constitution of human speech is essentially dualistic. It cannot measure gradation except by the substitution, where that is possible, of symbols for words. It cannot, except by tiresome circumlocution, allow for relativity. Outside the limits of exact science, dualism in speech, if not unavoidable, is very difficult to avoid. Yet we ought always to be on our guard against it in the sense of not taking over-seriously the dualistic statements of ourselves and others. For the pity of it is that dualism in speech leads insensibly to dualism in thought, in feeling, in action. In the sphere of thought dualism is a fruitful source of error and confusion; in the sphere of feeling, of anger and hatred; in the sphere of action, of quarrels and wars.

In the ordinary affairs of life the confusion between negation and opposition is so common as to be almost unnoticeable. But one would have thought that the metaphysician, who prides himself on being strictly logical, would be on his guard against it. Yet nowhere is the temptation to think dualistically so overwhelmingly strong as in the sphere of abstract thought. For there, where we are dealing with our own ultimate, or at least ulterior, conceptions, where the terms that we use have a very wide range of meaning,[1] and where the corrective influence of experience is wanting, there is too often but a single step from negation to diametrical opposition or even to entire annulment, and that step may well be taken before the thinker has time to realise what he has done or to what he has committed himself.

For example: The *existence* of a certain book on a certain shelf is in dispute. The book is or is not on that shelf. It cannot be both on it and not on it. Here the Law of Contradiction holds good. But here "existence" means no more than *is-ness;* and the slightest deviation from is-ness is negation. In that sense of the word there can be "no medium between existence and non-existence." The word has, however, another and a widely different meaning. When Fr S. J. Hunter, S.J., tells us that "the creation of the substance of things must have been instantaneous because there is no medium between existence and non-existence," he is using the word in that other sense. Existence for him means *Being*, a world-embracing and world-affirming conception; and non-existence means *non-Being*, a world-embracing and world-denying conception; so that between these two alternatives—for such they are in the eye of the logician—the whole world-process intervenes. The dualism of existence and non-existence has widened out in an instant, in obedience to the logical Law of Excluded Middle, into the dualism of Everything and Nothing.

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[1] Where two words which seem to contradict each other have each a wide range of meaning, the normal relation between them, or rather between the ideas which they stand for, is pretty sure to be one of correlated opposition, not of negation. Where each has a world-wide range of meaning they cannot afford to deny each other; they are bound to co-operate even while they oppose each other. If they did not, the world would fall in two.

We see from this example that there is a fatal and irremovable obstacle to the successful advance of pure thought into the field of philosophical speculation—namely, the fluidity, the protean instability, of its terms. Pure thought is most at home in pure mathematics, where the terms used are *symbols*, which take the place both of words and things. In metaphysics the words that matter most, words that meet the thinker at every turn, are as far removed as it is possible to be from the status of mathematical symbols. Think of some of them: *soul*, *self*, *spirit*, *thought*, *feeling*, *will*, *happiness*, *goodness*, *truth*, *reality*, *world*, *universe*, *nature*, *God*. Will these, and the like of these, allow themselves to be degraded to the level of the alphabetical symbols of algebra or the diagrammatic symbols of geometry, so that pure thought, "guided by the principles of its own distinctive working," may be able to use them as counters in its speculative game? Have they not unfathomed depths and unexplored tracts of meaning, for the tentative apprehension of which are needed just those "functions of our being"—emotion, intuition, vision—from which thought must "disentangle" itself if it is "to attempt a pure development of its own"? Do not their meanings vary from age to age, from people to people, from person to person, from context to context? Are they not ever awaking trains of thought in every thinking mind, trains of feeling in every sensitive heart? Whatever pains the metaphysician may take to tie them down to the particular meanings which he may find it convenient to assign to them, they are too buoyant, too elusive, too much alive to submit to imprisonment in his—or any other—form of thought. He has no choice but to use them in different senses, even at the risk of contradicting himself and so forfeiting his claim to the consistency which he regards as the one sure proof of reality and truth.

In Bradley's monumental work we have convincing evidence of the inability of pure thought to resist the pressure on it of the immense and ever-increasing vitality of language. We have seen that for him the Real is the Absolute and that the phenomenal world, under all its aspects, is unreal. What is the relation of appearance to reality in his system ? In the first half of his book the two are undoubtedly alternatives, mutually exclusive conceptions. What is unreal is “ mere appearance.” Now the word “ mere ” means “ such and no more.” If the word is used, as it seems to be by Bradley, of set purpose and with due regard to its meaning, it emphasises the fact that the various aspects of the phenomenal world have in them no saving element of reality in other words, that they are purely illusory. If this is so there is no reality apart from the Absolute ; there is no middle term between the “ mere appearance,” the phantasmagoria, of the phenomenal world and the “ genuine ” o “ true ” reality of the Absolute.

But in that case why use the words “ mere ” an “ genuine ” ? If appearance and reality are mutuall exclusive, if each is the negation of the other, the mer naming of each is surely sufficient to distinguish it from th other ; and the words “ mere ” and “ genuine ” are therefor superfluous. But if the gulf between the phenomenal worl and the Absolute is indeed impassable, how is the latter, in which all reality is concentrated, to be made available for human needs ? How is the soul of man to be delivered from the toils of illusion ?

When Bradley begins to ask himself this question, a change, profound and far-reaching, comes over the spirit of his philosophy. He realises, for one thing, that the Absolute is beyond all relations, whereas “ thought is relational and discursive, and if it ceases to be this it commits suicide.” In order to escape from this deadlock he allows thought t commit suicide and then resurrects it as a “ higher unity,” in which “ *thought, feeling* and *volition* are blended into a whole.” “ This higher unity can find its Other in the Absolute.” Pure thought could not do so without committin suicide. It is a pity that Bradley did not begin with th higher unity, *this critical effort of the whole man*, when h undertook to solve the greatest of all problems. To allo thought to undertake that task, to accept its solution a adequate and then, when its inadequacy, *from the point view of thought*, makes itself manifest, to call in “ feeling and “ volition ” (from which thought had been careful “ disentangled ” at the outset), blend these with though and hand over to this “ higher unity ” the completion of th task which thought began, or rather the correction of th defects of the solution which it arrived at, was scarce worthy of a serious thinker. Least of all was it worthy the thinker who made inconsistency, self-contradiction, th one sure proof of unreality and untruth. If thought had need of feeling and volition at any stage in the process of thinking it surely needed them most at the beginning. To disentangle thought "from other functions of man's being" was Bradley's initial mistake. The task which he set thought demands the co-operation of all man's higher powers.

"Mere thought," which is, I presume, the same as pure thought, is identified in one passage with "one-sided experience." But one-sided experience is surely an inadequate base from which to set out on the greatest of all philosophical adventures. Can we wonder that the adventure, on Bradley's own showning, has proved a failure? The object of metaphysical speculation is to "know reality." To know reality is to know the Absolute, in which all reality is concentrated, and apart from which everything is "mere appearance." And to say, as Bradley does, that thought needs to be blended with feeling and will if it is to know the Absolute, is to admit that pure thought, on which metaphysics relies for its knowledge of the Absolute, has failed in the task which has been assigned to it.

Having undermined the foundations of metaphysics by exposing the inadequacy of disentangled thought as the instrument of metaphysical speculation, Bradley goes on to wreck his whole system by a tardy recognition of gradation in reality. In his use of such phrases as "mere appearance," "bare appearance," "genuine reality," "true reality," it is possible to see a faint foreshadowing of the idea of gradation, for if there is no gradation in reality the qualifying words "mere," "bare," "genuine," "true," have no meaning. But, again, it is possible to see in Bradley's use of those words a resolute insistence on the quasi-logical assumption that appearance and reality are mutually exclusive conceptions. It matters little which of these interpretations we adopt. What does matter is that, with the recognition of the idea of gradation, *appearance and reality cease to be alternatives and become correlated opposites*. The immense significance of this change seems to be lost on Bradley, but it cannot be too strongly insisted upon. It is a change from the logic of Being to the logic of Becoming, from the Law of Contradiction to the Law of Polar Opposition, from oscillation between alternatives to the mutual interplay of correlated opposites.

Let us see what the idea of gradation in reality involves. Before the idea dawned on Bradley's mind, appearance was one thing and reality another. Each negatived the other. Each excluded the other. Each was, as it were, complete in itself—complete in its nothingness or complete in the fulness of its being. With the introduction of the idea of gradation a change came over their relations, which was not the less significant because Bradley never realised its significance. Henceforth each implied the other. Each owed its meaning to the other. Each drew its right to exist from the other. Each was always associated with the other. Neither existed in its own right. Neither was complete in itself. Each in turn, when abstracted from the other, became an ideal, eternally approachable, eternally elusive, lost in its own infinitude—the infinitude of Being or the inverted infinitude of non-Being. In other words reality became the positive, appearance the negative, pole of a process—the world process, for it was nothing less than this. It was to the co-operation of these correlated opposites that the phenomenal world owed its being, and the various objects of our experience their respective degrees of reality.

Looking upward along the ascending stages of reality, one arrives at last at the idea of Ultimate Reality or Absolute Being. Looking downward one arrives at last at the counter-idea of Ultimate Unreality or Absolute non-Being. These are ideas, not experiences. Each in turn passes beyond thought, beyond imagination, into a darkness which we cannot penetrate. For us reality and appearance always co-exist. They vary together in inverse proportion, but neither can wholly dissociate itself from the other. There is no appearance which is "mere" in the strict sense of that much-abused word, no appearance which has not reality in some sort and some degree behind it. And there is no reality which does not reveal itself, which does not appear to us, which does not clothe itself in form in some sort and some degree.

How does Bradley reconcile the idea of gradation in reality with his conception of the Absolute? When he introduced the idea into his philosophy he ought to have realised that the Law of Contradiction was no longer binding on him as a speculative thinker, and he ought to have revised his conception of Ultimate Reality. Had he done so we should have heard no more of the Absolute. For it was when appearance and reality (as he thought of them) were mutually exclusive alternatives, when each was the negation of the other, that he elaborated his conception of the Absolute, the dualism of the phenomenal world and the Absolute being but a reproduction in quasi-concrete form of the fundamental dualism of appearance and reality. But he could not bring himself to abandon a conception which was at the very heart of his whole system of thought. The idea of gradation in reality was an afterthought forced upon him by the practical failure of his dualistic metaphysics, and instead of allowing it to revolutionise his philosophy, he so interpreted it as to bring it (as he imagined) into harmony with the central conception which it had in fact made untenable.

What conception had he formed of the Absolute? The Absolute, as he presents it to us, is " a single, all-containing individuality," a " system," infinite, perfect, real—real, in the fullest sense of the word, because it is self-contained and self-consistent, because it rests in itself, because it is entirely free from the taint of " ideality " or self-transcendence.

How does he know that it is " all-containing " ? Because he thinks of it as such, is the real answer to this question. But it is not the answer which, as a metaphysician, he is content to give. He " enquires if there is anything, which declines to take its place within the system of the Absolute," and satisfies himself that there is nothing. Of each thing in turn he reports that it *may* take its place in the " system," in the sense that there is no reason why it should not ; and as, according to his general principle, it, like all other things, *must* take its place in the system, the conclusion is inevitable that it *does*. " What *may* be, if it also *must* be, assuredly *is*." Or, in other words, " what is possible, and what a general principle compels us to say must be, that assuredly *is*." Here we have *must* working under licence from *may*. And a very doubtful *may* ; for, with his mind dominated by his " general principle," Bradley can scarcely be expected to deal impartially with the claim of this thing or that to fall outside the " system." Would it not have been better for him to take his stand firmly at the outset on his general principle and say that, since all things *must be* contained in the system of the Absolute, therefore they *are* contained in it ?

But if the Absolute is " all-containing," how can it be perfect ? In the world of our experience there is imperfection on every plane of its being. And it is scarcely a paradox to say that it is well that this should be so. Perfection in human achievement is somehow felt to be a defect. And not without reason, for it is the proof either of a narrow range of activity or of an ambition which aims low. The perfection of maturity in living things is the sure precursor of incipient decay. And in the world as a whole, though there seems to be a general movement towards a goal which we may perhaps think of as perfection, there is nothing to make us look forward to the goal being ever reached. Indeed the very remoteness of the goal is, in a sense, the secret of its attractive forc Is the attribution of perfection to the Absolute anythin more than a deduction from a metaphysical principle, fro the "assumption about reality" with which, as we hav seen, thought is armed when it enters the field of speculativ inquiry? I doubt if it is. The arguments by which it i supported are scarcely convincing.

For example, in this world of ours evil is set against goo and pain against pleasure. This is undeniable; but it doe not disturb Bradley's complacent optimism. "Because th Absolute cannot contradict itself and does not suffer a div sion of idea from existence, it has therefore a balance pleasure over pain. In every sense it is perfect." Th existence of a balance of pleasure over pain is proved by a appeal, not to human experience but to a metaphysical pri ciple. And because there is a balance of pleasure over pai therefore the Absolute is perfect. I cannot see the force this argument. If the amount of pleasure in the world we represented by the number 5001, and the amount of pain b the number 4999, there would be a balance of 2 in favour pleasure, as against a possible 10,000. I cannot see that s small a favourable balance constitutes perfection.

The truth is that in Bradley's description of the Absolute in his enumeration of its attributes, there is one word which stultifies all the others—the word *infinite*. It is in mathematics that pure thought (so far as thought can be pure) is i its happiest mood and does its best work. The "Infinity" the mathematician is the analogue of the "Ultimate Reality of the metaphysician. This will, I think, be admitted. An Bradley's name for Ultimate Reality is "the Absolute. That being so, it is instructive to note that "ideality" "self-transcendence" is of the very essence of infinitud The Infinite is that which eternally eludes us by eternal retiring into and beyond itself. May not one argue from th that self-transcendence is of the very essence of the Ult mately Real, and that the Absolute, with its suggestion individuality, all-inclusiveness, self-consistency and perfe tion, is a misleading conception, involving a fundamental false interpretation of reality. As the Infinite is "that whi is beyond any assignable quantity"—eternally beyond, f it ever recedes as we approach it—so the Ultimately Real that which is beyond any imaginable degree of reality. T Absolute is said to be self-consistent, all-inclusive, perfe On the analogy of the Infinite the Ultimately Real is n self-consistent, for it has never found and will never find i real (*i.e.* ideal) self. It is not all-inclusive, for it is ever transcending itself and therefore ever extending its "all." It is not perfect, for it is ever advancing towards a higher perfection. In perfection a process is *carried through* to its conclusion, and there it stays and would fain rest. A perfect world is a self-contained world. There is in it no saving grace of self-transcendence. But perfection is not perfection if it is content with itself and stands still. If it cannot rise above itself it loses its perfection. The moment of final attainment is the moment of incipient failure. When high watermark is reached the ebb has begun.

"Things won are done; joy's soul lies in the doing."

When Bradley worked his way to the idea of gradation in reality he ought, as I have said, to have revised his conception of Ultimate Reality. He ought to have realised that appearance and reality are correlated opposites, not alternatives, and therefore that the Ultimately Real is not an "individuality," not a "system," not "self-consistent," not "self-contained," not "perfect in all its details," but, on the contrary, is a self-transcending ideal lost in the darkness of its own infinitude. When a graduated process runs diameter-like through the heart of the world, its opposite ends are not limits, but poles, ideals—positive or negative—which pass beyond the range of experience, of thought, of imagination. And the interval between such and such a point on the ascending scale of the process, however relatively high that may be, and the positive pole is always infinite. When Bradley tries to reconcile the idea of gradation with that of perfection, the incongruity of the two ideas becomes apparent. He tells us that "the ultimate Reality, where all appearance as such is merged, is in the end the actual identity of idea and existence." In this formula the words "actual" and "in the end," with their suggestions of completion and finiteness, are significant. He goes on to tell us how gradation in reality is to be mêasured :

> "Throughout our world whatever is individual is more real and true; for it contains within its own limits a wider region of the Absolute and it possesses more intensely the type of self-sufficiency. Or, to put it otherwise, the interval between such an element and the Absolute is smaller. We should require less alteration, less destruction of its own special nature, in order to make the higher element completely real."

We need not pause to ask what the word "individual" means in this context. What is significant in the passage is the twofold assumption (1) that the various embodiments of reality in "our world" are separated from the Absolute by various measurable intervals—measurable, as is said elsewhere, by the "idea of perfect reality"; and (2) that by "alteration" this or that "element" or "principle," which is only partially real, can be made "completely real," can be made to attain to "actual perfection." This assumption involves a profound misinterpretation of the idea of infinitude. To speak of an "interval" between a subordinate element or principle and the Absolute is as though one should speak of an "interval" between a finite number and Infinity. If the interval is measurable—as it certainly is if the word "smaller" has any meaning, and if "alteration" can make what is partially real "completely real"—the Absolute is finite. There is no escape from this conclusion.

Try as he may to invest the Absolute with infinitude, the conditions under which our author thinks are too strong for him. The hybrid creation of his mind—hybrid because it is the offspring of feeling (though he does not realise this) as well as of thought—insists on clothing itself with limitations. Such phrases as "completely real," "actual perfection," "perfect Reality," "Concrete Reality," though he may have uttered them carelessly and without fully realising to what they committed him, betray the direction in which the central current of his thought is moving. Self-transcendence is of the very essence of infinitude, and self-transcendence is, for Bradley, the very proof of unreality. If the Absolute is infinite, it is ever passing beyond itself, ever advancing towards a higher perfection, ever becoming what it is not, ever contradicting itself, ever convicting itself of unreality. If, on the other hand, it is perfect and self-contained, if it is the last term in the ascending scale of reality, if there is nothing outside it, if it cannot transcend itself, it has achieved the finality which is the negation of infinitude. The two ideas—perfection and infinitude—may be forced by a metaphysical theory to dwell together in apparent amity within the sphere of abstract thought; but when freedom is restored to them by the working of the secret logic of the soul, they straightway fall apart, refuse to co-operate, refuse (one might almost say) to co-exist. And of the two it is perfection, not infinitude, which is of the inmost essence of the metaphysical Absolute. "The Absolute is perfect in all its details. It is equally good and true throughout."

We have seen that the logic which is dominated by the Law of Contradiction and its satellites is the logic of Being, not of Becoming. If Being could resolve itself into Becoming, if it could be realised that the inmost essence of Being *is* Becoming, the Law of Contradiction would cease to operate; for we should then understand that the world is for ever changing its identity, that at any given moment it both is and is not itself. The logic of Being, with its demand for internal consistency, freezes the world into complete immobility, the immobility of "perfection"; and the Absolute, a word which suggests finality and rigidity, and therefore awakes no emotional response, is a fitting name for that still and silent world. But it is only in the sphere of abstract thought that the flow of the world-wide river can be arrested. The moment we descend into the world of experience, the world of feeling, of action, of life, the ice breaks up and the river resumes its flow. And in its flow it sweeps away all the assumptions, all the arguments, all the conclusions of the metaphysician, and places the deeper realities which he thought himself competent to investigate beyond the reach of his conscious thought.

The distinction between conscious and subconscious thought is one which he may not recognise, but which he cannot, if he would, ignore. In metaphysics the conscious workings of the mind are controlled by the logic of Being, with its horror of self-contradiction and therefore of paradox, with its demand for consistency and its consequent banishment of imagination from the realm of speculative thought. But the subconscious workings of the mind are controlled by the logic of Becoming, by the actual pressure of experience—of our daily, hourly experience of this living, moving, evolving, self-transcending world—of experience acting by secret methods of its own on the brooding rather than the thinking mind. Hence the inconsistencies in which the metaphysician is sure, sooner or later, to involve himself, inconsistency being, *on his own showing*, the final proof of unreality and untruth.

In the Preface to his book Bradley tells us that he came across the following sentence in one of his notebooks: "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find those reasons is no less an instinct." But surely if the reasons are bad one must reject them and seek better. And if the best of reasons are still bad one must never "count oneself to have apprehended." There is a sentence in the same Preface in which the metaphysician is warned against taking himself over-seriously: "The metaphysician . . . like other men, forgets the narrow limitations of his own special province, and filled by his own poor inspiration, ascribes to it an importance not its due." These are wise words. Why did not their writer pay heed to them? As a typical metaphysician Bradley does undoubtedly take himself very seriously. He allows his mind to be dominated by his own arguments, and accepts as conclusive "reasons" which, as he reminds himself in a moment of illuminating candour, are necessarily "bad." Also, though he recognises that his "special province" has "narrow limitations," he does not allow this obvious disability to deter him, *as a specialist*, from the attempt to solve the greatest of all problems, from the research of ultimate truth. On the contrary, he insists that for the research of ultimate truth specialisation in metaphysics is indispensable: "To be in earnest in metaphysics is not the affair of perhaps one or two years, nor did anyone ever do anything with such a subject without giving himself to it." Nor does he find any place for *philosophical* speculation outside the "narrow limitations" of metaphysics: "So far as philosophy is religious . . . it has ceased, as such, any longer to be philosophy. . . . Its essence clearly must be confined to intellectual activity." The significance of this remark will become apparent when we remind ourselves that in his first chapter Bradley defined metaphysics as the "intellectual effort to understand the universe."

Is it not this insistence on the purely intellectual character of philosophy, this assumption that the research of ultimate truth must be carried on within the narrow limits of a "special province" of man's mental activity, which is responsible for the failure of metaphysics—I will not say to solve the problem that it sets itself, for the problem is insoluble, but—to accomplish a single stage in its journey towards its goal, or even to clear the ground for its adventure? And, if this is so, may we not infer that philosophy must disentangle itself from metaphysics if its quest of wisdom is not to miscarry at the outset?

EDMOND HOLMES.

LONDON.

# PHYSICS AND GOD.

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PERHAPS the most obvious feature of the relation between religion and science is that in fundamentals there is no possibility of conflict. Science is the investigation of the processes of nature by reasoning based on sense observations. Religion is a supersensual experience which defies precise definition. It is impossible that two such dissimilar human impulses can interfere with one another until they have advanced from their sources into common ground. The fact that one man has seen a planet contains no germ of reason for denying that another has felt a peace which passes all understanding. Science must proceed from the particular observation to the general law, and religion must become in some degree rationalised, before conflict, real or apparent, is so much as conceivable. The first stage in the rationalisation of religion is the belief in the existence of God, and at first sight it appears inevitable that in advancing thereto religion must cross the path of science. For even if we understand by God nothing more specific than the source of our spiritual life, it is clear that such a Being cannot fulfil His function without having some kind of influence on everything that affects us. He cannot therefore be entirely dissociated from the material world, and a thorough-going examination of that world, such as science appears to be capable of undertaking, should in some manner light upon Him if He is there to be found. It is the purpose of this article to trace, in the broadest outline, the course of development of physical science, in order to see how far this apparent possibility has been or can be realised.

In the period following the Renaissance, when science began to assume the prominent position it now occupies in the intellectual world, its activities were largely confined to the accumulation of observations. The scientific man was one who saw and recorded what happened in nature. Tycho Brahe compiling the Rudolphine tables, Galileo watching the falling of bodies to the ground, are outstanding examples. It was quickly realised, of course, that the observations were not unrelated to one another. Tycho's measurements were summed up in Kepler's laws, which themselves were correlated with Galileo's observations by Newton's great generalisation. But still, scientific statements were simply accounts, in more or less concise terms, of what was observed to happen to bodies with which everyone was familiar and which everyone could observe for himself. Science was literally "organised common sense," and its ultimate completion and perfection could be conceived as consisting in the discovery of the existence and behaviour of every observable body in the universe.

No thought was entertained of unobservable bodies. If God was to be found in the universe, he might be expected to appear, not as the product of a process of analysis, but as the author and organiser of the newly revealed harmony which was found to pervade the world. His relation to nature would be that of transcendence, not that of immanence. Thus, Kepler beheld with rapture the regularity which he had found in the motions of the heavenly bodies, and felt that he was thinking God's thoughts after Him. Many since Kepler's day have experienced the same emotions and drawn the same conclusions, but on the whole the conception of the "reign of law" in nature has had the opposite effect. There is an element of blindness and indifference about inexorable laws which is not readily accommodated to the character of the religious experience, and evidences of God's presence in the world have been sought in violations rather than exemplifications of natural laws. "Miracles" have been looked for—interruptions of the order of nature which cannot be accounted for without admitting the voluntary intervention of a controlling intelligence such as was universally believed to take place before the conception of an order of nature arose. God could reveal Himself in the exception rather than in the rule. It is needless to say that this reaction to the new outlook was not the most powerful at the beginning. All other considerations were lost in the discussions (relatively unimportant from the religious point of view) which involved the persecution of Galileo and others and constitute one of the greatest of the occasional battles between science and religion. But those discussions have long passed into the dimness of historical curiosities. The lasting legacy of the renaissance of science has been the difficulty of admitting the existence of a Law-giver who cannot break His own laws to achieve His desires.

The fundamental misconception from which this difficulty arises is the interpretation which has been put upon the word "law." It has been wrongly regarded as analogous to a civic law, implying a law-giver and the possibility of infringement. Actually, however, scientific and civic laws have nothing whatever in common. A scientific law is simply a statement of what is observed to happen; a civic law is an instruction to be obeyed. If the movements of a planet are not in accord with a scientific law, the law is altered to make them legal. If the movements of a person violate a civic law, it is the person who is taken in hand, not the law. We often wrongly say that a delinquent breaks the law of the land; what we should say is that the law breaks him. But it is a literal truth that the planet Mercury broke Newton's law of gravitation—broke it beyond possibility of repair—and it is unthinkable that any astronomer therefore regards Mercury as a delinquent. Any conclusion, therefore, made possible by virtue of an implied analogy between scientific and civic laws is invalid. In particular, the notion of a miracle as an exception to the laws of nature is a complete delusion. An exception to the laws of nature cannot occur, because the laws of nature are statements of occurrences and must therefore automatically include the miracle. They imply the existence neither of a law-giver nor of anything else that is not explicitly contained in them. The achievements of science in the direction of revealing a harmony or rhythm in the observed events of the universe throw no light on the question of the existence of God, not because they have not been carried far enough, but because it is not in their nature to do so.

But science soon learnt to apply other methods to the study of its data. A time came when physics could no longer restrict itself to the direct statement of the results of observations. The physical properties of bodies, for example, showed a variety which admitted of no kind of correlation in terms of the observations themselves, and if physics had refused to extend its activities beyond their original limits there would have been some justification for Keats's remark about "the dull catalogue of common things." Physical science would have consisted of an indefinite number of isolated facts, such as that air was compressible but wate was not; that heat turned a quantity of ice into a smalle quantity of water, and a piece of iron into a larger piece o iron; and so on. Such a science would have been intolerable Some kind of correlation was imperative, and science adopted the device of the "hypothesis" or "theory." Unobserved particles known as "atoms" or "molecules" were postulated, of which all bodies were conceived to be composed. The diversity of physical properties could then be unified by employing the various possibilities of aggregation, motion and other modes of behaviour inherent in this conception. The compressibility of air, for example, was attributable to the closer packing of the molecules under pressure, while the incompressibility of water would be due to the molecules being already in contact with one another. It was not possible at first to bring chemical facts within the same generalisation without assuming the existence in nature of a large number of fundamentally different particles, and it has been left to recent times to show how this number can be reduced to two. That, however, is a minor point. The decisive step that had been taken was the employment of unobserved entities in order to systematise the results of observation. Science had definitely transcended the simple observation of nature.

The new departure gave rise to a new hope. If unobservable entities were accessible to science, there was every reason to believe that there might be a scientific solution to the final problem of theology. If a transcendent God was hidden, an immanent God might be disclosed. To realise the position it is necessary to understand what form this new conception of a scientific hypothesis took in the minds of physicists of the last century, for although it takes another form now, the older idea still reigns unchallenged in the minds of many thinkers who are not physicists. In the first place there was no ambiguity in the question, Is such and such a hypothesis true or not? In the example we are dealing with it simply meant, Do atoms and molecules actually exist or do they not? No philosophical difficulties were conjured up by the word "existence." It merely meant existence in the sense in which observed bodies are said to exist. The question whether the molecule of iron was real was simply the question whether the molecule of iron had the same kind or degree o reality as the piece of iron which could be seen and handled Hence the familiar question, "Is it only a theory or is i proved?" had a definite meaning, and was regarded as th ultimate and most significant question concerning a theor that could be proposed. It must be confessed, however, that the precise kind of demonstration that would constitute "proof" was not always clearly understood.

With this view of its character a hypothesis could properly be looked upon as an "explanation" of phenomena. It was legitimate to say that iron expanded when it was heated "because" the molecules were driven further apart. The observed expansion was an "effect," of which molecular motions were the "cause." This kind of language was not merely a convenient form of expression; it was to be taken literally, and no distinction was drawn between the kind of causality exemplified in the molecular movements and in the creation of the world by God. It was conceivable that the existence of God would be demonstrated as the only possible explanation of physical facts. Thus, Lagrange remarked that the hypothesis of God was one that explained much, although, as a matter of fact, he did not find it necessary to employ it. The assumption implicit in this language is clearly that the scientific device of the hypothesis was a method capable of leading to absolute truth, to the ultimate source of all things, and it was only too easy a step from this to the corollary that until it so led, belief in an Absolute was merely superstition. Lagrange, it is true, lived in a generation earlier than that of which we are speaking, but his conception of scientific truth is fairly representative of the dominant thought of the nineteenth century.

The world of nature which was the object of the scientist's investigation was thus regarded as being composed of observable and possibly unobservable entities. One is justified in saying "unobservable," and not merely "unobserved," because the correlation of observations through the conception of atoms was found to be possible only when the atoms were regarded as so small compared with the wave-length of light that they could never be seen, whatever improvements in the construction of microscopes might be made. This fact illustrates the degree of transformation that science had undergone from its original character. But one thing was universally assumed; namely, that if atoms could not be observed, they could be imagined. Since they partook of the same nature as the observed world, they could be pictured in the mind in terms of concepts embodied in observed things. An important part of the task of physics was to form *models* of things which could not be observed, which would differ from the things themselves only in the scale on which they were built. Thus, in a hackneyed passage, Lord Kelvin pronounced all knowledge which could not b embodied in a model as meagre and unsatisfactory.

But the time has now come when even this idea must b given up. The essential characteristic of the latest conception of scientific truth is the abandonment of the insistence on the imaginability of hypothetical existences. This is most strikingly exemplified in the attempt to form a conception of the atom which will correlate the ever-growing mass of observations which refined physical experiments have made possible. In the execution of this task, physicists have gradually been forced to the conclusion that such a conception cannot be formed in terms of familiar objects. It appears that the atom can be represented only by a set of quantities to which numerical values can be attached, but which cannot be regarded as corresponding to anything that has entered into our experience. We shall see how this has come about, and what appear to be some of its implications, but first of all it may be well to point out that it is, after all, only what might have been expected. All our familiar concepts are derived from material bodies, which, by hypothesis, are aggregations of billions of atoms. Is it likely that the characteristics of a single atom will be expressible in terms of the properties of such crowds? Suppose an intelligence unacquainted with humanity is asked to describe a human being in terms of his observations, from a distance of several miles, of the football cup final at Wembley. He may achieve some measure of success. He may, for example, conclude that a man is a being who can make a noise, move about, and exert a force on external objects. But what will he know of our more subtle characteristics—our sense of humour, our dyspepsia, our religion? How will he describe these, and a multitude of other personal qualities, in terms of attributes of the crowd? It is obviously impossible for him to do so. How, then, can we hope to construct a mechanical model of the atom?

When the atom was first introduced into exact science, it was pictured as a very simple thing—an elastic solid sphere, like a billiard ball. It was not supposed, of course, that this was a complete model. It contained nothing by which the atoms of different elements could be differentiated from one another, and gave no account of the mysterious properties of cohesion and chemical affinity. But it was not on that account regarded as false. Further discoveries might succeed in amplifying the model so as to remove these defects without introducing any radical modification; for example, the atoms of different elements might be distinguished merely by the sizes of the spheres. No facts were known to be definitely at variance with the conception, and it was therefore universally adopted. The atom, in fact, was correctly named; it was something which could not be cut.

At the close of the nineteenth century, however, a great change took place. Facts were discovered which were irreconcilably at variance with the elastic solid model. Particles were detected containing only about one two-thousandth part of the mass of the lightest atom known—that of hydrogen. These fragments could be knocked off the atoms of all elements, and were found to be simply electricity, of the kind arbitrarily known as *negative*. The atom, then, contained negative electricity in its structure. But since ordinary matter is not normally charged with negative electricity, and is nevertheless built up of atoms, the atom must contain positive electricity as well, sufficient in quantity to neutralise the effect of the negative electricity at any appreciable distance. Instead of a simple sphere, it was necessary to conceive of an aggregation of positive and negative electricity, the latter of which, at least, was composed of little unit quantities—the fragments which had been isolated, which were known as *electrons*. The task of physics was then to imagine a particular kind of aggregation which would behave just as the " billiard ball " had been conceived to do with respect to those phenomena which it had been able to " explain," and would further, if possible, provide an account of observations with which the older model had been unable to cope.

The model which eventually gained acceptance was somewhat like the solar system. It is perhaps speaking a little disrespectfully of the venerable and ubiquitous atom to say that it is built on the lines of an inconspicuous and relatively newly-born member of the stellar universe—rather like telling a man he is an imitation of his photograph. However, the illustration has been universally used and is certainly difficult to improve upon. In the new model of the atom, the sun was represented by a *nucleus*, consisting of a collection of electrons and particles of positive electricity (protons), with a predominance of the latter. The planets were electrons, and there were just enough of them to neutralise the surplus of positive electricity in the nucleus. The proton was equal and opposite to the electron in electric charge, but was nearly 2,000 times as massive, so that almost the whole of the mass of the atom resided in the nucleus. The atoms of different elements were distinguished by the net amount of positive electricity in the nucleus, and accordingly by the number of planetary electrons also.

With such a model in its hands, physics became rejuvenated. Phenomena which the billiard ball atom had been hopelessly inadequate to deal with were brought within the general scheme of physical thought and related to other phenomena with which they had had no apparent connection at all. One of the most important applications of the new model was to the problem of the light radiated by incandescent gases. Each gas was known to give its own characteristic "spectrum," *i.e.* to radiate its own peculiar collection of light-waves. The difficulty was to fathom the atomic processes which produced this result. The success with which this problem was attacked was so great that it would have been almost incredible twenty years earlier; it was so great, in fact, that it may be said without meaningless paradox to have been equalled only by its failure. For what happened was this. The model was capable of accounting for the whole process of spectrum emission in such detail as successfully to predict refinements previously unsuspected, provided it were allowed to work according to laws not merely different from the already accepted and widely verified electro-magnetic laws, but actually at variance with them. We can perceive something of the reluctance with which physicists abandon the use of mental pictures when we reflect that for something like thirteen years they continued to operate the solar system model of the atom by illegitimate movements rather than give up a conception for which no satisfactory substitute could be found. Two utterly inconsistent sets of laws—the "classical" laws and the "quantum" laws—were employed concomitantly, each for its own set of physical phenomena. As one physicist aptly expressed it, the classical laws were used on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, and the quantum laws on Tuesdays Thursdays and Saturdays.

Such a state of affairs, of course, could not be permanently tolerated. It was confidently hoped that one day the groups of laws would be reconciled, or one of them found unnecessary. What has actually happened is that the model has had to be given up. When forced to extremes it has been found incapable of producing all the results which are observed in nature, and means have been found of reconciling the quantum and classical laws which require its rejection. A system of mechanics, more fundamental than either the classical or the quantum mechanics, is growing up, which expresses itself in terms not of familiar figures or movements, but of abstract concepts which can scarcely be called symbols, since they do not symbolise anything imaginable. What was formerly regarded as the radius of an electronic orbit, for example, is now represented by the letter “r.” Its behaviour is rigidly defined, but only in terms of mathematical relations, not of what are ordinarily regarded as physical processes, because it does not behave like any physical or geometrical figure that we can conceive. The atom is now a set of metrical concepts with prescribed properties, and only their association with one another in certain defined ways corresponds to the quantities which we observe and measure, such as that which we call the “wave-length” of the light the atom emits. The actual is literally evolved out of the idea.

It must not be imagined that physicists will henceforth abjure, curse, and detest the solar system model, as Galileo was ordered to treat the Copernican heresy. They do not for all purposes employ only the most generalised conceptions they have arrived at, any more than do ordinary people. We do not say the earth has reached a certain position angle in its diurnal rotation; we say it is sunrise. And in the same way the physicist still thinks of electrons in orbital motion in atoms in order to elucidate many of the phenomena with which he has to deal. During the last fifteen years he has been building a stately palace on a foundation of sand. Now he has discovered a stratum of solid rock, but it supports as yet no superstructure. It is not to be expected that he will remain homeless while the new mansion is being built.

Now what does all this mean? Science, which began with simple observation of nature, discovered that by the method of hypothetical reasoning it could effectively so enhance its powers of observation as to witness the smallest and the largest, the earliest and the most remote, of nature's phenomena. It caught the vision of a time when the world would lie bare before it—an infinite expanse made up of infinitesimal units which, working by inexorable laws, could be watched eternally grinding out the cosmos. In its zeal to arrive at this supreme moment, it analysed and theorised until at length the secret of its mighty atom is exposed, and lo, it is nothing but mathematics! All that has been regarded as substance has melted into form; the means of research has become the end of research, and a single alif has turned out to be, not merely the clue to the treasure-house but the treasure-house itself. What is the meaning of all this from the point of view of the question with which we are concerned?

It means that all that can come from the ultimate analysis of the material world is a set of numbers. This conclusion rests, not on the assumed validity of the present tentative conceptions of the atom, but on the general fact that physicists have turned away from imaginable representations as inadequate for their purpose, and have definitely accepted mathematical analysis as a more fundamental process than model-making. In his amusing satire, *The Absolute at Large*, Karel Capek imagines the construction of a machine for producing energy by the destruction of matter. The machine works, but accompanying the operation there is a totally unforeseen liberation of God, the Creator, the Absolute, Who has been inherent in the matter from the beginning. God is thus set free in the world to work His will. But this *Deus ex machina* turns out to be simply a machine Himself, working with boundless energy but without discrimination or intelligence. In a somewhat similar fashion the idea that God can come out of a theoretical analysis of matter has reached an anti-climax. All that can be attained is a *Deus ex æquatione*, with the character of an arbitrary constant. But the scope and limitations of theoretical science can be fixed with a precision hitherto impossible, and at the same time its relations with other forms of spiritual and intellectual activity become clarified.

Nothing is clearer than that the older conceptions of scientific truth which have been outlined must be rejected. To put it somewhat crudely, the essential aim of science is to discover not how many things there are in the world, but what kind of relation exists between one thing and another. The hypothesis of the atom is significant, not because it brings about the discovery of some entity not previously suspected in nature, but because it provides a means of successfully associating with one another observations which are superficially independent. A hypothesis is " true " in so far as it is successful in correlating observations, and it is no more an explanation of the observations than the word " rose " is an explanation of certain visual and olfactory sensations that might enter into my experience. That word, speaking loosely, might " explain " to another person why I would rather sit in a garden than in a coal-cellar, because it associates my observations with some previous observations of his own, but all the same, a rose by any other name would smell as sweet.

The significance of scientific progress must now be contemplated from an entirely different standpoint from that which in the past has commanded the spectacle of science and religion at strife. The content of a scientific hypothesis is entitled to whatever value it may possess, not through being a part of the world of potentially observable entities, but because of its power of welding together observations apparently disjoined. The recognition of this power is, of course, not new, but what the recent developments of physics have revealed are its value and import, and the relative insignificance of the kind of truth implied in the old question, Is the hypothesis true ? We can realise now that the atomic theory tells us nothing about the nature of matter, but a great deal about the connection between the observable properties of one piece of matter and those of another. As scientists we can no longer dare to write on the nature of things, but we can become eloquent on the relations between things.

Science visualises the world of our common sensory experience as a multitude of discrete observations inextricably enmeshed in a network of relations. The problem of the essential character of the observations she hands over to metaphysics; her concern is with the network. It is probably the faith of most scientists that the whole of external nature is involved in the meshes, and this is sometimes expressed by saying that science rests on the assumption of a world order. I am not convinced that this statement is justified. The degree of relatedness which science has so far discovered in the world appears to be a definite acquisition of knowledge, for which she is unbeholden to any assumption. I can see no valid reason why she should reject it if it should turn out to be impossible to involve all phenomena in the same network. Nor do I see any necessity to suppose that a common network inevitably exists. We like to think of the ultimate uniqueness and universality of scientific laws, but inasmuch as we are seekers and not creators we can have no certainty in the matter.

So far as physics is concerned, the one thing that we can at present say about the network is that it can be represented by numbers, real or imaginary. If all our observations were physical, our watchword might be, Back to Pythagoras. But it is not yet clear that all observations can be represented by physical concepts. In order to relate together such observations as the texture of a rock in the Fayum and an elephant in the Zoo, biology has introduced a hypothesis which is not so far demonstrably metrical in character. Nor are the events connected with the migration of birds, the division of cells, and the desire of the moth for the star certainly involved in a maze of numbers. We cannot yet assert that the whole round world is every way bound in a single connecting frame. But it does seem justifiable to extend to the scientific investigation of all events of the purely automatic type, such as those just mentioned, the view of the nature of scientific truth at which physics has been the first to arrive. In the organic as well as the inorganic world, the scientific method is capable of relating, but not of analysing, observations. Whatever spiritual reality may underlie the events of nature is eternally inaccessible to science.

There can thus be no direct collision between the idea of God and the demands of science. Any apparent clashing that may occur must involve false deductions from the basic principles of one or the other. Whether God be immanent or transcendent or illusory, He must remain for ever unilluminated by the scientific torch. The "single alif" which turns out to be the treasure-house is no clue to the Master.

Whenever science speaks in terms of unobserved existences, it is speaking in metaphor. The ultimate products of its analysis are not of the nature of things which can be experienced, but of things which can be thought. Its truth is the truth of art, not that of philosophy, and certainly not the truth of which Pilate vainly sought the meaning. It is a fascinating task to trace the relations between science and art as alternative representations of nature, but to venture on it here would take us too far from the main point of this article. It is a subject for independent consideration.

Long ago the greatest of religious teachers declared that the kingdom of God cometh not with observation. Eighteen hundred years later, one of the greatest of scientists declared that he had no need of God on his hypothesis. It is possible to construe the first of these utterances as a condemnation of science by religion, and the second as a condemnation of religion by science, but to do so would be to obscure the vital fact that they are in obvious and perfect accord. We have now reached a much more advanced phase of the controversy between religion and science. Before prolonging a discussion which it is difficult to preserve from partiality and bitterness, might it not be well to see whether the opposing parties are not saying the same thing with differing balance of emphasis?

LONDON. HERBERT DINGLE.

# LABOUR A MANIFESTATION OF GOD.

## W. R. LETHABY,

Architect.

LABOUR has made the world as we know it. It has built our cities, and it maintains them day by day; it is the largest thing we know, the great foundation of all our lives. Only by improving and heightening this common ground can we better and lift ourselves as a community. We are all one body. My purpose here has nothing to do with current labour problems, politics, economics or philanthropies; it is only concerned with labour as we are all concerned with it, as a great function of our common life. I want to do nothing less than to consider labour as a manifestation of God.

What sort of world do we wish for? We all agree in the most general terms that we would like the world of men to be good, prosperous and happy; but what are the most immediately necessary steps towards the realisation of such desires? What shall we best aim at for the ennobling of civilisation as a whole? The ennobling of civilisation is what we aspire to and strive for.

My own suggestion is this: That which in our particular time is first needed, after the great idealisms—if indeed it be not one of them—is a transformation of our minds in regard to labour. Our neglect to think about it, our fear of it, and flight from it must be faced. We have to create a psychology for, instead of against, bodily toil—the will to work. Part of this transformation is to be brought about by approaching labour as Art.

Our words are so worn by use and misuse that it is very difficult to pass thoughts from mind to mind. What sort of impression do the words "labour" and "art" make on most men? These words are symbols covering great realities and ideas—possibly they are among the ideas that in an age of wisdom would evoke deepest responses. I often think that we need a closer early introduction to a wider range of potent and serious words than is now common, to make appeal to diverse minds. One particular word-idea well explained might unlock and clear some group of young hearts that no other could reach. Now I want special sympathetic interest in the two words "art" and "labour."

By art I mean a normal factor and function of all right labour—something like mind and heart embodied in worthy toil. Ruskin and Morris would have been ready to define it as joyful labour. As Ruskin said, "Life without industry is guilt; industry without art is brutality."

Art is not a style, a pattern, a taste; it is a spirit, the spirit of full and happy labour.

Our modern view of art that it is amusement and luxury, which may be restricted to a few narrow fields, has sprung less from Puritanism than from the pressure of steam commercialism backed by the political economists who wanted man's labour net and in the mass, without any "nonsense" about mind or contentment. This modern view that art was only to be preserved as a luxurious amusement for the financial world is well brought out in Carlyle's description of grand opera:

> "The explosion of all the upholsteries. The modern aristocracy of men had brought the divinest of its arts, heavenly music itself, and piling all the upholsteries and ingenuities that other human art could do, had lighted them into a bon-fire to illuminate an hour's flirtation of lean domestic dandies. Never in nature had I seen such waste before. Music has for a long time been avowedly mad, divorced from sense and fact, and runs about now, as an open Bedlamite, bragging that she has nothing to do with sense and fact, but with fiction and delirium only."

An admirable account this of the tenuous modern theories of æsthetics which were founded after isolating art sensations from use and service.

Art is best thought of as full work of high quality. Even the words "high quality" may take a mechanical sense, as something that will not easily wear out, but I mean work saturated with intelligence and suffused with heart—work of high *human quality*. Art as well as speech is a means of expression; it teaches. A work so soon as it is complete turns round, as it were, and looks at the maker. In saying this I am reminded that Ruskin wrote, "Painting is how the Venetians talked."

There are two main possibilities in regard to labour: to aim at humanising it or at mechanising it; getting our life satisfaction through it, or outside, while regarding it as a task of torture. Few there be who recognise the existence of this greatest labour problem beyond questions of politics and strikes; but it is the problem of Carlyle, Ruskin, Morris, Tolstoy and Gandhi. It was left to Morris to see that, looked at from the side of art, labour might be counted all joy. He taught what he called "the true doctrine that labour should be a real tangible blessing in itself to the working man." This was said in 1884; later in his *News from Nowhere*, he makes the dustman talk a little anxiously about a fear that had been emerging, in that otherwise happy land, that rough work might get a bit scarce.

*Labour* is universal; by it the world we know is carried forward from day to day, it hangs and turns on labour. Labour is the great base of civilisation; it not only made and feeds cities, but by its reactions it has shaped man himself. It still makes men and moulds bodies and faces. Look at sailors and shepherds, even at diggers and navvies; it is among them that you will find sculptors' types, void of fat and flabbiness. One of man's most fundamental characteristics is the instinct of workmanship. In the great new French history of civilisation, De Morgan writes:

> "That which marked the end of animal development and the beginning of human history was the discovery of the hand. Man at his origin is the maker. Decisive at the beginning; the importance of technique is immense all along the human line. Man in the mass has been a workman."

Labour is a way of evolution and creation. Things made, in turn make us. We now all tend to be motor-men. Says Romain Rolland: "The nucleus of modern civilisation, its heart so to speak, is machinery. Age of iron! Heart of iron!"

Labour is a contribution, service, charity; it is a function of love, and like it is long-suffering and kind. Labour is a method of discipline and even of absorption and rapture. In work one may forget the world. It is a Path, a Way. Labour is athletic and heroic. There is no heroism without hardness, and toil is the best earner of health, rest and sleep. By labour we can maintain some training without killing gentle creatures in the rich man's way, and without golf in the middle-class manner. When I think of the extent and apparatus of modern sport and the chronicling of it in the press I blush all over. All this gaming is a disease caused by the divorce of art from labour.

Labour, hard, stern labour, is poetic; after all we cannot have a financial poem save in the key of tragedy. Rich people and all we who live by our wits have had our reward. While writing this I read of the conclusion of a French novel:

> "Then no longer rich, but a humble working man, he set out to labour, that daily manual toil to which the mystics of all time have attributed a virtue of redemption."

Whatever labour may do individually, I am convinced and feel in my bones that so it is collectively. The chief aim of civilisation should be to join labour to joy, thus turning it into art. What I want to suggest is a change of view regarding the meaning of work, a change of outlook and direction. The foundation of any worthy and continuing form of civilisation must be well and truly laid on noble labour. The old "orthodox" political economy was a creed rather than a science—the theology of Mammon!

. . . . .

I was going to quote examples of the teaching of scribes, beginning with the writer of Genesis, but they must be omitted, and instead I will tell a little tale. About a year ago I had the pleasure of talking to an able Chinese man in London, and asked him if he could explain how the great system of education in the classics was established in China. "Oh," he answered, "that is well known: it was under the Ming (?) dynasty; it was purposely done by the Emperor for ignorancing of the people."

We must consider the injustice and misleading that may have been brought to the world by a one-sided clerkly view of things—the notion that human culture is only to be obtained in the way of the scribes. It seems now at last, and alas! to have brought about a widely diffused, almost a universal opinion that work—real physical labour—is not superior and must be fled from. About two years ago an article by a leader of labour in the *Labour Leader* contained these words:

> "Do not let any of us be blind to the fact that most men and women simply hate the ordinary forms of

# THE INNER MORALITY OF ART.

## DON LUIGI STURZO.

### I.

MORALITY in relation to art is usually understood as a quality outside art itself; as a conformity of the work of art —be it picture or poem—to ethical laws, or to public or social morality. This conception, which regards morality as something extrinsic to art, gives rise to two literary and artistic currents. The one, with the famous catchword "*Art for Art's sake,*" repudiates in art all moral bonds and principles; the other would make art serve a moral purpose, thus depriving it of all autonomy.

Each of these irreconcilable antagonists falls into a double error, ethical and æsthetic. Each regards morality as a law outside man and his activities, whereas it is primarily an inner law; and neither recognises that the æsthetic value of a work of art is identical with its ethical value, there being no æsthetic value if there is no ethical value.

Undoubtedly, moral law is essentially an inner law, an innate bent of the human mind towards the good in general, and hence a shrinking from evil as such. That this inner moral sense finds outward expression in the precepts and enactments of religion and law, and evolves differently in different ages and civilisations, is the result of the social nature of man.

Less general is the view that the æsthetic value of a work of art is identical with its ethical value, because the mental habit of analysing these values in unrelated categories often leads to the belief that they are separate by their very nature, which is not the case. In reality, man is an indivisible whole. The social being, living in constant communion with others, is the same man who lives his own inner life. This communion, this mutual contact, can only be based on living reality, on the triple values of truth, goodness, an beauty.

Truth is intrinsically moral. Otherwise it would not b true. And it is intrinsically moral because it is that ver reality which, apprehended as truth, is desired as the good capable of satisfying some spiritual or material need of ou nature. In the same way, truth, as a good which pleases and awakens joy, is also beauty; since beauty is merely truth and good in its capacity of pleasing and awakening joy. And as, in a general sense, all existing things are true and good, so they are also beautiful. In nature, falsehood, evil and ugliness do not exist; there only exist our reactions to the universe, which also have their inner law (as we may call it) and system—the law and system of truth, goodness, and beauty, or, in other words, of reality which can be perceived, loved and admired by us.

The further we penetrate into nature, this inner and outer reality in which we live, and the more we make it ours, the deeper become our reactions, and the better do we understand truth, love goodness, and admire beauty. And when we give outward expression to the feelings which have been thus deepened, we enhance the value of reality itself, in that we add to it from our own being, enriched with truth and goodness and beauty.

Falsehood, evil and ugliness do not exist in nature—they are a disharmony in our relations with nature, a deterioration or reversal of values. They are, in fact, a disequilibrium between us and the external world, or between us and ourselves, as of two forces in opposition. Consequently it is impossible for falsehood to be good and beautiful, for evil to be true and beautiful, or for ugliness to be true and good This absolute and abstract formula may appear to be paradox. Yet it is not really paradoxical. It has a paradoxical air because, in nature, the absolute or abstract doe not exist, because, in the concrete stuff of human activity the false, the evil and the ugly are always interwoven wit the true, the good and the beautiful in innumerable grade and qualities, so that now the one, now the other predominates; and often there is no clear distinction between them

Thus a good deed, for instance, an act of charity, may b mixed with the desire for praise, despite the Christian precep that the left hand shall not know what the right hand doeth In this case we should not say that the charitable action i evil, but simply that it is tainted with a feeling not goo This taint gives a false note to the act of charity, which deprives of perfect sincerity and of the beauty that arouses admiration.

In the same way, if a poet sings of emotions he does not feel, as, for instance, when he writes to order of a royal wedding or other similar event, he is said to be false because he lacks sincerity, like somebody singing on a false note. He may in this way write verses technically perfect; he will not produce true poetry.

Thus in every form of human activity the relationship between truth, goodness and beauty is permanent. The more inward this relationship, the deeper its degree of conformity with the subject, the higher the degree of its perfection. For this reason artists are urged to be sincere, to express what they feel, to live the life of the subject they wish to represent, to make it part of themselves, to feel it in its real and profound reality. Superficiality in art is the beginning of falsity, and all falsity is fundamentally ugly. If the artist is truthful in the double sense of having experienced reality and of having expressed it as he has felt it, the work of art which he produces conforms to its own intimate moral law, which is one with the ultimate end of art, namely to awaken a sense of beauty and to give joy.

As truth in relation to man has one inherent purpose—that of transforming itself into good—and this is the intrinsic morality of truth—in the same way beauty in relation to man transforms itself into good. All reality exists for man in function of the good, whether the knowledge of the stars as revealed by the telescope, or of the atom as revealed by the microscope, or joy in a beautiful landscape, in beautiful music, or in a beautiful poem. Æsthetic pleasure is a good, artistic joy is a good, and can only be desired as a good.

Beauty thus conceived is fundamentally moral. If not moral, it is not true beauty, and any part of it that is not moral will not be beautiful.

## II.

Nevertheless, certain works of art are habitually classified as more or less moral or frankly immoral, without ceasing to be regarded as works of art. Morality is here taken in an extrinsic sense, as a standard of human conduct. From this standpoint it is possible to speak of morality or immorality only in the arts which touch human conduct, namely poetry (and generally all literary creation), painting and sculpture in so far as they portray the human form, and dancing as the art of movement of the human body. In this special sense there can be no question of morality or immorality in pure music, architecture, painting, sculpture or drawing of other things than the human form; while all these arts in themselves, in so far as they succeed in expressing beauty, are profoundly moral.

Let us consider in the first place the problem of the artistic representation of the human form.

From a general and objective point of view it may be taken that the artistic representation of the human form contains no inherent element of immorality. Yet such a representation, to be artistic, must above all have an æsthetic purpose and spiritual meaning. In a word there must be what is called an "idealisation."

Before the artist can express any theme he must first feel and live it, as it were, outside the bounds of time and space; and yet, by the vehicle of words and notes, lines and colours, make it felt and give it life in time and space in the concrete as a work of art. But this is not a soulless thing; it has a soul, it contains the "idealisation" as lived by the artist, created and communicated by him.

Thus, it is possible to speak of a work of art being true when the theme is, in the artist, an ideal *lived;* in the work an ideal *expressed;* and, in the public, an ideal *communicated.*

There is no work of art without ideality, *i.e.* without an idea-sentiment, more or less instinctive or reflective, elementary or complex, which is to be communicated to others and re-lived by them in æsthetic contemplation and enjoyment.

This idealisation may not pass beyond the first stage of pure sense of form, but may, on the other hand, reach sublime heights. It can never be entirely absent. Thus a purely linear decorative motive, a simple harmony of colours always contain an idealised feeling and reproduce it, rudimentary though it be, in such a way that it appears one with artistic technique.

Sometimes again in a work of art idealisation predominates at the expense of the means of expression, which may be too poor, childish and schematic, like certain images in primitive art, or writings in the infancy of literatures, and many works lacking technical perfection, such as the pictures of Blake On the other hand it is possible to have a work in which the ideal content is poor, but the technical execution perfect Then this perfection becomes, as it were, paramount, and acquires a value of its own, quite apart from the ideal content. But both in the first case and in the second, the value as a work of art is not complete, and artistic idealisation is lacking more, indeed, in the second case than in the first.

The artistic idealisation with which we are concerned, in connection with the representation of the human form, includes a very important element, commonly called the sense of decency.

The sense of decency is both a safeguard and a psychic limitation of the sexual instinct, and it develops spontaneously into a moral factor in the standard of individual and social conduct. With differences of degree, it is also a limit of the expressiveness of a work of art which reproduces the human form. The difference may be noteworthy. Normally, in social life, a naked person is an offence against decency. We must say normally because in the case of a baby, a shipwrecked man swimming ashore, one escaping from a fire, or a patient on the operating table, there is no offence. But a statue or picture of a human being which idealises the physical beauty of the body, an athletic movement or the grace of childhood, or which symbolises feelings or ideas such as faith, charity, justice and peace, has in it such an ideal content that it can never fail to convey supreme respect for the sense of decency.

And if, by mistake or design on the part of the artist, this sense is not respected in some detail of the work, the whole thing becomes less artistic, less harmonious, and may even be disfigured.

The same may be said of dancing, as expressing rhythmic movements of the body according to eurythmic laws. Therefore, dancing which offends decency becomes by that very fact, not only anti-moral, but also anti-eurythmic and anti-artistic.

The reason for this bond between morality and art is to be sought in the inner affinity of which we have spoken above. At bottom, external, social laws and conventions are nothing else than manifestations of a much deeper and more intimate law, the law of the essential unification of reality in its varied aspects with truth, goodness and beauty which exist between reality and human beings. Indeed, every breach of decency is pure sensuality and animality, and, far from containing any potential ideals, contains the very negation of ideality, even to the degradation of man.

Students of art are, in the main, in agreement with these ideas. There are very few who believe that decency is merely a social prejudice, a convention created by false education, and think, therefore, that they must not take it into account.

Psychologists and moralists, sociologists and doctors are agreed not only on the existence of the instinct of decency, but on its natural function of defence and respect.

The question often put by students and artists is how to determine the proper limits between respect for decency and its morbid exaggerations.

Undoubtedly the boundaries are not merely objective, but subjective also, emanating not from nature alone, but from education as well. They come from the artistic culture of a people; and, the more artistic it is, the greater is its repugnance for certain forms of exhibitionistic and illusionistic art, which appeal for popular favour more by their daring execution than by their inherent worth.

Whatever efforts adventurous artists may make to produce true and lasting works of art, they only succeed when they are expressing conceptions and emotions capable of idealisation. When the so-called *realists* and *naturistes* achieved artistic results in their work, they owed it certainly not to their excesses of sensuality, but, on the contrary, to the degree in which they succeeded in attenuating the sensual note in the fresh, clear air of a purer ideal. Then only have they aroused æsthetic emotion by fragments of art or even whole works of beauty. Their realism was in many cases a reaction against cold, insincere academician or superficial and conventional sentimentalism. But they in their turn exaggerated, and in their exaggeration accentuated their deficiency of artistic idealisation; and though they produced works technically good or even perfect, they did not create complete and veritable works of art.

This conclusion is not shared by many artists and æsthetes, either because they do not go beyond a partial analysis, and so insist on technical perfection (which undoubtedly holds initial elements of idealisation), or because of artistic prejudices. But often the artistic conscience of a whole people either sanctions or covers with oblivion works which in their time created a sensation by their moral daring.

Time wears down violent impression, and exercises an unconscious and steady selection, softening and modifying aversions and oppositions. A collective adaptation to certain excessive or repugnant representations of the human body comes about insensibly, leaving behind meanings and impressions which are no longer felt, or felt in a different way. This easily happens in decorative style-work in symbolical imagery, and in mythological and historical presentations, so that the idealisation, to a certain extent, surpasses th execution. This same idealisation, produced by the gradual elimination of deforming emotions, also takes place in dancing, so that ancient dances, popular or classical, bring into relief the eurythmic forms rather than the sensual meaning which they may have originally had.

But whatever psychological and historical factors unite in modifying in the conscience of a people or an epoch the meaning of a work of art, the basic principle of our argument stands firm, *i.e.* that, in the artistic representation of the human form and its movements, there cannot exist a true work of art where idealisation is lacking, and that true idealisation cannot be where there is no sense of decency. The true work of art is always moral; immoral meaning or expression always reveals itself as an artistic defect to the point of making the work anti-æsthetic and ugly.

This is not a mere metaphysical and ethical deduction; it is at the same time an æsthetic conclusion.

## III.

This theory applies also to poetry. But in poetry, the artistic material itself, viz. words, express thoughts and emotions which the poet idealises. These thoughts and emotions are none other than the reflection of the sentient, thinking human soul. In painting and sculpture, through the medium of lines and colour, the artistic material is the human form inasmuch as it reflects the soul. In poetry, the material, through the medium of words, is the human soul itself; and this may be projected to infinity through all the ramifications of thought. But, as the artistic representation of the human form is limited by the sense of decency, the artistic representation of the human soul is restricted by a deeper and more inward sense of decency, *i.e.* the sense of good and evil, as experienced by us. This prevents the poet from lying to himself or others, from perverting himself or others. True, he may err in his knowledge of truth, and appreciation of good; but he cannot dress up falsehood and evil as truth and goodness without denying the very essence of poetry, since falsehood and evil are incapable of idealisation, like sheer sensuality.

The poet does not express ideas of truth and goodness as a philosopher and moralist. He sings of feelings and moods, portrays and colours the human soul, which he transports to the world of dreams and ideals; he gives a lyric existence to the subtlest throbbings of the heart, discovers unexplored aspects of human desires, joys and griefs. In all this, the poet cannot falsify the material which he derives from th human soul; he can only live it over again by poet's inspiration and transmute it into poetry.

The representation of spiritual evils and human degradation, particularly by novelists and dramatists, who are also in the broad sense poets, cannot overstep the twofold limit of truth (*i.e.* must portray them as evils), and of discretion in the use of shades and colours. What we have said of the sense of decency in painting and sculpture applies also in this case.

We repeat that an art which does not idealise is not true art. A purely naturalistic and sensual art can never attain true beauty. If technical perfection may compensate, to a certain extent, for poverty of spiritual and ideal substance, and sometimes allow us to forget the morbidness of the subject, yet, unaided, it only succeeds in imparting a partial and limited æsthetic value to the work of art. This holds good both of the pictorial arts and of poetry.

The true work of art is, like the good in itself, *bonum ex integra causa*, since, for us, in nature as in art, the true, the good and the beautiful are convertible; they are one and the same reality as known, enjoyed and admired.

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# POWER AND GOODNESS IN THE PRIMITIVE CONCEPTION OF THE DIVINE.

### R. R. MARETT, D.Sc.

From ritualisation to rationalisation—such, it may be assumed at the start, has been the general direction of religious evolution. To the anthropologist the historical continuity between those very various activities of mankind which he classes under the head of religion seems to warrant him in holding that their psychological justification is much the same everywhere and always. The purpose that they embody, the value that they exist to realise, the meaning that they are intended to express, appears to him to have reference to a fundamental need that must be satisfied somehow, if the human race is to persist in being at all. It may in fact be considered essential to that being, as he views it in the light of its becoming, to be perpetually conscious of this need and to keep on trying to satisfy it ever more fully.

The first duty, then, of the anthropologist is to proclaim this *consensus omnium gentium* as against all those who would treat human religion as a passing eccentricity or chance invention—as, indeed, anything short of a biological and psychological necessity. So far back as man's specific history can be traced there is evidence that the struggle for existence has meant for him more than feeding and breeding. Even Neanderthal man, to judge by his burial practices, had an inkling of a state of being—one may even say, a state of well-being—untrammelled by the obvious conditions of the sense-world. Now whatever the other animals may feel in this way, they do little or nothing that we can detect to give expression to such a feeling. Man, however, from the earliest known times, has enjoyed enough spare energy, thanks possibly to his biological dominance, to cultivate what ma be shortly described as a soul-life—an invincible youthfulnes an impulse towards the out-of-bounds, that cheerfully defi the pedantic rules of schoolmistress Nature. With th impulse, however, there has always gone enough fear of th unknown to chasten utter recklessness and so to bring ou the better side of the adventurous spirit—its dependence o courage, on endurance, on skill in questing, on loyalty t leaders. Thus, what is essentially valued as a liberation ha never broken with the life on earth so completely as not t preserve, and by a sort of abstraction to distil and fortify the most valuable of the habits inherited by man from hi animal progenitors—those primary aptitudes that alread had survival-value even in the far-off days of his pre-huma existence.

In what follows, however, stress will have to be laid, no so much on the identity running through the historic manifestations of the religious spirit, as on the differences tha enable us to contrast its earlier and later phases with each other as severally rudimentary and advanced. Something, however, will need to be said too concerning their commo features. For it is sound method, in all attempts to represen the evolution of man, to emphasise continuity and discontinuity in turn, even at the risk of logical contradiction since logic in its application to life and nature must bow to that ultimate law of the time-process which is summed u in the French saying, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*

First, then, as to the difference in outlook between primitive and advanced religion. What is here termed their outlook, namely the more or less conscious sense of a directio to be pursued, is bound to conform largely, though perhap never wholly, with the suggestion naturally conveyed by th mechanism whereby a given kind of behaviour attains expression. The tone peculiar to the instrument is lent the tune. Consequently, if our initial assumption be correc that ritualisation and rationalisation are broadly the characteristic methods that differentiate savage and civilise religion from one another, we may expect a colour borrowe from these methods to pervade the ideal that becom explicit in so far as the activity becomes self-conscious each case. Now students of comparative religion are agree that notions of the type of the Polynesian *mana*, a wor meaning the power belonging to all that is sacred or occul have a very wide range among primitive folk and, in fac provide them with the most generally-accepted explanati of the meaning and purpose of their rites. So far as they ask themselves at all, "What are we about? What point is there in all this complicated business?" their typical answer would be: "To obtain *mana*—the communication of a certain kind of power." On the other hand, I suppose that all the higher religions would agree with Christianity in answering the same question by saying: "To obtain a certain kind of goodness—the goodness we know as righteousness." Supposing, then, that the main difference in outlook between rudimentary and advanced cult of the sacred or divine consists in just this insistence on power or goodness as the culminating experience making the cult worth while, let me try to show that this difference is largely one of what I have called instrumental tone. In other words, it will be argued that association with the mechanisms of ritualisation and rationalisation respectively accounts for a certain divergence of conscious aim within an activity that nevertheless, deep down, obeys a constant inclination—as constant indeed as any known psychological tendency of man.

Now ritualisation may be likened to a sort of gesture-language. The reason why a deaf-and-dumb alphabet does not suffice for our wants is that it is relatively cumbrous as a mechanism. Our fingers, agile as they are, are not so well oiled as our tongues. Conversely, we can develop more capacity for imitative reaction and hence more understanding in, or rather through, tongue than finger. It was only when, thanks to the invention of writing, the finger became the slave of the tongue, that man came to take full advantage of both. Manual rites, then, as the French sociologists term them in contradistinction to oral rites, carry less meaning on the face of them than do the latter. The originator of the more or less silent drama may possibly have started with some dim apprehension of what he was trying to express. Those who imitate his actions, however, in order to enjoy the same inspiration are more likely to reproduce in themselves the bare excitement than any idea of the exciting motive. The rite is deemed powerful because it works powerfully on them at the moment, but exactly what ends the power is otherwise meant to serve remains altogether obscure. Here, the primitive ritualist feels, is strong medicine; but, since he is without directions as to its use, is he not just as likely to kill with it as to cure? As a matter of fact, his transports seem often to be almost aimless.

Indeed, to go back to the originator of the ritual, one may easily over-estimate the degree of conscious motive attaching to his effort to give expression to his feelings in a new ceremony, or, as one might say, a new dance. In his latest work on the Arunta[1] Sir Baldwin Spencer confirms his previous accounts of the religious innovator. His inspiration comes to him in a dream—a term that must be taken to include waking vision. Thereupon he gets himself up with decorations never seen before and postures strangely and surprisingly in the sight of all. So much is the pantomime his own that the copyright descends exclusively to his son. Yet surely it is a wise son who should know what his father's dance was all about. Nay, given the ecstatic condition in which he is alleged to have discovered it, we may doubt whether the father himself, if pressed for an explanation, could say any more than, "See, thus and thus goes the dance." At most one might find in the original performance a certain appositeness in relation to the special occasion—a relevance to some religious purpose suggested by an initiation, a funeral, a totemic celebration or what not. Such association, if it did little to bring out the intrinsic meaning in detail, would at least invest the rite as a whole with a certain functional significance. It would appear, however, that the Arunta are wont to enjoy the repetition of such ceremonies as take their fancy quite regardless of context. Any festal gathering may be rendered the brighter by the introduction of these personally owned and personally conducted mysteries. Show after show is presented, and the total result is felt to be somehow good. In fact, every one contributes such strong medicine as he has, and collectively they proceed to dose themselves with "the mixture, as before."

It should, however, be noted that this tendency exhibited by all primitive folk to impute an unspecified efficacy to any piece of ritual approved by custom co-exists with an intense appreciation of the importance of observing the forms in all their detail. Just as the child insists on the very words of the story, so the savage must have the set of gestures complete if the religious performance is to go right. Thus we learn that the Arunta, tolerant as they are of the innovator who comes forward with something entirely fresh, would resent the slightest departure from the stereotyped representation of any theme that had once become sanctified by tradition. This means that the religious leaders must attend above all to making themselves mechanically perfect in their duties. Whether they understand, or can help others to understand, what is being done, matters little so long as the actual doing leaves nothing to be desired. Such a view of their functions tends to develop in them a sort of one-sided intelligence. They are conscious of an intellectual mastery over their method of which they may be proud and for which they become famous throughout the community. But neither they nor the rest are more than vaguely aware of the bearing of these methods on the common good. It is no one's business to systematise, to justify, to purge and revise. A Polynesian college of priests would perform prodigies of memorisation; yet they must not modify the sacred formulæ in the slightest; for, however much it might help to render them more intelligible, this would be to deprive them of all their wonder-working power.

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[1] *The Arunta: a Study of a Stone-age People*, by Sir B. Spencer and the late F. J. Gillen (London: Macmillan, 1927).

Again, in so far as the holy man finds room within the rigid bounds of a prescribed ritual to let himself go, the experience takes for him the well-known appearance of possession by some more potent spirit—a being having personality and will of its own, yet sufficiently akin in its nature to be able to use the human subject as its medium of expression. So far as the psychologist may legitimately identify this spirit that seems to be at once internal and independent with part of the man himself, a manifestation of psychic disintegration, he will be likely also to recognise in the superior potency attributed to the control a special case of that sense of release which accompanies the removal of some of the inhibitions governing the normal life. Thus the God-intoxicated man communes with omnipotence as a mere feeling; but the violence therewith imported into the accompanying thought and action is as likely as not to disturb rather than to fortify and exalt. Indeed, at all stages, but perhaps chiefly in its more primitive forms, religion displays an orgiastic side; and in this direction moral aberrations of all sorts are to be looked for. To throw off cares by throwing off restraints is a panacea of doubtful efficacy, because the good effect is transitory, while the evil consequences are likely to persist. Long and painful experiment, however, was needed to bring home this lesson to mankind. It would indeed be unscientific to condemn offhand and in the mass the very various types of religious activity of which the prime object would seem to be to induce some kind of ecstatic condition. Nevertheless, it is safe to assume that a process of so-called sublimation is needed if the uprush of power is to be dissociated from such ebullitions as are shared with drunkenness and madness. It must be given a new orientation before it can become the ally of the most reasonable and salutary tendencies of human nature.

Now a hint of the way in which such sublimation comes about in the course of religious evolution is given in the fact recognised by all primitive peoples that the price to be paid for *mana* is the strict observance of *tabu*. Human experience boldly faces and overcomes the paradox that freedom and restraint are at once contrary and complementary to each other, like man and wife. Now it is quite a mistake to think of the savage as a creature of unbridled appetite. On the contrary, he is a "rigorist." His little set of life-preserving rules have to be obeyed, since they allow no comfortable margin of error in a world where most deaths are sudden. Nor is the leader of society more unbridled in his conduct than the rank and file. Rather it is he who has to be most careful, and who therefore is bound to feel the strain most. The common man has always been disposed to blame the Government for the state of the weather; and, if the Government take itself so seriously as to believe this to be true, it cannot conduce to lightness of heart. Thus the occasional outbursts of the primitive despot taking the form of arbitrary acts of cruelty, such as are sometimes reported from the great African monarchies—though here we should distinguish between such effects as can fairly be traced to the personal influence of the king himself and those due to the inveterate custom that he maintains with the entire approval of his subjects—are perhaps to be regarded as human nature's protest against undue self-repression. Typically, the primitive man of authority displays all the outer marks of the stoic, and there is no reason to doubt that the inward temper is likewise adapted to this pose. Thus the will for power is bound to translate itself in no small degree into a will for power over self. At the earlier stages of moral evolution, however, such power over self is not likely to be so understood as to convert it into a force making for welfare in the widest sense—in other words, for the interests of the whole man, or, to put the same thing in another way, of mankind.

Now among the men of light and leading in the primitive society who seek *mana* along the narrow path of *tabu*, two types may be distinguished, namely, the chief or king, and the medicine man or priest. No doubt *The Golden Bough* has familiarised us with the priest-king who is the two in one; and a temporal and a spiritual authority are, in fact, so closely conjoined in many cases that at most the one can be said to predominate over the other, though even so standing in need of its support. Nevertheless, the chief, as primarily a man of practical affairs, is affected by his *tabus* somewhat differently from the priest, who is less concerned with the world, at any rate in its workaday aspect.

Now the mental attitude fostered by *tabu* in the more or less secular ruler is essentially a sense of dignity. He removes himself from the avocations and from the ken of the common folk so as to avoid defilement. In so doing he cannot escape from a critical, not to say contemptuous, frame of mind whereby the essential vulgarity of many of the ways of the *homme moyen sensuel* becomes apparent to him. Again, by reserving the demonstration of personal interest and activity for great and worthy occasions, he cannot but learn to distinguish weighty from trivial matters, and so develop within himself an increasingly just apprehension of the ends to which good government and statesmanship should be directed. His duties, indeed, are too completely externalised in the forms that he maintains, in the sheer parade incidental to his traditional office, to be subject to much analysis on his part; and, though much is expected from him by the rest of the community, he will be chiefly conscious of being answerable for a faithful rendering of his part as the embodiment of tribal custom. Even so, this training in formalism is not without its effect both on the character of the ruler and on public morality. The dignity, remoteness, and indifference, not to say impartiality, of the mouthpiece of the law come to attach themselves by association with the law itself; while its formal character, at any rate in times when, as Bagehot says, the quantity is more important than the quality of the control exercised on the ruder kind of society, imparts to it a certain hardness of fibre that prevents it from becoming subject to the vacillations of passing sentiment or opinion.

On the other hand, the second of our two types, namely the priest, has by reason of his calling a better chance of developing a character of the introverted kind. Often he will have been especially selected for such office in view of a capacity for abnormal experiences—a tendency, for instance, to see ghosts—as exhibited during infancy or in the course of the initiation which he must undergo in common with every other youthful member of the tribe. After being so distinguished as a good "subject," he will then have to pass through a further initiation as a candidate for the priestly profession; and, although the details are mostly lacking in regard to such esoteric proceedings, we may be sure tha everything is done to bring out in him whatever powers o the visionary order may be latent in his disposition. Incidentally, we may note that such a discipline entails a retirement from everyday occupations and the ordinary converse of men, in short, a literal sojourn in the wilderness. Thus the medicine-man of the Arunta, we are told, is not expected to practise as a healer even when his term of special initiation is complete; but a further interval of time, a year perhaps, must be spent in solitude and meditation. Seeing how hard it is in the primitive society to enjoy any sort of privacy, given that huddled life of camp and hut which is bound to be morally no less than literally stifling, a unique opportunity for communing with self is thus afforded to the man of priestly bent and education. This term, by the way, must be taken to include the healer, the diviner, the prophet, the repository of lore, the bard, and so on—functions which, however, are often assembled in the same hands. Now it is true that, as among civilised peoples, so with savages, one can distinguish those who are relatively stable-minded from those who have a strong leaning towards the mystic. Lévy-Bruhl, however, is fully justified in describing primitive folk in general as, by force of nature and nurture combined, of the mystically-minded type, as contrasted with the type of mind fostered by modern science, with its insistence on the subordination of emotionally-directed fancy to the objective control of fact. In consequence, it may be regarded as a universal demand of primitive religion that the expert especially devoted to its maintenance and exposition should be an introvert—one whose eye is primarily turned inwards, so that external things are at best mirrored in a medium that reflects them oddly, shedding on them a strange radiance that is richer in tone than in sheer illuminating power. To borrow a metaphor from painting, the introverted mind lends a Rembrandtesque effect to whatever part of the sensible world it contemplates. On the other hand, the man of science, seeking to make allowance for the personal equation, is more like the Pre-Raphaelite; though perhaps in this case, too, the escape from artificiality and bias in the point of view is more apparent than real.

Be this as it may, let us assume that the priest rather than the king is the typical introvert, and go on to inquire how the sublimation is likely to come about of that access of power which appears to reward him at certain supreme moments. At first sight there would seem to be less chance of applying the test of results to the priest's than to the chief's activities. The chief cannot govern badly with impunity, or at least not for long, and resignation by apotheosis is apt to be a painful process for the individual in a primitive society, however convenient it may seem to others as a constitutional device. The priest, however, when he doctors the weather, or even the sick, without avail, is not so easily brought to book; though one hears sometimes of a system of payment by results which for the unsuccessful medical practitioner entails an ignominious end. On the whole, however, there are stock ways of explaining away failure; and these make it possible to defy utilitarian considerations and establish the principle that, as the Indian proverb says, "one cannot milk the cow of righteousness." In short, it is on the spiritual as opposed to the material plane that the hierophant claims to achieve his chief triumphs in proportion as he has a wise regard for the reputation alike of himself and of his sacred office. But to say "spiritual" in such a context is hardly to say "moral." Among primitive folk at all events many experiences, such as might be described as spiritual in the sense that they are highly charged with emotion and imagination so as to seem to belong to a world more or less independent of the things of sense, have little apparent bearing on the moral life, as construed in terms of welfare. In a word, their survival-value is not clear, and, when they take an orgiastic form, it is likely that they may even be seriously detrimental from that point of view.

In order, however, to be fair to the primitive priest, let us remember that in many respects character affords a more adequate test of moral excellence than conduct, since we blame a man rather for not trying than for not succeeding. The question, then, may be raised whether certain moral qualities are not generated by the austerities themselves that so thickly beset the path of the man who walks alone with God. Thus humility, purity and self-sacrifice form a triad which might be distinguished as the religious virtues, even in reference to that earlier stage of their history when it is in and through meticulous attention to negative rites or *tabus* that they find their most characteristic expression. Whole volumes of anthropology might be written, and, indeed, ought to be written, on the development of each of these special dispositions, the common effect of which is to impose a stern check on the natural appetites. Whereas the chief is normally a man who must have wealth, by aid of which he may effectively maintain a band of henchmen to support his decrees, the priest has no such need for a material basis of his authority, and does not as a rule amass more than the means of a bare existence. The renown of a medicine man is not to be estimated in the primitive community by the scale of his fees. No doubt gifts are made to him; and we hear that, even in aboriginal Australia, they are acquainted with the charlatan who, for the sake of the profits, pretends to have undergone the severities of the training. We may be sure, however, that one who thus grew rich by illicit methods would earn a name for black magic that sooner or later would bring his career to a sudden end. As religion evolves, or at any rate grows more complex, the priestly order doubtless comes to enjoy great possessions, such as, however, are at least in part required for the upkeep of costly forms of public worship. Among savages, on the other hand, the typical priest or medicine-man wears a hungry look. Thus we may credit him on the whole with honestly keeping his "vows" of poverty, chastity, and so on, as it is scarcely an anachronism to call them. So far, then, as character depends on abstaining from doing rather than on doing, he is bound to develop a power of resistance to appetite which is, morally, half the battle gained. Further, the access of *mana*, the communication of divine grace, will by reason of this association with a previous struggle take the form of a release from all that belongs and appeals to the body; and, from being a negative condition, the purity attendant on the experience of a liberated energy will be rendered positive as an independence of being—a realisation of the soul as something other than the body and intrinsically transcending it. Of course the primitive mystic cannot put such feelings into abstract language intelligible to us; if, indeed, any mysticism succeeds in making itself clear to the intellect. But, however he puts it to himself—though his peculiar symbolism leads him to claim communion with animal or plant or heavenly body—there is good reason to suppose that, by association with *tabu*, *mana* becomes desensualised; and that chiefly through the experiences, or, one might almost say, the psychological experiments, of the more ascetic type of holy man.

Passing on to view the matter from the side of conduct as contrasted with character, it is perhaps chiefly as an example to the plain man that the "twice-born" type of man proves a benefactor of mankind in general. Eccentric alike in demeanour and behaviour as he is in the opinion of the "once-born," they cannot but admire him for the resolution with which he endures deprivation and pain. In a primitive society courage is the foremost of the virtues, and a spirit of emulation must be stirred in the hunter or warrior, who indeed is already acquainted with *tabu* as it bears on his special pursuits, by the sight of this spiritual athlete who hardens himself by a manifestly crueller discipline to encounter far more daunting, because far less intelligible, perils. Thanks to association with *tabu*, the notion of physical courage develops those wider and more subtle implications involved in what we know as moral courage; and, since morally no less than physically the majority of men incline towards prudence rather than towards recklessness, it is perhaps well for all that a society should have before its eyes a few outstanding examples of men who are not afraid to carry devotion, that is, concentration on an unworldly purpose, to the point of extravagance and seeming folly.

To consider further the moral helpfulness of the ecstatic or shamanistic type of religious leader from the standpoint of the plain man, one must remember that his *mana* is contagious in proportion as the rest of the society are, like most savages, excitable and high-strung; so that the antics of the bandmaster, pointless as they might seem if considered in and for themselves, are really functional in the fullest sense, since without them the band would lack all spirit and fire in its playing. To realise this one must not have regard solely to those moments of supreme crisis in the life of the community when, in the face of impending death and disaster, something drastic must be done to restore confidence, and by preference something mad—something putting common sense and its calculations to shame, as when a chief sacrifices his son. Quite apart from such horrors, which, however, have their psychological justification on the principle that an abnormal situation must be met by an abnormal call on our mental resources, let us note how a more or less frantic fugleman can impart liveliness to a body of men otherwise apt to be listless in regard to their ordinary day's work. Much attention has of late been given by anthropologists to the subject of what is not too happily described as "productive magic," namely, the body of rites employed to assist food-production. Why it should be set down as magic I do not know, unless the prayer "Give us this day our daily bread" is held to be unworthy of religion. Call it what we will, however, the kind of cult that is primarily connected with the food-quest is of immense importance among primitive folk, who have grasped the truth that soul and belly are necessary to each other on our present plane of existence. Thus our University Press has just brought out a book by Mr F. E. Williams, of Balliol, called *Orokaiva Magic*, in which is described very vividly the extraordinary *Vailala* cult—known to official circles as a "madness"—that has during the last ten years swept through the Orokaiva people of New Guinea with the violence of a contagion.[1] As a ritual it is simplicity itself. The coryphæus is shaken violently, and presently the whole chorus shakes. The ulterior purpose of evoking this wonder-working power is to make the *taro* grow. How a "shaker" cult should act causally so as to improve the gardening is not clear to the Government; but the Government ethnologist is inclined to think that somehow it does.

> "It is essential [he writes (p. 84)] that we bear in mind the emotional aspect of primitive religion, and remember that unless religion provides some emotional satisfaction it fails to fulfil what is perhaps its principal *raison d'être*. The Taro cult—which is obviously enough a religious movement if we allow a proper wideness to the term—gives its devotees more to *do* than to think about, and it gives them what they like doing. Besides that it is intermixed with all the pursuits and interests of their daily life. It is probably safe to say that native religions are usually associated with, or rather embody, a deal of ceremonial, of dressing-up, of feasting, and of high excitement. These things, which may seem mere frills and furbelows to those who follow a sterner creed, are in primitive religion of far greater relative importance. A religion without such attractions is hardly likely to be acceptable to the native, especially because it is too completely separated from his other interests."

Now, though the gladness of the man who authentically feels God within him is very different from the cheerfulness of the crowd that copies his outward movements to the accompaniment of vague pregustations of bread and butter, yet these are notes belonging to one and the same psychological scale. The coarsest clay out of which men are fashioned has something in common with the material which, in response to the internal fires of the genius, takes on the beautiful, if often fragile, shapes that decorate the temple of religion.

Now compared with the New Guinea folk we are all rationalists. That is to say, we think it wise to try to rationalise our natural sentiments and intuitions. At the same time, while seeking to purge them by criticism, we are anxious not to weaken the force immanent in them so far as it is required to make us live strenuously and boldly. Thus the organised religion in modern times, which is not always in the closest touch with tendencies apparently bound up with philosophy, science and art that really make in the same direction, fluctuates between attention to criticism and reliance on inspiration. Perhaps, then, it needs psychology to assure it that reason belongs to the soul, not the soul to reason. This does not mean that we should become irrationalists. Reason is a good dog, if trained. Indeed, since biological evolution is strictly irreversible, and cultural evolution in practice hardly less so, we may be said to be committed by our historical destiny to a type of religion that should strive to make the most of our reasoning powers—develop them to their fullest as one of the chief ways of giving glory to God. At the same time every psychologist, who is likewise versed in the long history of religion, knows that institutions such as religion which are built to last go down through the rather thin and washy alluvium that forms the surface of our present human nature to the bed-rock underneath. There is some sort of hard fact there, and the true "fundamentalist" must make it his business to find exactly what it is. To me it seems hardly distinguishable from the life-impulse itself. This impulse reveals itself within the human consciousness at all known stages of its development as a sense of the richness of life—in a sort of pregnancy of the soul. The given is instinct with the promised. At once within the actual world and beyond it is an ideal world of pure possibility which on the one hand is, since it stirs and beckons, and yet on the other hand is not, since it dances ahead and as it were mocks. Religion, then, I take to be essentially a heartening process. Thanks to a psychological mechanism which sometimes appears as ritualisation, sometimes as rationalisation, but is always essentially the same thing, namely, an idealisation, a symbolism, the mind or soul represents to itself whatever possibilities of life have for the time being the power of inspiring enough courage to make us try to transform the actual, so that we may thereby taste more of life's inherent richness. Man has to be content with a symbolism because the vision of fulfilment is elusive. Construed in static terms, as any established religion is ever tempted to do, the vision loses its power of appeal. As a dynamic, however, though it works powerfully, it must always on a logical view amount to nonsense, because it both is an is not. Thus, in so far as religion uses its truly inspired gif of tongues, it tends to verge on the unintelligible. Hence t the realist, or rather the actualist, as he should be called, th religious genius appears to suffer from a sort of noble madness. Indeed, facts of the class collected by William Jame in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* decidedly indicat that men and women of original mind who have left thei mark on the history of religion had, from the standpoint o the plain man or even the plain psychologist, somethin queer about them.

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[1] *Orokaiva Magic*, by F. E. Williams, Oxford University Press, 1928.

Now if this be so—though I would certainly not wish to dogmatise on the subject—may it not be that inspiration is always much the same kind of experience, whether it be a savage or a civilised man to whom it comes? The intensified life-feeling that it expresses is in a way above good and evil, and breeds in the devotee a sort of recklessness, a readiness to accept all that the universe has in store, the bitter fruit with the sweet. The power, promise, *mana* is, as the Freudians say, ambivalent, since the cleavage felt in the moment of religious exaltation is between the actual, which is negated and so deemed worthless, and the ideal, which is precious even though at once divine and diabolic—at once a fruition and its denial, the satisfying foretaste of an unsatisfied and baffling love.

Finally, as to moral goodness. How does its relation to the saintly man's experience affect its development? If one is right in supposing that inspiration in all ages has consisted in much the same feeling of liberation and wider reach, might it not seem to follow that one and the same type of moral goodness will be its correlate, if indeed there is any essential connection between the two at all? But in certai respects at all events savage morality is manifestly differen from, not to say inferior to, that of the civilised man. Fo instance, what has been called the dualism of primitive ethic is notorious, that is to say, their more or less explicit recognition of the principle that it is equally right to do good to friends and to do evil to enemies. To-day, however, we at least do lip-service to a kindlier creed. If it be granted, then that moral theory has greatly changed for the better since primitive times, and that this evolution has not been withou its effect on moral practice, we are faced, it would seem, b the following dilemma: either we must revise our conceptio of the psychological uniformity of the religious experience o the saintly type of man; or we must admit that religion, o at any rate saintliness, has had little to do with man's moral progress.

A solution is perhaps to be found in the distinction between saintliness and organised religion in general. It may be that great saints are as rare as great poets, or musicians, or mathematicians. No doubt we all have some capacity for religious experience; and so, too, in the philosophy of the savage some *mana*, though rarely much of it, is held to be every man's portion. On the other hand, moral goodness must be regarded as something in which all can share more or less alike. Or, again, it must be regarded as having to do with the actual no less than with the ideal—with the social life of every day no less than with the life of that other world in which society seems to be left behind and yet the feeling of loneliness is transcended. In short, morality must rest at once on common sense and on regard for the things of the spirit. It may be, then, that the moral teacher must stand somewhere half-way between the saint, the religious genius, shy, solitary, rapt, and the common man too much concerned with worldly affairs. The history of religion shows a great development of its organisation whereby numbers of mostly very worthy persons enter its service who have less insight into its mysteries than the true saints, but more than the rest of the people. Their natural function being not to initiate but rather to interpret, they are as it were the middle-men of religion, spreading abroad the products of religious genius in a form suitable for general consumption. If something is lost in such a process of popularisation, more possibly is gained in the long run. From the common man's angle the saint seems too queer to be imitated directly, though viewed from a certain distance he shines as a star. Thus the pathological side of intense religious experience is perhaps better hidden from a public that would but misconstrue the symptoms of the most genuine theopathy. If morals could be levelled up, while ecstatic religion was as far as might be necessary levelled down, to a universally shared attitude of sane yet heart-stirring enthusiasm for truth, beauty and righteousness, there can be no doubt that this world would be a better place to live in. It might be also that many who are extraverts more by custom than by real inclination would then be led to discover in themselves the capacity for a supreme type of experience that is only to be reached by individual seeking.

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# A CHINESE ESTIMATE OF HARDY'S POETRY.

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While it is possible to find large numbers of genuine admirers of Thomas Hardy as a novelist, his poetry will for some time remain unread. The question is still very frequently raised as to whether Hardy is a poet at all: this is because his poetry is so very different from what is usually associated with that name. Poetry, we are told, heightens our appreciation of beauty through its appeal to the imagination and to the emotions, and Hardy's poetry seems to offer us very little delight in these realms. The fact is, however, not that Hardy fails to give us an imaginative or emotional appeal, but the quality of his imagination and emotion is different from the usual kind. It is charged with profound intellectual significance.

To say that Hardy is an intellectual man of letters is to give him a unique position both in the history of English literature and in modern literature generally. I do not know what precisely are the characteristics of poetry that has been written within the last thirty years, but I think there is a general feeling that apart from a consideration of its form and technique, contemporary poetry is sadly deficient in the fullness and adequacy of its content. It may excel in the expression of delicate sentiments or in the art of describing the gentle hues and subtle shades of beauty in inanimate nature: but at best the satisfaction that it affords us is no higher than what we derive from a Dutch painting or from the works of a J. B. Rousseau or a Watteau. Now this satisfaction is what Thomas Hardy refuses to give us in his poetry. He is never pretty in the sense in which a great deal of ou modern poetry is, but there is always in him an attempt to grapple with some important fundamental ideas on god, on nature, and on human life. He is not sweet and mellifluous, and rarely does he burst into a flood of melody and music which we usually claim to be the proper possession of lyrical poetry. On the contrary, there is frequently a note of harshness as if every word was forged from a mind working in agony and mortification. It requires time and energy to accustom our ears to this imperfect versification, and, even then, we may turn away with a sense of discomfort. Let us choose at random :

> " Here goes a man of seventy-four
> Who sees not what life means for him,
> And here another in years a score
> Who reads its very figure and him.
>
> The one who shall walk to-day with me
> Is not the youth who gazes far,
> But the breezy sire who cannot see
> What Earth's ingrained conditions are."

Now this is hardly the type of lyric poetry that people are ordinarily acquainted with. There is no warmth of feeling, no trace of that idyllic imagination which depicts for us

> " Magic casements, opening on the foam
> Of perilous seas in faery lands forlorn."

One is not transported to a sense of rapture or of ecstatic joy in human life as it reveals itself in warm and happy love, or in good fellowship around the hearth-stones of the family ; but instead we have verses on " Satires of Circumstance," " Time's Laughing-stocks " or " Life's Little Ironies," in which life is presented to us in a lean, emaciated and haggard form with no kind memory of the past and no hope of the future.

There is thus ample reason why Hardy's poetry will perhaps remain unpopular, but for those who have deep intellectual interests and who are willing to see human existence in crude and barbarous realism without the sweetness and the glamour which some of us in all times and all of us in some time find necessary to humour ourselves, there is very adequate compensation in the fair collection of poetry which Hardy has given us.

I have said that Hardy as a poet occupies not only a unique position in contemporary literature, but also in English literature generally. This statement needs perhaps some elucidation. People have always employed different criteria in their estimation of poetry. An eminent Victorian critic insisted that poetry was the criticism of life, and therefore to him first-class poetry was poetry which gave the fullest and most satisfactory interpretation of human life. We are familiar with the storm of protest against this arbitrary criterion, but I think that for poetry to be in the highest order it is not sufficient only to amuse and delight, it is not sufficient to be musical and richly imaginative even as a superb lyricist like Shelley was; it must at the same time make its universal appeal in interpreting some broad human issues in a full and adequate manner. Poetry of the highest order must therefore in the last analysis be moral poetry, and by moral I do not mean any narrow ethical views, but that power which is able to elevate and console. A sound, healthy and consistent view of the world becomes then a prime requisite of a great poet.

Now if there is any English poet who has consistently identified himself with a more or less definite view of the world, that poet is Thomas Hardy. The man most similar to him in thus powerfully applying ideas to life is Wordsworth. But whether Hardy holds as broad and generous a view of life as Wordsworth, or as sane and healthy, is of course an entirely different question. The fact remains that in order to appreciate Hardy's poetry one must understand his point of view, his general outlook upon the world.

The whole body of Hardy's poetry is not extensive. *Wessex Poems* was published in 1898. That was succeeded by *Poems of the Past and the Present*, published in 1901; and to these have now been added *Time's Laughing-stocks* (1909), *Satires of Circumstance* (1914), *Moments of Vision* (1917), and the recent *Late Lyrics and Earlier*. Aside from these there is the colossal epic-drama of the Napoleonic wars, *The Dynasts*, the germs of which were conceived as far back as 1880, when Hardy wrote *The Trumpet-major*. Arranged in this chronological order, we find that Hardy has been devoting himself to writing poetry for the last thirty years, and during that period he has not added one single volume to the list of fifteen novels and a number of short stories which took up the earlier part of the author's life. *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* was written in 1891, and *Jude the Obscure* in 1894 and 1895, the last two, and the most remarkable, products of Hardy's genius as a novelist.

It seems therefore that there is a definite and clear-cut distinction between the two periods of Hardy's life. There is, of course, some slight overlapping, since a small number of lyrics, scattered in the body of his poetical works, were written much earlier than 1898, the date in which the first volume of poetry was published, reaching as far back as 1865, when the author was only twenty-five years of age and when he had not as yet written anything in the world of fiction, his first novel, *Desperate Remedies*, being written in 1871. This clear-cut distinction between the two periods is rather unfortunate, as it has given rise to a good deal of suspicion that Hardy took to writing poetry only as an agreeable pastime for his declining years, and that what is central and representative of his genius is to be discovered in his latest novels which consumed the major portion of the vigour and energy of his life. This can hardly be so, however, when we remember that *The Dynasts* was completed in 1908, a work which must have cost the author much greater labour both in respect of creative effort and scholarly research than any single one of his novels. But the best way of dispelling the doubt and suspicion is, of course, to read the poems themselves, and it would be difficult to draw any other conclusion than that here, even more so than either in *Tess* or in *Jude*, we find the author's articulate philosophy of life, and that is what after all we are most concerned with. That philosophy is of course not a coherent, logical, systematic presentation of ideas, but that it is a consistent view of life no one will deny. In the preface to *Poems of the Past and the Present* Hardy himself says :—

> "Of the subject matter of this volume" (as of other volumes, we may well add) "which is in other than narrative form, much is dramatic or impersonative even where not explicitly so. Moreover, that portion which may be regarded as individual comprises a series of feelings and fancies written down in differing moods and circumstances and at various dates. It will probably be found, therefore, to possess little cohesion of thought or harmony of colouring. I do not greatly regret this. Unadjusted impressions have their value, and the road to a true philosophy of life seems to lie in humbly recording diverse readings of its phenomena as they are forced upon us by chance and change."

For a thorough and complete treatment of Hardy's philosophy of life, it may seem necessary to include a discussion of his novels, and wherever necessary I shall draw freely upon them, especially *Tess* and *Jude*, for material and confirmation. But, from another point of view, the novels may very safely be put aside, for, although there is a continuity of thought, a deep underlying conviction in Hardy's mental outlook, there is a difference of expression determined by the requirements of the artistic media. In other words, what is implied in the novels is very frequently made explicit in the poems. A novel involves a greater and more complicated artistic scheme than a poem, and a dominating idea has to be woven into that scheme and expressed in terms of the experiences which form the basis of its construction. A novel deals with the realities of life, and Hardy cannot express his ideas except as they are embodied in these realities. In the concluding paragraph of *Tess*, for instance, we are told "Justice was done and the President of the Immortals had ended his sport with Tess," and the entire novel was written to explain and justify this conviction.

Now in poetry, when the effort is not a dramatic one and when the author attempts to disclose some of his most intimate convictions in a lyrical way, he can always have recourse to direct appeal; and this is why when we consider Hardy's poetry together, we shall find that it consists of a body of beliefs and guiding thoughts without which we shall be entirely at a loss to understand and appreciate his point of view.

The leading and, at the same time, the most characteristic thought underlying all of Hardy's works is that life is a tragedy, and that it is a tragedy because of the eternal and inevitable conflict between the human will on the one hand and the Immanent will on the other. We shall therefore consider what Hardy means by destiny or fate which underlies all human existence, and its relationship to his religious views and his general philosophic outlook upon life.

It does not help us very much if we simply say that Hardy is a fatalist, for fatalism does not imply any sense of the tragic. Fatalism conceives of the world as being permeated by a force, a power over which there can be no human control, but the world is considered as something apart from this power. It is essentially a dualistic conception, but of conflict there is none: there is only annihilation of the one by the other. With Hardy, however, the basic element of his fatalism is that existence itself is essentially a tragic affair, that this eternal power, cold, indifferent and purposeless, is at the very foundation of all existence whatever. This eternal power does not necessarily possess any malicious intention, but it is callous and irresponsive to the needs and desires of human life. Hence the tragedy, and the tragedy becomes intense in proportion as Hardy exerts the integrity and dignity of human life.

Both in *Tess* and *Jude*, and more especially in *The Dynasts*, where the controlling figure is a great and striking personality, we find that the leading characters are people of strong self-assertiveness which the fatalist of the traditional type will not probably allow. For fatalism implies something that is overpowering and a consciousness of being overpowered. And it is this consciousness which renders impotent the forces of opposition. What is typical of the fatalist is therefore resignation and an attitude of willing submission to the merciless onslaught of an invincible and malicious power. There is pity, but there is no tragedy, for tragedy implies a condition of disharmony and an attempt on the part of these disharmonious elements to adjust themselves, not through compromise, but through mutual subjugation.

In the case of Hardy, the universe forms a part of a general tendency which begins nowhere and ends nowhere. It is simply a process which continues its motions almost automatically, but into the vortex of which are thrown innumerable manikins, strong and defiant according to their own individual natures. The misfortune of human existence is that it has a will and a purpose which is essential to its creative being. Now the significance of human life lies precisely in its creativeness, in its desire to introduce new values in place of the old and thereby to modify the cosmic process. But in this attempt to create new values it is continuously brought to face obstacles of which it has no previous knowledge, and therefore human attempts in the last analysis are at best ironical. This lack of consciousness of a ruthlessly disturbing power is very essential in Hardy's conception both of destiny and of the tragic significance of human life, as we find that all the characters created by Hardy either in his novels or in *The Dynasts* are charged with great vitality and vigour. There is no gloom, no dejection, no abjectness, which would be inevitable if there is an awareness of the futility in all exertions of the human will. This is shown in *The Dynasts*. It is a work which consists at bottom of two plays between which there is no logical connection whatever. One is the human drama enacted through the realities of the Napoleonic wars, and it is enclosed within the veil of a supernatural drama to which the human drama must ultimately conform. That supernatural drama is the drama of the spirits of which the Spirit of the Years, the Spirit Ironic and the Spirit of the Pities are the most important representatives. And it is the ignorance on the part of the human characters of their eventual outcome that intensifies our sense of pathos. Napoleon is put in his true historical perspective, but powerful as he was, even he could not escape from the destiny which is the lot of all mankind. It is when the calamity has taken place that Napoleon becomes conscious of his evil star :

> " Some force within me, baffling mine intent,
> Harries me onward, whether I will or no.
> My star, my star is what's to blame—not I.
> It is unanswerable."

And the Spirit of the Years, having done his work, serenely gives praise :

> " He spoke thus at the Bridge of Lodi. Strange,
> He's of the few in Europe who discern
> The working of the will."

We must not think, however, that the Immanent will deliberately insists upon thwarting human desires and efforts. In the poems, and especially in *The Dynasts*, the assumption of the anthropomorphic form, required by the necessities of the art seems to endow this primary will with the qualities of the human mind, with a power of volition as if it were conscious of a teleological end. But it is really a blind general tendency innocent of any sense of discretion and discrimination. As one of the semi-choruses of the Ironic Spirits says :

> " Of Its doings, if It knew
> What It does, It would not do ! "

The Immanent will is simply a " fixed foresightless dream." When it was asked :

> " Are there, Love and Light its aim—
> Good its glory, bad its flame ? "

the answer was :

> " Nay ; to alter evermore
> Things from what they were before."

Indifference, callousness—that is the characteristic of Hardy's destiny. It is not open to persuasion because it does not have that condition upon which the forces of persuasion could be brought to play, and this is an important distinction from the conception of destiny as held by the ancient Greeks personified in their elaborate hierarchy of gods and goddesses who, if they err, err frequently in having too much of the milk of human kindness.

I think I can best illustrate this neutral character of Hardy's fate by a few quotations. When the complaint was brought to it that it was not beneficent, that it was "impious and profane," the reply in *A Dream Question* was:

> "Save me from my friends, who seem
> That I care what my creatures say!
> Mouth as you list: sneer, rail, blaspheme,
> O manikin, the livelong day,
> Not one grief—groan or pleasure—gleam
> Will you increase or take away."

The purpose of the Primary will, if it can be called a purpose, is merely to create. Having created, it is no longer Its business to supervise the eventual outcome, so that in *God-forgotten*, when the sons of earth cry for mercy and retribution, God is made to answer:—

> "The Earth, say'st thou? The Human race?
> By me created? Sad its lot?
> Nay: I have no remembrance of such place:
> Such world I fashioned not."

It may seem rather undignified for God to deny one of His little acts, but this, according to Hardy, is His characteristic behaviour. In another poem, *The Sleep-worker*, where the Ultimate Force is conceived as a feminine person, She was asked what She would do when She became conscious of Her creatures:

> "When wilt thou wake, O mother, wake and see,—
> As one who, held in a trance, has laboured long
> By vacant rote and prepossession strong—
> The coils that thou hast wrought unwittingly;
>
> Wherein have place, unrealised by thee,
> Fair growths, foul cankers, right enmeshed with wrong,
> Strange orchestras of victim-shriek and song,
> And curious blends of ache and ecstasy?—
>
> Should that morn come, and show thy opened eyes
> All that Life's palpitating tissues feel,
> How wilt thou bear thyself in thy surprise?—
>
> Wilt thou destroy in one wild shock of shame
> Thy whole, high heaving firmamental frame,
> Or patiently adjust, amend, and heal?"

The question is made, of course, in behalf of humanity. It is essentially a human question; and to expect an answer from the primary Force which is to be framed in terms of mankind's desires and wishes is to bestow on it a consciousness and a teleology of its existence which, according to Hardy, it never possesses. We must realise that the Immanent will has no consideration whatever for the conditions of human well-being, not because it cannot be propitiated but because it seems to be itself in the grip of absolutely unalterable laws. Like the sky, the northern wind, like sickness and death, of that deeply pathetic poem *The Subalterns*, it does not possess any free will of its own.

> " 'Poor wanderer,' said the leaden sky,
> 'I fain would lighten thee,
> But there be laws in force on high
> Which say it must not be.'
>
> 'I would not freeze thee, shorn one,' cried
> The north, 'Knew I but how
> To warm my breath to slack my stride;
> But I am ruled as thou.'
>
> 'To-morrow I attack thee, wight,'
> Said sickness, 'yet I swear
> I bear thy little ark no spite,
> But am bid enter there.'
>
> 'Come hither, Son,' I heard Death say;
> 'I did not will a grave
> Should end thy pilgrimage to-day,
> But I, too, am a slave!'
>
> We smiled upon each other then,
> And life to me wore less
> That fell contour it wore ere when
> They owned their passiveness."

All is passiveness. Even the Immanent will itself is passive: it keeps on its movements because it cannot help it. It creates also because it cannot help it, and in that poem *New Year's Eve*, in spite of all persuasions, the immanent will:

> "—Sank to raptness as of yore,
> And opening new year's day,
> Wove it by rote as theretofore,
> And went on working evermore
> In his unweeting way."

Strictly speaking, this attitude towards human life and towards the universe is not pessimistic from the metaphysical and cosmological point of view, because in Hardy there is an utter denial of any kind of significance whatever, whereas in pessimism strictly so called, there is an assumption of a significance, only that significance is an evil and malicious one. I take this to be an important distinction, because Hardy has been very frequently classed together as a pessimist with men like Leopardi and Schopenhauer or with the author of *The City of Dreadful Night*. There is, as it seems to me, only a superficial similarity between them. The practical bearing of their conception of fate upon human life is, from one point of view, entirely similar in all cases, because they perceive no joy in it, but eternal pain and suffering. In addition to this, however, Hardy says, as I have already quoted :

> " —life to me wore less
> That fell contour it wore ere when
> They owned their passiveness."

Both in the case of Schopenhauer and of Leopardi, Fate is not conceived as a passive force, but as decidedly active, and human pain and suffering are the results of its activity and of its deliberate purpose to frustrate and to annihilate. Not so in Hardy. With him " the all-Urging will, raptly magnipotent " weaves " with an absent heed " " in skilled unmindfulness " as we are told in *The Dynasts*, and human pain and suffering result from a disharmony between our desires and aspirations and those of Fate. The course of the Human will does not coincide with the course of the Immanent will, and the natural consequence is an eternal conflict in which the individual must yield to the general. The Immanent will is also frequently referred to in Hardy as an automaton, and this is sufficient to imply that it is aimless and purposeless.

The interesting feature is, however, that with Leopardi as with Hardy, the solution of the problem of human life is very similar. Recognising the presence of human pain and misery which spring, as we have seen, from two separate sources, they each have recourse to non-existence as the means of ending that pain and misery.

It may be said that instead of solving the problem of life, Hardy really dodges it. His attitude is therefore very often a negative one, and by this I mean he is always crying for the state of the unborn. He has sung of the perfect bliss and happiness of our pre-existent state on more than one occasion. In *Before Life and After*, the comparison is very clearly brought out :

> " A time there was—as one may guess
> And as indeed, earth's testimonies tell—
> Before the birth of consciousness,
> When all went well.
>
> None suffered sickness, love, or loss,
> None knew regret, starved hope, or heart-burnings ;
> None cared whatever crash or cross
> Brought wrack to things.
>
> If something ceased, no tongue bewailed,
> If something winced and waned, no heart was wrung,
> If brightness dimmed, and dark prevailed,
> No sense was strung.

But the disease of feeling germed
And primal rightness took the tinct of wrong;
Ere nescience shall be reaffirmed,
How long, how long?"

There is, indeed, in the last two lines a note of despair, the assertion of a desire for the impossible. The birth of human consciousness is conditioned by the birth of suffering and misery. It is only what Nietzsche calls the pathos of distance that gives attractiveness to the created state.

"I rose at night and visited
The Cave of the unborn:
And crowding shapes surround me
For tidings of the life to be,
Who long had prayed the silent Head
To haste its advent morn.

Their eyes were lit with artless trust,
Hope thrilled their every tone;
'A scene the loveliest, is it not?
A pure delight, a beauty spot
Where all is gentle, true and just,
And darkness is unknown?'

My heart was anguished for their sake,
I could not frame a word;
And they descried my sunken face,
And seemed to read therein, and trace
The news that pity would not break,
Nor truth leave unaverred.

And as I silently retired,
I turned and watched them still
And they came helter-skelter out,
Driven forward like a rabble rout
Into the world they had so desired
By their all immanent will."

It would seem from these poems, and they are legion, scattered throughout his collected works, that Death, as one of the most practical and easily realisable conditions of nescience, is to be preferred to all forms of human existence. This is a conclusion, however, which we can come to only with a great deal of caution. It has been said of Hardy as it has been said of Dante, that he is fond of "poetising among the tombs," and there is in fact a good amount of poetry on this subject, a very suggestive example of which is to be found in *Heiress and Architect*, in which replying to all the demands for architectural effect by the heiress, the architect proposes that enough space be given to "a coffined corpse adown the stairs" in preparation for life's consummation.

But while there is an eternal note of despair in all of Hardy's works, we must admit also that it is not such an irreconcilable despair as would seem inevitable in the system of thought of Leopardi or of Schopenhauer. Both of them are more fatalistic in their outlook upon life than Hardy, because, according to them, all things are doomed and preordained to destruction by a Fate which is conscious of its work and which is by its nature inherently addicted to malice prepense. In Hardy, however, the exclusion of an evil consciousness from his Immanent will makes it possible for the recognition of the existence of Hope, which is the mainspring of human glory in all its manifold aspects. Both Leopardi and Schopenhauer paralyse the human will, but in Hardy we find that the human will is always a very strong assertive power, vigorous, recalcitrant and defiant of all forces of obstruction. It is in the exertion of human vitality and of our will to create some values for human life that we at once find the basis of the tragic stories of Tess and Jude and the grandeur and nobility of their appeal. Neither in Leopardi nor in Schopenhauer can we find a sentiment as explicit as the one we find in Hardy's *Song of Hope* :—

"O sweet To-morrow !—
After to-day
There will away
This sense of sorrow.
Then let us borrow
Hope, for a gleaming
Soon will be streaming,
Dimmed by no gray—
No gray !

While the winds wring us
Sighs from the Gone,
Nearer to dawn
Minute-beats bring us ;
When there will sing us
Larks of a glory
Waiting our story
Further anon—
Anon !

Doff the black token,
Don the red shoon,
Right and retune
Viol-strings broken ;
Null the words spoken
In speeches of rueing,
The night cloud is hueing
To-morrow shines soon—
Shines soon !"

This sounds like a compromise between a Leopardi and a Robert Browning, but in any case, no forlorn and hopeless pessimist can utter such a vigorous and masculine appeal. We are accustomed to think of Hardy as diametrically opposed to Wordsworth. Wordsworth has been a great and consoling poet because more than any other English poet he sings of the eternal joy in human life ; but Wordsworth himself would perhaps show sympathy to Hardy in that exquisite lyric, *The Darkling Thrush*. After describing the desolateness of a winter landscape, Hardy goes on to exult in the shrill comforting notes of a lonely and aged thrush :—

> " At once a voice outburst among
> The bleak twigs overhead
> In a full-hearted evensong
> Of joy illimited ;
> An aged thrush, frail, gaunt, and small,
> In blast-beruffled plume,
> Had chosen thus to fling his soul
> Upon the growing gloom.
>
> So little cause for carollings
> Of such ecstatic sound
> Was written on terrestrial things
> Afar or nigh around,
> That I could think there trembled through
> His happy good-night air
> Some blessed Hope, whereof he knew
> And I was unaware."

The last line is, perhaps, full of regret, but the general tone is not one of resignation, but of supreme joy. That Hardy is able to live to well over ninety is therefore not a mystery after all !

With the presence of both despair and hope in Hardy's philosophy of life, it is difficult to class him with other thinkers. It has been suggested that he can be best described as a meliorist which brings him near to the position of George Eliot, but personally I do not see any need for a rigid classification, and it would be more profitable, with the discovery of that element of hope, to find out in our concluding remarks what Hardy's views on religion are. Where there is hope, there is inkling of a real religion.

I can say, with some degree of certainty, however, that while the recognition of hope as a vital force in human life brings Hardy into the pale of Christian thought, his religious views are not, in the real sense of the term, Christian. He was brought up and educated to enter the ministry, but we can see that early in his life the Christian faith became meaningless to him, and this because of various reasons into which I cannot here enter.

The general agnosticism of the last half of the nineteenth century furnishes the background from which the religious position of Thomas Hardy emerges. The prevailing faith in the omnipotence of science, with its natural corollary of a lack of faith in any human values except such as were verifiable by scientific experimentation—the drama, by the way, is being re-acted in China to-day—had created an atmosphere in which religion found it difficult to secure a place; and Hardy, like all thinking people of the day, had to forsake the tradition which had been thus critically abandoned. The ignorant were tenacious of their beliefs, but for the enlightened they had become dry and hollow symbols signifying nothing. In two very remarkable poems *God's Funeral* and *The Impercipient*, Hardy tells us how envious he was of those upon whom Heaven seemed still to show grace and charity, but as for himself, the anchor of his life has given way, and he was left helpless in the face of those "obstinate questionings" which come to all thinking minds.

"O man-projected figure, of late
Imaged as we, thy knell who shall survive?
Whence came it we were tempted to create
One whom we can no longer keep alive?
  Framing him jealous, fierce, at first,
We gave him justice as the ages rolled,
Will to bless these by circumstance accurst,
And long suffering, and mercies manifold.

. . . . .

"Till, in Time's stayless, stealthy swing,
Uncompromising rude reality
Mangled the monarch of our fashioning,
Who quavered, sank; and now has ceased to be."

But, asked Hardy, what was to be done under these circumstances? He could find but little hope in life.

"Still how to bear such loss I deemed
The insistent question for each animate mind,
And gazing, to my growing sight there seemed
A pale yet positive glean low down behind."

In these stanzas we see at once the origin of the gloom and despondency so characteristic of Hardy's thought, but we also see why he was never resigned to utter despair. It may be added that the gloom and despondency were characteristic of the entire period. Other men flew to different cults for what they could get in place of the traditional Christian faith, as for instance, Walter Pater flew to æstheticism and a refined hedonism. But in Hardy that gloom was hardened, because firmly set and crystallised into a general philosophic outlook. Human beings are incurably prone to explain lif and the universe in the light of an elementary and fundamental principle and Hardy identifies that principle with th Immanent will. This unknown automaton is for him th *primum mobile*, and the world is conceived as an eterna process of becoming.

We of the early twentieth century still find ourselves in a philosophy of relativity, in which the universe is regarded as a continual flux. Theories of relativity have invaded even the realm of science, and a great storm of spiritual unrest is inevitable when men have no sense of certainty, find no place of security for their souls. In such conditions it is difficult to promote religious faith, as faith cannot be manifested except in what is stable and permanent. Religion, if it means anything, means spiritual calm and peace.

But our modern consciousness is working in a vicious circle. Desiring peace, it yet embraces a notion of cosmological flux where one state of existence gives place to another in rapid succession. It is not happiness we promote, but regret, infinite regret in the fleetingness of all things. This is the note we continually hear in the poems of Hardy. "Father Time," as he says, is forever making changes in the world. He has frequently sung of our primary human emotions and desires, but only as they are in a state of transitoriness. In this state of mind need we wonder that, cry as he will for some gleam of hope, that hope is liable to desert him, for hope, too, implies a faith in a stable and permanent equilibrium of the universe. No one will deny the manliness of that call for home, but the question is, will it, when viewed in the light of Hardy's Heraclitian conception of the world, lead us to disappointment rather than to eternal joy, such as we find in the poetry of Wordsworth ?

Still, after all is said and done, Hardy is one of the greatest of our modern poets, because in him more than in anyone else are reflected the manifold aspects of our modern consciousness. Hardy is, if anything, fundamental ; and if he seems to emphasise misery and suffering, it is because they are the great realities of our modern existence. We should be grateful to have one reveal to us the truth of our being, but it perhaps requires a still greater soul to exalt and ennoble it. Hardy, in any case, is among the immortals of English literature.

CHANG HSIN-HAI.

SHANGHAI.

# THE BIRTH OF A GREAT POEM.

## J. MIDDLETON MURRY.

GREAT poems have a way of springing fully armed, like Jove, from the head of Minerva. They are there, dropped at our feet like thunderbolts, without precedents or pedigrees : and we must make the best of them. We accept them as happenings, and neglect them as creations. We have no choice, for there is seldom any evidence available concerning the process of creation. To the poet himself, for the most part, his poem is a thing given : his subsequent workings upon it are conscious enough, and sometimes these are permanently recorded in the erasions of his manuscript, but the substance of the thing is beyond his conscious control. The essential activity of poetic creation is either sub- or super-conscious.

If then it is sub- or super-conscious, how can we, how can the poet himself, investigate the act of poetic creation ? We read his poem—if it is a great poem it moves us greatly. But what do we mean by that ? I am moved greatly by a man's actual death which I behold ; I am moved greatly by the description of a man's death—Antony's in *Antony and Cleopatra*, for example ? Is the emotion the same ? No. Is it even of the same kind ? I doubt it. And if we could define the nature of the great emotion which a great poem awakens in us—can we, have we the right to, say that the emotion which we feel in reading, the poet himself felt in writing, his poem ? Certainly it is easier to make the assumption than to justify it.

Yet if we once suffer ourselves to be caught in these preliminary speculations we shall not shake off their toils. Let us shun abstraction as long as we can and contemplate a poem—at birth—Keats' sonnet *On First Looking into Chapman's Homer*. It is worth contemplating for many reasons : because it is one of the greatest sonnets in the English language ; then for reasons which gain weight and urgency because of this: because it is the first great poem that Keats wrote, because he wrote it at an incredibly early age—in the very month that he became twenty-one—because it was to take him many months, even of his brief and pregnant poetic life, to reach such certain mastery again, and finally because he wrote it with an astonishing speed. There are not many poems so well worth contemplating as this one.

But before we contemplate it let us have in mind the story of its composition. We owe the story to the friend of his youth, Charles Cowden Clarke, his young schoolmaster and intimate. The poem was written in October 1816. In 1816 Keats had left school some five years; he had served his apprenticeship to Hammond the surgeon at Edmonton, and had been living for some time in the Borough, studying for a diploma in medicine at Guy's Hospital, and also writing verses.

Keats and Cowden Clarke were in the habit of meeting together for literary discussion. One day in October Clarke was lent a copy of Chapman's *Homer* in folio, and Keats was immediately summoned over in the evening to Clarke's lodging in Clerkenwell to share the feast. They read Chapman together till dawn; then Keats went home to his lodgings in Cheapside, whither he had but lately moved out of the Borough. At 10 o'clock in the morning Clarke found the sonnet on his breakfast table.

That Clarke's narrative is substantially true seems plain from the attendant circumstances he gives. The particulars of the achievement had very naturally made a deep impression upon him. He was at the time Keats' most intimate friend, and he had been scarcely less excited than Keats himself by the opportunity of reading Chapman. (There were no cheap reprints in those days—you had your Chapman in folio or not at all.) And Clarke remembered turning up the shipwreck at the end of the fifth Odyssey and Keats' "delighted stare" at a truly magnificent phrase —

> "Then forth he came, his both knees falt'ring, both
> His strong hands hanging down, and all with froth
> His cheeks and nostrils flowing, voice and breath
> Spent to all use, and down he sank to death.
> *The sea had soaked his heart through* . . ."

It is exactly the phrase that would have brought a "delighted stare" into Keats' eyes. The quality of Clarke's memory of this particular occasion is evident: we may rely upon it.

There is no need to make the vain effort to establish precisely how long it took Keats to write his sonnet. The important facts are simple. It was written between daybreak and breakfast-time one day in October 1816, the month when Keats became twenty-one. It is one of the great sonnets in the English language, and it was the first great poem Keats wrote. If the words "inspiration" is ever to be used in literary criticism it might be used with some propriety here.

. . . . . .

Now let us look at the sonnet as Cowden Clarke found it on his breakfast-table that October morning. Three hours before there was nothing: now a masterpiece, a possession for ever, has been dropped into the lap of the world. It has not quite all the perfections of its final form. By one whole line, and one perfect epithet, it differs from the sonnet with which we are familiar.[1] But even if these had never been changed the sonnet would still hold its same sovereign place in English poetry :—

"Much have I travelled in the realms of gold
And many goodly states and kingdoms seen,
Round many a Western island have I been
Which bards in fealty to Apollo hold ;
Oft of one wide expanse had I been told
Which deep-browed Homer ruled as his demesne
Yet never could I judge what men could mean
Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold.
Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
When a new planet swims into his ken ;
Or like stout Cortez, when with wond'ring eyes
He stared at the Pacific,—and all his men
Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
Silent, upon a peak in Darien."

What is the impression produced by the sonnet upon us? Impressions of this sort are hard to define: but here one seems to be predominant and recognisable.

We receive an impression of excitement so intense that the declared and actual subject of the poem is as it were dissolved away by it. It is almost impossible not to forget that it is all about a book—Chapman's translation of *Homer*. There is a direct communication of emotion, which grows swifter and swifter, till in the final picture of Cortez, half visual, half abstract, it touches a consummation: the image is not merely stamped upon our minds by the emotional force of the poem, but the image gathers up, clinches, makes tangible, the emotional content of the poem. Cortez on the peak—it is the perfect culmination of the sonnet. All that the sonnet really means is crammed into that final image: it is the flower of the plant, the purpose and the essence of the created thing.

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[1] In the first form line 7 became "Yet never did I breathe its pure serene"; and line 11, "Or like stout Cortez, when with eagle eyes." On the first of these changes a good deal of curious information might be given.

Let us leave this for a moment and examine the sonnet more coldly, putting aside, if we can, the immediate and overwhelming impression. We observe that the imagery of exploration and discovery is maintained from the beginning.

> "Much have I *travelled* in the realms of gold,
> And many goodly states and kingdoms seen,
> Round many western islands have I been . . .
> Oft of one wide expanse had I been told . . ."

From the first line the poet is a traveller, an explorer, voyaging among islands, discovering the realms of gold: he hears on his travels persistent rumours and reports of a great *El dorado*. The word of the conquistadors is helpful; for the phrase " the realms of gold " is become so familiar, so much a part of current speech, that we forget that when Keats used it it was original.[1] And it had come, I fancy, from the same reading whence came his picture of Cortez. " *El dorado* " means simply " the realm, or the city, of gold." Keats was, to his own mind, a conquistador with Chapman's *Homer* for his new-found land.

In the first two lines of the sestet—

> "Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
> When a new planet swims into his ken,"

the imagery is slightly changed—he becomes the explorer not of earth but of heaven—an astronomer who has discovered a new planet; but the change, instead of weakening the poem, quite definitely strengthens and enriches it: it gives an infinite extension to its imaginative scope—to the yet unlimited earth the illimitable heavens are added, and by the exquisite use of the word " swims " is created an impression of ethereal stillness, a background of quiet translunary spaces, against which the figure of Cortez on his peak emerges with tremendous and craggy definition.

So that, on a colder examination, the immediate impression that the image of Cortez on the peak in Darien is the natural and, so to say, organic culmination of the poem, is fully substantiated. At the very outset Keats imagines himself as the explorer in search of *El dorado*, and when finally he likens himself to the mightiest of the conquistadors, at the supreme moment of discovery, he has carried the imagery with which he began to the pinnacle of its potentialities.

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[1] Leigh Hunt, in publishing the poem in *The Examiner*, December 1816, objected to the vagueness of the phrase.

It is one of the greatest sonnets in the English language: its immediate effect is startling, and perhaps this cold-blooded analysis has yielded some reason why this is so. The unity of the poem lies deep and is *organic:* in the first line the last is implicit, as a flower is implicit in a seed. And this perfect unity is achieved by what appears, on still closer examination, an almost miraculous subtlety.

Considered in its imagery alone, as we have seen, the poem is a perfect whole—one single and complex metaphor, as intricate as it is clear. There is a real progression, as it were a crescendo, of the imagery which seems to grow out of itself. It completely satisfies Keats' own demand upon poetry which he formulated eighteen months later.

> "The rise, the progress, the setting of Imagery should, like the sun, come natural to him (the reader), shine over him, and set soberly, although in magnificence, leaving him in the luxury of twilight."—Letter to Taylor, February 27, 1818.

Almost certainly Keats, when he wrote those words, was not thinking of this sonnet, and yet there could not be a more exact description of its peculiar magnificence. The quality of his unconscious achievement had become, in eighteen months more, his conscious ideal. That happened often with Keats; it is, indeed, the most profound and persistent trait in his character, and this submission of the consciousness to the unconscious was to become, in his brief and dazzling maturity, not only his declared philosophy, but the means by which he achieved his most consummate poetical perfections. And we may take " the progress and the setting of Imagery " in this sonnet as the concrete example in which we can glimpse the meaning of Coleridge's penetrating, but more intellectual *dictum*, which is so often misinterpreted :—

> "Images, however faithfully copied from Nature, and as accurately represented in words, do not of themselves characterise the poet. They become proofs of original genius only so far as they are modified by a predominant passion, or by associated thoughts and images awakened by that passion."

That is to say, imagery must not assume a *raison d'être* of its own; it must exist, not for its own sake, but as subordinated to the predominant emotion, which it has at once to obey, to express, and to communicate. Only in so far as it does this will it, in Keats' words, "come natural to the reader": otherwise it will merely distract him. In other words, on the side of the poet the imagery and the emotion must be one: "rise, progress, and set" together in a perfect accord.

And this, the most singular manifestation of original poetic genius, is the final wonder of Keats' sonnet. The unity of imagery and emotion is astonishing: in the octave, the imagery and emotion of eager exploration; in the sestet, the imagery and emotion of breathless discovery. The rhythm of the imagery precisely corresponds to, nay is indistinguishable from, the rhythm of emotion: and with a subtlety truly miraculous. For mark: never have the true capacities of the Petrarcan sonnet form been more cunningly realised; the octave and the sestet have each their separate crescendo. The rhythm of imagery and emotion of the whole sonnet is reduplicated in either part. In the first the silence of eager expectation and impotent surmise is triumphantly broken by

> "Till I heard Chapman speak out loud and bold;"

in the second, where a repetition of the actual effect is impossible, because Chapman's *Homer* has been discovered and the discovery cannot be undone, its equivalent is nevertheless compassed by a master-stroke of intuitive genius, by a sort of imaginative parallelism. The silence of infinite space is first suggested, and against that silence absolute the silence of Cortez sounds like a thunder-crash.

Analysis will not carry us farther than this revelation of the intricate structure of the harmony which makes so single and so signal an effect upon us. And, paradoxically, the more the intricacy of the structure is realised the more impossible it becomes to conceive that the poem was constructed deliberately as a watchmaker constructs a chronometer. The complexity, the more closely we comprehend it, the more obviously is the complexity of an organism. To find an analogue or explanation for it we are forced to go to the new-born animal, before whose birth there is indeed a long period of elaboration, but the elaboration is unconscious, and occurs in the darkness of the womb.

Yet, apart from the initial difficulty of applying such a theory—to the genesis of a poem—namely, that if the elaboration is unconscious, *ex hypothesi*, we can know nothing about it, and it must remain a pure conjecture—how is it possible to call such a theory in aid in the present case when we know that Keats had read Chapman's *Homer* for the first time on the evening before he wrote his sonnet, and that he went on reading it till the break of day ? Within two or three hours after that the sonnet was written.

. . . . . .

Let us begin our inquiry by returning to the first immediate impression made by the sonnet. We are conscious of a certain discrepancy between the emotional content of the poem and its ostensible cause: as we have said, for the reader of the poem Chapman's *Homer* is as it were dissolved away in the intensity of the emotion it is supposed to have excited. That noble book, in its own quiddity, passes out of question ; its function is not its own self-existence, but rather to be a symbol of something beyond itself, a point of crystallisation for a condition of thought and feeling which existed in independence of it. Chapman's *Homer*, we feel, has served the office of a spark to ignite a highly combustible gas in the poet's mind into a flash of perfect incandescence. The force of the explosion is as great as the flame is beautiful.

Of so much a sensitive reader is conscious through a simple submission of himself to the isolated sonnet. But if he goes further and reads it no longer in isolation, but in its native setting among Keats' poetry of this period—that is to say, if he reads it in its place in Keats' first volume of poetry—the immediate impression becomes more definite. He becomes aware, at first perhaps only vaguely, that this particular sonnet, besides being the one perfect poem in that uneven and exciting book, is a perfect crystallisation of a mood of thought and feeling which exists in solution throughout the volume. In the sonnet Keats succeeded in expressing, with a strange completeness and concision, a complex condition of thought and feeling which finds imperfect and partial utterance in nearly all his serious poems of the same period.

The condition is not easy to describe, it needs to be demonstrated ; but we may call it, provisionally, the ardour of exploration and the excitement of discovery.

We are first aware of it as a baffled ardour of exploration of two different realms—Poetry and Nature. In the *Epistle* *to George Felton Matthew*, written at the end of 1815, he cries :—

> "Far different cares
> Beckon me sternly from soft Lydian airs
> And hold my faculties so long in thrall
> That I am oft in doubt whether at all
> I shall again see Phœbus in the morning . . ."

Keats was, we must remember, working at medicine in the Borough. The Borough was a dirty place, and the lodgings of medical students there, to judge by Dickens' account of Bob Sawyer's rooms in Lant Street, took the colour of their surroundings. In the same *Epistle* Keats laments that even if he had the time for poetry he could not write it there :—

> "But might I now each passing moment give
> To the coy Muse, with me she would not live
> In this dark city."

The darkness and the gloom forbid. From the first quotation it is already apparent that for Keats Nature and Poetry are one. " Soft Lydian airs " are the virtual equivalent of " seeing Phœbus in the morning." The idea that he might be the poet of a city of dreadful night never entered his head. Nature and Poetry are one ; and he is chained prisoner from both. Again :—

> "O Solitude, if I must with thee dwell
> Let it not be among the jumbled heap
> Of murky buildings : climb with me the steep—
> Nature's observatory—whence the dell,
> Its flowering slopes, the river's crystal swell
> May seem a span. . . ."

He had evidently broken his bonds for a moment and climbed out of the smoky Borough ; his escape is more certain in another sonnet.

> "To one who has been long in city pent
> 'Tis very sweet to look into the fair
> And open face of heaven—to breathe a prayer
> Full in the smile of the blue firmament."

What had happened ? He had found his way to Hampstead Heath ; and not merely to Nature and Poetry in the simple sense, but to the company of a poet. Cowden Clarke had shown some of Keats' verses to Leigh Hunt. Hunt had been, as he himself tells us, " fairly surprised with the truth of their ambition and ardent grappling with nature," [1] and had invited Keats to his cottage in the Vale of Health on the

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[1] *The Examiner*, December 1, 1816.

Heath. To Hunt's cottage Keats went often, in the spring of 1816, and stayed long. (Even his first visit, says Clarke, was prolonged into three morning calls.) He departed reluctantly. Two of his sonnets of 1816 are concerned with his journeys back to the Borough from Hunt's cottage. One describes, with singular charm, his walk back beneath the stars:—

> "Keen fitful gusts are whisp'ring here and there
> Among the bushes half leafless and dry,
> The stars look very cold about the sky
> And I have many miles on foot to fare.
> Yet feel I little of the cool bleak air
> Or of the dead leaves rustling drearily,
> Or of those silver lamps that burn on high,
> Or of the distance from home's pleasant lair:
> For I am brimful of the friendliness
> That in a little cottage I have found;
> Of fair-haired Milton's eloquent distress
> And all his love for gentle Lycid drown'd;
> Of lovely Laura in her light green dress
> And faithful Petrarch gloriously crown'd."

We are fairly safe in dating that in the very month of the Chapman sonnet; and probably the other sonnet, definitely entitled *On Leaving Some Friends at an Early Hour*, belongs to the same moment. In the first he had been brimful of friendly and excited talk of poetry as he shaped the lines on his long walk home; but the excitement was comparatively calm. In the second sonnet it could scarcely be controlled at all:—

> "Give me a golden pen, and let me lean
> On heaped-up flowers, in regions clear, and far;
> Bring me a tablet whiter than a star . . ."

It is absurd, preposterous; but it comes off. The purity of sheer enthusiasm carries it:—

> "The while let music wander round my ears,
> And as it reaches each delicious ending,
> Let me write down a line of glorious tone,
> And full of many wonders of the spheres:
> For what a height my spirit is contending!
> 'Tis not content so soon to be alone."

Such was the ambition with which his contact with Nature and Poetry together at Hampstead had filled him. But we have outrun chronology. We have passed from early spring to autumn. Let us go back to the spring, to his first meeting with Hunt.

Hunt published a poem of his—the sonnet on *Solitude*—

on May 6, 1816, in *The Examiner*. No doubt to Keats, as to any common slave of the inkpot, publication was a tangible evidence of vocation. His mind forsook his gallipots, once and for all. He must be with Nature and Poetry. He walked the Heath; he stood tiptoe upon his little hill, by the gate which leads from the Heath to the field by Ken Wood. It was not enough. He must go away. And away he went to Margate—to something he had not seen before, the sea. In August he writes an *Epistle* to his brother George:—

> "Full many a dreary hour have I past,
> My brain bewildered, and my mind o'ercast
> With heaviness: the seasons when I've thought
> No sphery strains by me could e'er be caught
> From the blue dome."

Again Nature and Poetry are one: the sphery strains are caught direct from the blue dome. All his three *Epistles*, to Matthew, to George, to Cowden Clarke, are concerned with a single theme, his consuming ambition to write poetry and his conviction that poetry is somehow directly created in the poet's soul by Nature. Nature is poetry—"The poetry of earth is never dead"—but to his knowledge of Nature one thing is now added—the ocean. "E'en now," he writes to George:—

> "E'en now I am pillared on a bed of flowers
> That crowns a lofty cliff, which proudly towers
> Above the ocean waves . . ."

So in his *Epistle* the simple fact; in his sonnet of the same time to the same brother George, he tells of the significance.

> "The Ocean with its vastness, its blue green,
> Its ships, its rocks, its caves, its hopes, its fears,
> Its voice mysterious, which whoso hears,
> Must think on what will be and what has been."

Let us pause to gather together the scattered threads of this tumultuous condition of thought and feeling. A double excitement was fermenting in Keats: the excitement of a discovery of Nature and of a far fuller discovery of poetry. But the excitement is one, and its unity finds lovely utterance in the lines of "I stood tiptoe upon a little hill."

> "Open afresh your round of starry folds
> Ye ardent marigolds!
> Dry up the moisture from your golden lids
> For great Apollo bids
> That in these days your praises should be sung
> On many harps which he has lately strung."

Keats' harp, we may be sure, was one of them. He is at once exploring Nature and his own powers of poetry; and the two explorations are a single process. Elsewhere in the same poem his power of poetry is precisely identified with his power of response to Nature. Nature creates her poet. The poet's mind is

> "ever startled by the leap
> Of buds into ripe flowers; or by the flitting
> Of divers moths, that aye their nest are quitting;
> Or by the moon lifting her silver rim
> Above a cloud, and with a gradual swim,
> Coming into the blue with all her light."

(There, unmistakably, is the naïve and charming bud of the full-flowered :—

> "Then felt I like some watcher of the skies
> When a new planet *swims* into his ken.")

And Keats goes on, after an apostrophe to the moon :—

> "For what has made the sage or poet write
> But the fair paradise of Nature's light?"

So the ardour of exploration and the excitement of discovery become threefold: of the loveliness of Nature, of the loveliness of poetry, and of his own power to utter the loveliness of Nature in poetry. And as his excitement accelerates, so does his confidence in his own powers. In the sonnet *Great spirits now on earth are sojourning*, there is no mistakino the reference of :—

> "And other spirits there are standing apart
> Upon the forehead of the age to come;
> These, these will give the world another heart
> And other pulses."

It is to himself.

Now let us take stock of our materials—what we have gathered toward the making of the Chapman sonnet. The moment is apt, for that spirit "standing apart upon the forehead of the age to come" is singularly reminiscent of Cortez on his peak in Darien. We have the ardour of exploration, the excitement of discovery: of Nature, of Poetry, and of Keats' own powers of poetry. We have an ocean, that speaks to him unutterable things, upon which he looks down from a lofty cliff. We have, if not a planet, a moon, to whom he cries :—

> "O maker of sweet poets, dear delight
> Of this fair world and all its simple livers,"

whom he had described first in *Calidore,*

"Lovely the moon in ether, all alone,"

and later as " swimming into the blue with all her light."

The discovery of poetry—the thing in itself and his own powers of it—the discovery of the moon, the discovery of the ocean. Since Nature and Poetry are one to him, why should not all these be the same ? But how to express these as discoveries ? The moon had been discovered—why not a new planet ? The ocean had been discovered—why not the ocean when it was unknown ?

A good deal seems to be gathered together in Keats' unconsciousness. Can we follow it still nearer to the point of fusion ?

Keats' longest and most ambitious poem of this year 1816 was *Sleep and Poetry.* It was composed at intervals between the early autumn and the winter of the year. Part of it, perhaps the greater part of it, was written before the Chapman sonnet. In its entirety it belongs to the same moment, temporal and spiritual ; and its occasion, characteristically enough, was a white night spent on the sofa at Hunt's cottage, where he lay thinking of poetry, with a picture of Petrarch and Laura before his eyes.

"Most happy they !
For over them was seen a free display
Of outspread wings, and from between them shone
The face of Poesy : from off her throne
She overlook'd things that I scarce could tell.
The very sense of where I was might well
Keep sleep aloof : but more than that there came
Thought after thought to nourish up the flame
Within my breast : so that the morning light
Surprised me even from a sleepless night.
And up I rose refresh'd, and glad, and gay,
Resolving to begin that very day
These lines ; and howsoever they be done
I leave them as a father to his son."

Naturally there is not much about sleep in the poem ; as it was conceived in a night without sleep, so sleep in the poem is but the whiffler before the mighty king—Poetry. From the first we are conscious that the poet is straining to utter a conception of poetry too great for his words. He has had an intuition into a mystery, which he seeks again and again to declare. Poetry, he seems to be saying, is the instinctive response of the purified soul to the wonder and majesty of the Universe : through the poet the All finds voice.

> "To see the laurel-wreath, on high suspended,
> That is to crown our name when life is ended.
> Sometimes it gives a glory to the voice
> And from the heart up-springs, rejoice ! rejoice !
> Sounds which will reach the Framer of all things
> And die away in ardent mutterings.
> No one who once the glorious sun has seen
> And all the clouds, and felt his bosom clean
> For his great Maker's presence, but must know
> What 'tis I mean, and feel his being glow."

Suddenly comes the bitter thought that he may not live to achieve the poetry he dreams of, and he cries :—

> "O for ten years, that I may overwhelm
> Myself in poesy ! so I may do the deed
> That my own soul has to itself decreed."

Then he tries to explain what the deed is. "First, the realm I'll pass of Flora, and old Pan," which indeed he did pass, though not as the crow flies, in *Endymion*. But that indulgence of his delight in the loveliness of Nature is only the prelude to his real purpose.

> "Yes, I must pass them for a nobler life
> Where I may find the agonies, the strife
> Of human hearts."

Clear enough, it seems ; he will leave the world of Nature for the world of men and women. But the reason he gives is startling—"for lo ! I see . . . a car." He has a vision of a chariot and a charioteer, who drives from the sky to the mountains, from the mountains to a concourse of "shapes of delight and mystery and fear," to whom he listens, "awfully intent." The detail of the vision is obscure ; but it is plain that the charioteer is some strange embodiment of the spirit of Poetry, and that the vision meant much to Keats, for his next words are deeply felt :—

> "The visions all are fled—the car is fled
> Into the light of heaven, and in their stead
> A sense of real things comes doubly strong,
> And, like a muddy stream, would bear along
> My soul to nothingness ; but I will strive
> Against all doubtings, and will keep alive
> The thought of that same chariot and the strange
> Journey it went."

So ends the first "movement" of the poem—an attempt to declare a mysterious significance of poetry, and a proclamation of his own intention to achieve it.

The second movement begins with the famous apostrophe :—

> "Is there so small a range
> In the present strength of manhood, that the high
> Imagination cannot freely fly
> As she was wont of old ?"

It is a vision of the present state of poetry in a country which had been its chosen home.

> "Who could paragon
> The fervid choir that lifted up a noise
> Of harmony, to where it aye will poise
> Its mighty self of convoluting sound,
> Huge as a planet, and like that roll round
> Eternally around a dizzy void ?"

We note that the great English poetry of the past is imaged as a planet rolling round, and pass to his denunciation of the age of reason that " blasphemed the bright lyrist to his face."

> "Ah, dismal-soul'd
> The winds of heaven blew, the ocean roll'd
> Its gathering waves—ye felt it not. The blue
> Bared its eternal bosom, and the dew
> Of summer night collected still to make
> The morning precious : Beauty was awake !
> Why were ye not awake ?"

Again we note that response to ocean, first seen by Keats a bare few weeks before, has become part of the acid test of true poetry. But now he exults, the time of barrenness is past. There is a rebirth of Poetry, and he hopes that, before he dies, she will regain all her past glories.

So to the third " movement." He will be charged with presumption. (He was, and most venomously, by Byron.) He will hide from the thunderbolt, if he hides at all, in the midmost light of Poetry. Against all charges of presumption he vindicates himself by reiterating his claim that he *knows*.

> "What though I am not wealthy in the dower
> Of spanning wisdom ; though I do not know
> The shiftings of the mighty winds that blow
> Hither and thither all the changing thoughts
> Of man ; though no great ministering reason sorts
> Out the dark mystery of human souls
> To clear conceiving : yet there ever rolls
> A vast idea before me, and I glean
> Therefrom my liberty ; thence too I've seen
> The end and aim of Poesy."

We note that an ocean rolls, a planet rolls ; but hardly an idea. But ocean, planet, and this idea were, by this time, all one to Keats' imagination. For this is the idea he has been trying to communicate throughout the poem—the idea of Poetry that he has discovered. He says so: "Thence too I've seen the end and aim of Poesy." And, though he cannot explain, it shines vast and lucid before him.

> "'Tis clear
> As anything most true; as that the year
> Is made of the four seasons, manifest
> As a large cross, some old cathedral's crest
> Lifted to the white clouds. Therefore should I
> Be but the essence of deformity,
> A coward, did my very eyelids wink
> At speaking out what I have dared to think.
> Ah, rather let me like a madman run
> Over some precipice: let the hot sun
> Melt my Dædalian wings, and drive me down
> Convulsed and headlong."

Better any fate than deny his discovery of the idea, the planet, the ocean. Cortez stands on his peak, and can no other. He looks out before him. What does he see? It is an ocean, after all.

> "Stay, an inward frown
> Of conscience bids me be more calm awhile.
> An ocean dim, sprinkled with many an isle,
> Spreads awfully before me. How much toil!
> How many days! what desperate turmoil!
> Ere I can have explored its widenesses.
> Ah, what a task! upon my bended knees
> I could unsay those—no, impossible;
> Impossible."

By these devious ways we have followed Cortez-Keats while he has climbed the steep to the peak in Darien to discover with wondering eyes the dim ocean before him. With him we stare at the Pacific: it is not exactly Chapman's *Homer*, but rather his vast and rolling idea of poetry, and his own poetry to be; and if we are at all his men we feel the tremor of a wild surmise: surely not less thrilling because the Peak in Darien is found in the final inquiry to be situate somewhere between the cliffs of Margate and the heights of Hampstead Heath.

. . . . .

But what can we claim to have accomplished by this inquiry? To have explained a great poem? Assuredly not. The act of composing the sonnet on Chapman's *Homer* remains unique and beyond analysis. But we can, I think, fairly claim to have substantiated the theory that the composition of a *great* poem is but a final conscious act supervening upon a long process of unconscious elaboration.[1]

Can we, with the help of our evidence, more clearly define the nature of this process? What elements can we distinguish in it?

First and foremost, a predominant, constantly recurring complex of thought and emotion. Throughout the period of unconscious elaboration Keats had been continually discovering more and more of what was to him the highest reality: Nature, Poetry, the Nature of Poetry; and the continual discovery was accompanied by an incessant emotional excitement. Whether his successive acts of discovery can properly be called "thoughts" will depend upon the philosophy of the man describing them; but "thoughts" they shall be for us, as they were for Keats:—

> "There came
> Thought after thought to nourish up the flame
> Within my breast . . ."

These successive thoughts (which some would call intuitions), accompanied by an incessant emotional excitement, form what Coleridge calls "a predominant passion," more exactly a persistent process of thought-emotion.

Second, in the service of this persistent thought-emotion the specific poetic-creative faculty has been continually at work to find means of expression for it. These means of expression are chiefly images derived from a series of particular sense-perceptions. Thus, the poet's first perception of the Moon:

> "Lovely the moon in ether all alone"

is refined to a subtler perception of her

> "Lifting her silver rim
> Above a cloud, and with a gradual swim
> Coming into the blue with all her light."

And this sense-perception is used to enable the poet to grasp his own thought of the nature of poetry. The smooth and lovely motion of the moon is a quality of the poetry he conceives:—

> "More strange, more beautiful, more smooth, more regal
> Than wings of swans, than doves, than dim-seen eagle."

So the image of the moon becomes an image of his thought of poetry.

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[1] "Unconscious" is here used quite arbitrarily, to denote a less complete awareness than that of the final act of creation. The nature of this "unconsciousness" is sufficiently defined in the course of the essay.

Again, he sees the sea for the first time, and that perception of the sea, with its attendant emotion, enables him once again to grasp his main thought with its emotion. The image of the vast ocean also becomes an image of his vast "idea" of poetry. Nay more, the very sound of the sea,

> "which whoso hears
> Must think on what will be and what has been,"

enables him to make audible, as the sigh of the sea to make visible his thought. Again, another aspect of his thought is grasped through the vision of himself standing alone on a cliff (at Margate) or on a hill (at Hampstead), staring with wondering eyes at the prospect before him. He is "a spirit standing apart upon the forehead of the age to come."

So the poet's mind has been accumulating through successive acts of sense-perception a series of images which can be assimilated into the main process of his thought and act as surrogates for it. And the condition of this assimilation is an emotional and qualitative correspondence. His perception of the moon is a delighted discovery, so is his perception of the ocean—in both the hidden loveliness of an unknown reality is revealed to him; therefore, both in the qualities discovered and in the emotion awakened in discovering them, these sense-discoveries are analogous to the main thought—discovery of the nature of poetry. With his senses he discovers Nature, with his thoughts he discovers the nature of poetry.

His two crowning sense-discoveries were those of the moon and sea, and those are instantly pressed into the service of his thought: the images of the moon and the ocean can serve at will to embody the objects of his thought. And he is able to think more exactly concerning the nature of poetry because the sensuous images of moon and ocean are become true symbols of the reality about which he is thinking. So that in the process of unconscious elaboration the continually progressing thought is given ever fresh definition and substance by the images it is able to assimilate; and, on the other hand, the images acquire a thought-content. The thought steadily gains focus and intensity; the images significance.

Suddenly this complex of thought and images, which is working itself towards an organic unity, is ejected into poetic form. What occasions this sudden birth? The dominant thought, with its attendant emotion, is given a final focus by a particular event. The discovery of the nature of poetry, which had been going on for months, is consummated by the discovery of Chapman's *Homer*. Utterance becomes urgent, necessary, inevitable. The means are at hand—images long since assimilated to that dominant thought-emotion, of which the discovery of Chapman is the final instance and occasion.

But there is a final creative act. If this unconscious preparation were all, we should imagine Keats in his sestet saying: "Then felt I—as I did when I discovered the moon, as I did when I discovered the ocean." But the moon was discovered long ago, and so was the ocean. It will not do. It must be: "Then felt I—as a man who discovers a new planet, as a man who discovers a new ocean." Then to his need came the memory of Robertson's *America*, which he had read as a schoolboy. An inexact memory—for as Tennyson pointed out, it was Balboa, not Cortez, who stared at the Pacific—but one definite enough to give the final perfection to his imagery.

Of the last act of poetic creation there is nothing to say. We cannot explain it; but it is no longer utterly miraculous. We have seen at least how the main materials lay ready prepared for the final harmonious ordering; part, and not the least part, of the final harmony had already been achieved; we may fairly say that the actual composition of this great poem was but the conscious last of a whole series of unconscious acts of poetic creation. And we may hazard the guess that it is this long period of unconscious preparation which distinguishes the great poem from the merely good one; but this is the reason why, in a great poem, the subject seems to be dissolved away in the incandescence of the emotion it kindles; and, finally, that this is the reason why the depths of significance in a great poem are inexhaustible.

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# HINDUISM AND CHRISTIANITY IN INDIA.

## A REPLY.

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MR H. G. D. **TURNBULL**, formerly a Professor in the Deccan College, Poona, India, challenges Dr Stanley Jones and myself, because we have each, in a book, given expression to the belief that the Hindu people will yet accept Christ, and also challenges Lord Meston for expressing a similar conviction. Had I been still in India, it is possible that Dr Jones and I might have attempted a joint reply, but in the circumstances that is not possible. Hence this paper.

There can be no doubt that, on the surface, it seems as if Mr Turnbull were right; but many an unlikely prophetic hope such as grips us fast has, in the past, been fulfilled; and I therefore suggest that the basis of the whole Christian attitude and outlook had better be expressed before a summary judgment be passed against us.

I am quite well aware that in all parts of India educated Hindus as a class, like ordinary Hindus, have no intention of becoming Christians themselves, and are also utterly opposed to the Christianisation of the Hindu community. On this point I have no illusions. The fact is very soon driven into one's mind in conversation with individual Hindus. *At least 95 per cent. of the educated men and women of the Hindu community are definitely hostile to the upbuilding of the Christian Church in India.* This is absolutely true despite the other fact, that a percentage of them admire Christ sincerely, recognise the high values of His teaching and acknowledge the precious services which Christian Missions have done among the sick, the poor, the afflicted and the downtrodden in so many parts of the country.

How, then, have I reached the seemingly foolish conviction that in the future the Hindu people will accept the crucified Saviour and become a glorious Church for His service? There are a number of reasons which converge to make the idea seem to be something much stronger than a mere possibility.

A. During the first twenty years of my life in India practically my whole time was spent in direct Christian work among educated Hindus, first in Calcutta, later in visits to many other parts of India. The most significant sections of my experience during those years were the long conversations I had with individual Hindus on religious matters. In some cases a convinced Hindu did his utmost to show me the error of my Christian way of thinking; on other occasions a Hindu student would read portions of a Gospel with me and would attempt to get at its real meaning and value; but in a very large number of cases a Hindu, young or old, poured out the need, sorrow, repentance, anguish or aspiration of his soul and asked for sympathy and Christian advice. A part of my work was thus of the nature of a clinic, and in that my experience gradually reached form and clearness; and the outcome of the whole was the conviction that *in Hinduism there is nothing that can take the place of the living Saviour who, in love for man, became man, died for our redemption, but rose again, and now lives to lead us, through repentance and spiritual cleansing, to a new life of devotion, obedience and dependence on Him for all our religious needs.* Such, in barest outline, was my experience in dealing with many men through many years.

The evidence on which this judgment is based is too intimate, sacred and detailed to be set down or analysed in such an article as this; but it belongs so certainly to the innermost shrine of human personality, of conscience and of religious experience that the man who passes through it cannot doubt as to what it implies as to the final relations of the Hindu spirit with Jesus Christ.

Very few of these men gave up all things and accepted baptism, but there could be no doubt about the facts, and many of them frankly acknowledged the truth. Most of them found the price of discipleship too great to pay and therefore drew back; but about the reality of the truth there could be to them or to me no doubt whatever. Jesus is the healer of all the diseases of the Hindu heart and soul, and apart from Him the awakened soul cannot find pardon, peace and spiritual healing.

Along other lines of effort and experience I saw and realised to the full the very high value of Christ's principles in relation to Hindu society and life, as we shall see later in this paper.

Thus throughout this period of personal religious intercourse with individual Hindus there was demonstrated in my own experience the supreme value of the death of Christ, the absolute quality of His ethical laws, the healing and convincing power of His teaching, the great attraction of His personality, all in relation to the Hindu soul and to Hindu society, and the eagerness with which many Hindus would accept Christ as Lord and Saviour, were it not for the loss of home and relatives and the dire ban on the man who becomes a full Christian.

The outcaste or the villager can, in most cases, become a Christian with little loss or none, but in the case of the educated man or woman the ordeal is in most cases very serious indeed. Here and there I have known an educated man who accepted baptism and yet suffered very little, but such a case is one in a thousand.

B. There are then certain large facts of a more visible order which suggest to the reflective mind that forces are already working in India which seem to presage a great overturning in the future.

(1) I begin with the most important fact that *Hinduism is a polytheism*, while modern thought carries within it the conviction that the whole universe, in all its inconceivable vastness, is one, and is therefore the creation, the expression, the garment of a single Supreme Spirit. Hence to open-eyed men *nothing less than a faith which acknowledges, obeys and adores the Supreme Spirit* can be the religion of modern men. Anything less than that is to modern thought sheer futility.

In full conformity with this inevitable conviction on the character of real religion stands the largest of all the facts of religious history, viz. this, that during the last nineteen centuries there has been *a vast movement of the human family out of polytheism into monotheism.* When the Christian era dawned, there were only two groups of real monotheists on earth, neither very large, the people of Israel and the Zoroastrians of Persia. For uncounted millenniums the religions of all the races of men had been polytheisms; and with those two exceptions, they were still polytheisms in the first century A.D.

The following figures, the most reliable obtainable, enable us to realise, at least roughly, how many monotheists there are in the world to-day :[1]

| | Millions. |
|---|---|
| Christians . . . . | 682 |
| Moslems . . . . | 234 |
| Jews . . . . . | 15 |
| Zoroastrians . . . . | $\frac{1}{10}$ |
| | 931$\frac{1}{10}$ millions. |

The whole population of the world is believed to number over 1800 millions at the present time. Thus half of the whole human family are already in the monotheistic camp. While in the childhood of the race polytheism was the only possible form of religion, it is altogether behind the times to-day. The change since the first century is very great, for at that time nearly all men were polytheists. Thus the importance of the movement towards monotheism can scarcely be exaggerated. Clearly it has mighty forces behind it.

We may also note at this point the very large fact that more than one-third of the human race call themselves Christians to-day.

(2) There is a widespread feature of modern Hinduism which fits perfectly into the idea which we have just emphasised, that the necessary outcome of the pressure of modern science and philosophy upon educated minds is the conviction that nothing less than monotheism is fit to be the religion of thinking men.

The feature of present-day Hinduism to which we refer is this, that although Hinduism is actually a polytheism, *practically every educated Hindu calls himself a monotheist* and expects to be recognised as such by Moslems, Zoroastrians and Christians. What justification do they offer for the claim ? It is built on the position of the chief god in the case of each of the great Hindu sects. We shall deal with the two greatest of all the sects.

(*a*) There is first the notable group who follow the great thinker Śaṅkarāchārya and repeat the ancient Upanishad utterance, *Ekaṁ eva aditīyaṁ*, "One there is and there is no second." But this is monism, not monotheism : God, in this system, is the supreme *Ātman* (*i.e.* Self), impersonal, unknowable, actionless, who hears no prayer,[1] accepts no worship, grants no boon. Thus the Hindu monist *cannot* worship the one impersonal Supreme. He *acknowledges* the one impersonal God and meditates on Him, but he *worships* a group of five of the ordinary Hindu gods, viz. *Brahmā*, *Vishṇu*, *Śiva*, *Sūrya*, and the goddess, *Devī*, or some other group. Thus each faithful follower of Śaṅkarāchārya, like the great leader himself, is both a monist and a polytheist, but cannot by any stretch of the imagination be conceived as a monotheist. To call such a system a monotheism is simply a gross abuse of language.

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[1] In Northern India there are a few sects which sprang originally from the monotheistic teaching of Kabir (c. 1440–1518 A.D.) ; but, in most cases, they have degenerated and now practise either the worship of the original founder of the group, or of the living religious teacher, or of the sacred book. Their position is thus most ambiguous.

(*b*) We shall take next a member of the Śrī-Vaishṇava sect, the most distinguished of all the Hindu sects, the sect of the famous philosophic thinker Rāmānuja, whose philosophy is definitely theistic. In this system Vishṇu is held to be the supreme God of the universe, and he is declared to be personal. Hence the Śrī-Vaishṇava says, "I am a monotheist."

Yet, strange to say, this "monotheist" worships not only *Vishṇu*, but also all his consorts, especially *Śrī* (*i.e.* the goddess of beauty and wealth) and *Bhū* (*i.e.* the earth); also all the incarnations of Vishṇu, especially *Rāma* and *Kṛishna*; and also all their consorts and companions, especially *Sītā* the wife of *Rāma*, *Rukmiṇī* the wife of *Kṛishṇa*, and Rāma's faithful henchman, *Hanumān*, the divine monkey. This whole group and many more are revered by the Śrī-Vaishṇava and are worshipped through images. He also worships his *guru* (*i.e.* the living man who is his religious teacher) as God. Further, the Śrī-Vaishṇava, while he worships only Śrī-Vaishṇava gods, acknowledges all the other gods included in the Hindu pantheon but worshipped by other sects. Will any sane man call this system a monotheism? Yet every Hindu sect is in the same predicament; each is richly polytheistic. Thus we need carry our study no farther: to call educated Hindus monotheists is gross misrepresentation of the facts.

On the other hand, the fact that these men, almost without exception, call themselves monotheists is proof clear as noonday that, as modern men, they cannot acknowledge themselves polytheists, but must represent themselves as worshipping only the one God of the universe. Thus *the*

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[1] Contrast the living monotheism of the Bible:—

"O thou that hearest prayer,
Unto thee shall all flesh come."—Psa. lxv. 2.

*educated mind of India has already moved a long lap away from Hinduism in the direction of Christianity.*

(3) In India during the last 100 years practically every form of Hinduism, and also Zoroastrianism and Islam, have come under Christian influence so seriously that some thirty fresh religious organisations [1] have been formed, each created with the definite purpose of leavening the old religious system with just so much Christian and modern reform as shall enable the constituency to weather the serious storms in which the new ideas and practices of the Church and the advance of modern thought have involved the educated classes in all parts of the country. Perhaps *the Brāhma Samāj, the Prārthanā Samāj* and *the Ārya Samāj* [2] are the most influential of these movements, but all have proved vigorous and effectual in varying measure. They form the second and perhaps the most noticeable indication of the extraordinary impact of Christianity.

The truth is that in these movements Christianity is omnipresent. All teach either monotheism or some form of theology which can be dressed in monotheistic robes. God in each is called the Father of men; and the brotherhood of all men is emphasised, even in those organisations which represent Caste as a most healthy form of community life! Idolatry is in most cases abandoned; but some leaders defend it and use it. In a number of these organisations one finds, instead of temple-worship, a religious service, consisting of *prayer*, *praise*, *readings from a sacred book* and *exhortation*, precisely like a simple Protestant service. The methods of propaganda used by these groups are in all cases copied from Christian Missions. Here, then, is Christian influence being disseminated by Hindus through their own defensive organisations.

(4) The educated class in India to-day is dominated by the idea that the people of India must become a vigorous, self-governing, modern nation. They also see plainly that national vigour and the capacity for self-government are impossible without the peculiar acquirements and characteristics of a modern people. Hence their passion for the spread of education and enlightenment, for the uplift of all backward communities, for the strengthening of the press and for the introduction of certain measures of social reform.

There are other countries to-day which share these admirable aspirations with India, notably Turkey. In her eagerness for progress the young republic has already shown large courage and large common sense, and presumably will go farther. The Turks have one great advantage over the Hindu people in the fact that they are already monotheists: thus far they are modern men. Yet they have felt the need of the introduction of large reforms. Within the last few months they have:

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[1] See my *Modern Religious Movements in India*, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1915.

[2] See Mr Turnbull's article, p. 619.

A. Made polygamy illegal;
B. Made the sexes equal in the matter of divorce;
C. Made the wearing of the veil illegal.

Since these new social rules became part of the Turkish law, the Government has proposed certain reforms connected with worship which are likely soon to be legalised, viz.:

A. That the language of worship should be Turkish instead of Arabic;
B. That worshippers should not put off their shoes as they enter a mosque;
C. That seats should be provided for worshippers in the mosques;
D. That music and singing should form part of the worship;
E. That the day of worship should be not the sixth but the first day of the week.

The interest of the three new laws regarding polygamy, divorce and the veil is this, that each is in full accordance with the spirit of Christ; while each of the new regulations proposed for worship is a clear approximation to Christian practice.

It is a matter of the utmost interest that these changes have been proposed by the Turkish Government, not from any religious motive, but solely because it is believed they will conduce to national health and prosperity. We must also note that each of the eight changes is a direct violation of Koranic law.

These reforms are mentioned here because they are parallel to a great many social changes which during the past 100 years have been introduced into Hindu society, partly by legal enactment, in the main through changes in public opinion. Here is a list of the more notable of these reforms:

1827–35. Female infanticide put down by Lord Bentinck.
1829. Widow-burning prohibited.
1829–36. The Thugs, an organisation of robber-stranglers, put down.

| | |
|---|---|
| 1848–56. | Obscenities connected with Hinduism prohibited. |
| 1856. | The first Widows' Home organised by Missionaries. |
| 1856. | Hindu Widow Re-marriage legalised. |
| 1860–70. | Child-marriage, polygamy, enforced widowhood, caste, all repudiated by the Brāhma Samāj. |
| 1872. | Brāhma inter-caste marriages legalised. |
| 1875. | The founder of the Ārya Samāj opposes child-marriage. |
| 1887. | The first Widows' Home organised by a Hindu. |
| 1891. | The minimum age of marriage for girls fixed at twelve. |
| 1903. | Hindu opinion roused on the subject of the Out-castes. |
| 1905. | Mr Gokhale organises *The Servants of India Society.* |
| 1906. | *The Depressed Classes Mission* formed by Hindus to help Outcastes. |
| 1908. | *The Seva Sadan* organised by Hindus to serve poor women. |
| 1909. | Hindu protest against the tonsure of Hindu widows. |
| 1913. | Act for the better protection of girls. |

What we require chiefly to note is that most of these social and religious changes, both in Turkey and in India, are, on the one hand, *inconsistent with the rules and customs of the national religion*, but, on the other, are all *in full accordance with the teaching and the spirit of Jesus.*

Thus Christ is bringing national health and strength to the Hindu people.

(5) About one-sixth of the whole population of India, *i.e.* a mass of humanity larger than the whole population of Great Britain and Ireland, are *Outcastes*, *i.e.* people of such low origin and culture that for more than 2000 years Hindus have regarded them as too foul for ordinary human intercourse. They have thus been kept *outside the Caste system*, and Hindus take care not to touch them: hence they are frequently called "The Untouchables." The result of this severe and long-continued ostracism has necessarily been that these poor people have made no progress, but remain gross, unclean, uneducated, untrained, with only the slightest rudiments of culture to this day.

Missions have drawn scores of thousands of those human brothers of ours into the Christian Church, and the work still goes on. But the point of living interest in the story lies here, that the touch of Christ soon fills these people with another spirit: they become new men and women; they cultivate cleanliness, take a pride in their houses and eagerly seek education for their children. Above all, their character at once begins to rise and expand in the love and sunshine of Christ. Hindus frankly recognise the very great value of the influence of Christ in their case; and the Christianised Outcaste is no longer treated by Hindus as an Outcaste. In many a Christian High School the son or grandson of an Outcaste holds a good position as a teacher, and frequently has Brāhman boys as pupils. Thus does Jesus "lift up the needy from the dunghill."

(6) In every section of India one meets numbers of educated Hindus who are impressed with the character of Jesus, and some of them use the Lord's Prayer and read from the Gospels daily. I have met Hindu fathers who read selected passages from the Gospels with their children daily. Every Christian educationalist in India knows Hindu parents who deliberately send their children to Christian schools and colleges, in order that they may hear the Gospels read and expounded and may have the ethical teaching of Jesus planted in their hearts from their earliest years. Yet these men do not intend to become Christians themselves nor to make their children Christians.

Thus it is not merely the multiform service done by Christian Missions for the afflicted, the sick, the poor and the Outcaste that grips these men, nor even the fresh social and moral movements (mediated by Christ, as we have seen) which are slowly leavening Hindu society, but the moral and religious principles of the Saviour in all their depth and strength.

(7) But if Christ has already done so much for India, and if educated men in general recognise in a greater or less degree the value of His teaching, what do the educated classes think of Christ Himself? Mr Gāndhī calls Him "the Ideal Man," and if my experience is trustworthy a considerable percentage of educated Hindus would be ready to use the same phrase. It is heard also, nowadays, in the Far East, especially in China and Japan.

Yet neither Mr Gāndhī nor any other Hindu seems to realise what the phrase implies. Jesus is "the Ideal Man"; no other human being has approached Him. Whence, then, came this perfect mind and character, alone, unapproachable, among the crowding generations of men? How are we to account for this unparalleled miracle?

But the recognition of Jesus as the Ideal Man raises a much larger issue. It is recognised on all hands that He is the very embodiment of the religion which He preached; if then He is the ideal man, CHRISTIANITY MUST BE THE IDEAL RELIGION. How can Mr Gāndhī escape from that inference?

(8) Why do Hindus oppose Christianity? Is it because they believe that Hinduism is the absolute truth, the only religion which a thinking man can accept, and that Christianity is a very inferior system? I have seen one book in which an attempt was made to prove something of this nature, but Hindus themselves laughed the book out of court. That certainly is not the Hindu way of looking at the religions. The actual position of most educated men on the Hindu side may be summed up in the following paragraphs:

(*a*) Hinduism is part of our very constitution and nature; it is the spirit that informs our philosophic thought; it is the very foundation of our family and social life; it is intertwined with all that makes us men and a great people. To give it up would be to destroy all that is most precious to us in our spiritual, intellectual and daily life.

(*b*) Therefore we do not compare it with any foreign religion, but we clasp it to our hearts, and we tell our Christian friends that Hinduism, even if it be in some aspects inferior to certain foreign faiths, pleases us more than any other religion could and is sufficient for all the varied needs of the Hindu spirit.

(*c*) Thus it is perfectly clear that these men are still dominated by the polytheistic outlook on the world. So far as their way of thinking is concerned, a thousand religions may conceivably exist at this moment, each valid for its own people. There can be no such thing as *absolute religious truth*, valid for every mind, necessary for the health of every people, the spirit of the living God breathed out for the sustenance of His children.

C. Mr Turnbull gives us, in his article, a sketch of the higher elements of Hinduism, and he probably expects his readers to draw the conclusion that a people which possesses such a rich legacy of philosophy, literature and art, can never dream of adopting an altogether strange faith so alien to their spirit as Christianity seems to them to be.

No one who has seriously sought to appreciate Hindu philosophy, asceticism and devotion will be inclined to say a word against his outline of the riches of Hinduism. But may we not, quite reasonably, remind him of another land, still more famous than India for philosophy, science, literature and art, viz. ancient Greece? So far as my studies have gone, I have found no really first-rate Orientalist who speaks of the achievements of India as being equal to the triumphs of Greece.

Yet the ancient Greeks opposed, condemned and mocked at Christianity for three long centuries, and then accepted the Crucified and His teaching with such understanding and enthusiasm that they did more for its elucidation, expansion, stability than any other nation of antiquity. If ancient Greece, after centuries of contempt and opposition, laid aside polytheism to accept monotheism, and turned away from Zeus, Apollo, Hera and Aphrodite in passionate adoration of the crucified Nazarene, is it altogether incredible that India also should tread the path of renunciation and of acceptance of the Cross when the moment of supreme enlightenment at last arrives ?

Educated Hindus to-day detest the Christian movement, regarding it as a foreign force, destroying the beloved ancient faith and culture. But Jesus is no destroyer. He comes "not to destroy but to fulfil." [1] Did He destroy the glories of ancient Greece when the Greeks fell at His feet ? Nay, it was chiefly through the Church of Christ that during the early centuries the culture, the thought and the literature of Hellas were carried to all the nations of Europe, Eastern Asia and Northern Africa. European culture rests primarily on two foundations, Christ and Hellas. Many other nations have contributed to the rich stream, but these are the fountains.

When the great overturning will come, I do not know. I do not expect it in the near future, but that it is coming I can have no doubt. The Christian forces which, as has been shown in this paper, are now working for the uplift, remaking, regeneration of the Hindu people, will inevitably grow in strength and will produce still larger results as the decades pass. Educated Indian leaders within the Church are steadily rising in capacity and influence. The Bishop of Dornakal is but the most brilliant, the most prominent of a rapidly growing company. They have a great advantage over their Christian brethren from other lands, for they can speak to the heart of India as no outsider can. The movement among the Outcastes will go steadily forward, increasing in strength, in numbers, in influence : it is already a blazing portent of extreme significance to the whole civilised world. Fresh forms of Christian service and enlightenment will inevitably break out as the years pass, each adding to the value and the fruitfulness of the movement.

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[1] Matt. v. 17.

Thus a day will come when the light will break into the hearts of the leaders of Hinduism. Her most intellectual and spiritual men will at last see that Jesus brings light and life and that the Hindu needs His help. Then will they recognise in Jesus the Saviour of India and will fall at His feet in inexpressible gratitude and adoration.

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# THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE JOHANNINE CHRIST-TESTIMONIES.

## VINCENT TAYLOR, PH.D., D.D.

THE outstanding feature in current research relative to the Fourth Gospel is the attempt to give a constructive account of the origin and significance of the Johannine sayings of Christ. The value of this more positive approach, after the long and dreary debate about questions of date, authorship and attestation, can scarcely be exaggerated; it marks a definite advance into the hinterland after long-contested bases on the coast have been fixed by fairly general agreement. It is true, of course, that the significance of the Johannine sayings has always been felt to be the heart of the problem; but a thorough-going treatment has again and again been thwarted by the necessity of debating afresh introductory problems tangled almost beyond belief. What is characteristic of present-day investigation is the resolute effort to unravel the central mystery, and to enlist in the enterprise results gained from the study of Comparative Religion, Psychology, and Church History. New Testament research can undertake no more vital inquiry; for among the crucial interests involved are Christology, the permanent validity of the great creeds, and the justification for the attitude of *devotion* to the Person of Jesus Christ.

### I.

It will be of value, in the first place, to state broadly a point of view which has become widespread in Great Britain, inasmuch as it is precisely this attitude which is on its trial.

Few competent scholars of to-day are prepared to take the Johannine sayings just as they stand, and to say: "This is a transcript of what Jesus actually said." The differences between these sayings and those recorded in the Synoptics are too marked; and the similarities between the Johannine sayings of Christ, the words put into the mouth of the Baptist, the statements of 1 John and the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel are too patent. It is impossible to think that the two series of sayings, as they stand in John and the Synoptics, can have come from the cycle of Apostolic eye-witnesses. Moreover, the influence of external factors, stylistic, philosophical, and religious upon the form and thought of the Johannine sayings cannot be denied. The writer, whoever he was, breathed the air of a religious and intellectual environment which has clearly influenced all he has written, narratives and discourses alike. Recognising these facts of the situation, scholars for at least a quarter of a century have claimed that while John records things said and taught by Jesus, he records them, not in their spoken form, but as they are present to his own consciousness after long years of brooding and ripe Christian experience. The words are the words of Jesus interpreted and selected for a definite religious purpose: "These are written, that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name" (John xx. 31). This position is so well known that it needs no detailed illustration. It may, however, be of advantage, in the light of what is to follow, to have a clear statement of this view in the words of one of its leading exponents; and for this purpose we cannot do better than cite the words of the late Canon Sanday in *The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*:—

> "It has often been remarked that we are constantly left in doubt where the words of our Lord end and those of the Evangelist begin. Probably the Evangelist himself did not discriminate. A modern writer, in similar circumstances, would feel obliged to ask himself whether the words which he was setting down were really spoken or not; but there is no reason to suppose that the author of the Gospel would be conscious of any such obligation. He would not pause to put to himself questions, or to exercise conscious self-criticism. He would just go on writing as the spirit moved him. And the consequence is that historical recollections and interpretative reflection, the fruit of thought and experience, have come down to us inextricably blended" (*Op. cit.*, p. 167 f).

It should be added that since the time these words were written we have become still more mindful of the importance of the Evangelist's environment; none the less, the passage may be taken as representing the prevailing opinion among modern British New Testament scholars. The question at issue, forced upon us by current research, especially in Germany, Holland and France, is whether this hypothesis gives us a satisfactory psychological account of the origin of the Johannine Christ-Testimonies, or whether we ought not to be content to find in them later beliefs and experiences put back, without real historical justification, into the lips of Jesus of Nazareth.

## II.

In order to form an opinion on this issue some account must be given of the Evangelist's religious environment, so far at least as early Gnosticism and Mandaism are concerned.

Gnosticism, with its emphasis on knowledge and its dualistic explanation of the origin of the universe and of evil, is now known to have existed before the spread of Christianity; while its prevalence in the region where the Fourth Gospel saw the light is witnessed by the Johannine writings themselves. There is, in truth, in this literature a combination of tendencies both sympathetic and antagonistic to Gnostic conceptions, and it can hardly be a matter for surprise that the Gospel has recently been explained (H. Delafosse, *Le quatrième évangile*, 1925) as the catholised version of an original Gnostic-Marcionite writing. The original draft, Delafosse holds, was written by a disciple of Marcion about the year A.D. 135, while the redaction, the Gospel as it now stands, belongs to the years A.D. 170–175. In support of this view he discusses the attitude of the Johannine Christ to Mary (ii. 4), to the Old Testament, and to Moses and the Prophets (cf. x. 34), the teaching about the "Prince of this world" (xii. 31, xiv. 30, xvi. 11), the rejection of the idea of a fleshly resurrection, and the indications which seem to show that the Johannine Christ is *un être spirituel*, free from the ordinary laws of space and form (viii. 59). "Le Christ johannique n'a que les apparences du corps humain. . . . Le Christ johannique ne doit rien à David, ne doit rien à Marie. Il est venu directement du ciel dans la Galilée sans passer par Bethléem, sans passer par Nazareth" (*op. cit.*, p. 30). All that cannot be attributed to this *Grundschrift* is, of course, the work of the catholic redactor. It is not likely that this hypothesis will win much favour. Its delimitation of stages in the formation of the Gospel is arbitrary in the extreme: as well might we exhibit some of the works of Bishop Gore as the catholised redaction of critical writings. Again, as

Professor H. Windisch has pointed out, nowhere is the "Prince of this world" identified with the Creator (not to speak of other Marcionite dogmas), while Marcion's choice of Luke, and not John, as the basis for his editorial activity remains a mystery. We can, however, often learn much from theories with which we disagree, and I think it may truly be said that no one can read the work of Delafosse patiently without being impressed by the fact that the Fourth Gospel was written by a man whose mind was deeply influenced by ideas and tendencies which subsequently received cruder expression in Marcion's teaching.

Perhaps the more interesting part of current discussion is that which centres round Mandaism.

Living in communities along the lower courses of the Euphrates and the Tigris and in scattered bands farther east, the Mandæans of to-day are probably the descendants of a Palestinian community driven out of their original home by persecution. Their history and their sacred writings (the Ginza, the Book of John, and the Qolasta) have in recent years been studied by Lidzbarski, Reitzenstein, Bultmann, following on the earlier work of Brandt. Many striking passages about the King of Light and the despatch of his envoy, or Son, into the world have been cited as parallels to sayings and ideas found in the Johannine writings. Examples of these can be found in abundance in the second edition of W. Bauer's commentary on the Fourth Gospel (1925), and they are available for English readers in Mr G. R. S. Meade's translation of part of Bultmann's article (*Die Bedeutung der neuerschlossenen mandäischen und manichäischen Quellen für das Verständnis des Johannesevangeliums*) in *The Quest* (January and April, 1926).[1] We may, for example, compare the following :

> "My son, come, be My messenger ; come, be My bearer, and descend for Me to the mutinous earth. Go to the world of darkness, into the darkness in which is no ray of light, to the place of lions, to the abode of accursed leopards. . . ." (Book of John) ;

and the following cited by Bultmann from the Ginza :

> "The envoy of the Light am I ; every one who smells its fragrance receives Life."

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[1] See also a valuable article by Professor W. F. Howard, "The Fourth Gospel and Mandæan Gnosticism," in the *London Quarterly Review*, January, 1927.

Still more striking are the citations by which Bauer illustrates John x. 1–21, as, for example, the following taken from the Book of John :

> "A shepherd am I, who loves his sheep. . . . About my neck (I carry) the sheep. . . . I put round them a girdle at sight of which the wolves tremble. No wolf leaps into our fold. . . . A thief cannot break in among us."[1]

The temptation to find a direct connection between such passages and the Fourth Gospel itself is strong. Bultmann has contended for the existence of a Palestinian-Christian type of thought, deeply influenced by Mandaism, which is earlier than that reflected in the Synoptic Gospels and which finds its expression in John[2]; and in this opinion he has been followed by writers of the French school like Couchoud and Stahl.[3] This bold historical reconstruction, however, outruns the available evidence.[4] The difficulties, indeed, are formidable. The most primitive of the Mandæan writings, the Ginza, is probably not earlier than A.D. 651, and although this literature contains material which has a long history, the attempt to describe with any certainty a type of pre-Synoptic thought from which the Johannine and Mandæan writings alike have sprung must obviously be speculative to a degree. For all we know to the contrary the Mandæan books may be influenced by the Fourth Gospel itself, just as they are possibly indebted to Babylonian and Persian ideas. Moreover, to support a theory of direct borrowing, we should need to find the original home of the Fourth Gospel in Syria, and although the Antiochian origin of the Gospel was asserted by the late Canon Burney,[5] the case for Ephesus is very much stronger. In any case, direct borrowing, on either side, is neither a necessary nor a likely explanation of the parallelisms. This, indeed, is the opinion of W. Bauer himself, who in the introduction to his commentary says that in no passage is the similarity of such a kind that we need assert the dependence of the one upon the other. His own preference is for the view that the ideas and expressions of Mandaism and those of the Fourth Gospel spring out of the same cycle of thought, and share the same store of religious notions, symbols, and forms.[1] Beyond this our present knowledge does not permit us to go.[2] The one solid gain from this and allied investigations is the ever-increasing certainty that the Evangelist was deeply influenced by contemporary movements of religious thought which supplied him with terms and conceptions by means of which he could set forth his beliefs about Jesus and His relationships to God, man, and the universe.

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[1] *Das Johannesevangelium*², p. 139.

[2] Bultmann asserts, *e.g.* the Mandæan origin of the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, Jn. i. 6–8, 15, 17, being the Evangelist's interpolations.

[3] Cf. the article, "Jesus-Barabbas," HIBBERT JOURNAL, XXV., No. 1.

[4] It is rejected by H. Windisch, who holds that the Gnostic-Mandæan elements by which John is distinguished from the Synoptics are certainly "interpretation" of the manifestation of Jesus, who in his essential aspects belongs to the Jewish Old-Testament world, not the Gnostic-Mandæan. Cf. *Johannes und Syn.*, p. 143 f.

[5] In *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel* (1922).

The point reached in the last paragraph appears to me to mark the extent to which Comparative Religion and Church History can help us; and I believe we reach much the same kind of result when we examine other influences, Alexandrian and Stoic, which may be thought to have determined the Evangelist's mental environment. We learn something about the vocabulary and thought-forms accessible to the Evangelist; and a study of the Gospel permits us to infer, with greater or less probability as the case may be, whether they have actually been appropriated and used. But what such investigations do not, and cannot, disclose, is the *kind* of use the Evangelist makes of his thought-milieu—the extent to which contemporary ideas are his masters or his servants. Has he expressed his own conceptions in terms of contemporary thought, and then transferred these ideas some two or three generations earlier to the lips of the historical Jesus; or does he begin with traditional sayings of Christ which arise in his consciousness, coloured by contemporary notions and clothed in contemporary language-forms? This is really a *psychological* inquiry; it is the study of a mind at work, so far at least as that mind is revealed in the resulting product—the Gospel. This kind of inquiry was bound to present itself once the problem of the Johannine Christ-testimonies was seriously faced, and it is part of the merit of the brilliant contribution which Professor Hans Windisch, of Leiden, has recently made to the Johannine question that he faces this issue so thoroughly. In the next section I propose to give

[1] Cf. *Das Johannesevangelium*², p. 4.

[2] In a recent article ("The Mandæans," *Journal of Theological Studies*, April, 1928), Dr F. C. Burkitt claims that while Mandaism may be interesting in itself, "it is useless to go to it as a key to unlock the mysteries of early Christian development." This judgment, certain to be widely quoted, would be easier to accept if in his article Dr Burkitt had discussed the striking Mandæan parallels to Johannine sayings so freely sprinkled on the pages of Bauer's commentary.

some account of his treatment and then to indicate some points where, as it seems, the inquiry needs to be pressed even more closely still.

## III.

The main contention of Professor Windisch is the view that the Fourth Gospel was written to supersede the existing Gospels, because the Evangelist was convinced of their unsatisfactory character, and because he believed that he possessed a tradition more adequate to the spiritual and intellectual needs of the community for which he wrote. The need for providing a psychological explanation of the Evangelist's procedure is obvious, and Windisch offers this in the ninth chapter of *Johannes und die Synoptiker*.

An explanation of the writer's right to crowd out the works of his predecessors might be taken from the soil of ecclesiastical tradition—the author's right as an eye-witness, an intimate disciple of Jesus who had heard and seen more, and had understood the Lord better and more deeply than all others. For Windisch, however, this view is impossible; he is convinced that "John is no work of an eye-witness." Nevertheless, the motive of the "better tradition" is by no means to be eliminated entirely. The Evangelist's attitude towards the Synoptists will certainly have been influenced, if, as we assume, he drew the majority of his non-Synoptic narratives from a collection of "signs" at his disposal, to which perhaps also a few "testimonies" (Logia and Discourses in the Johannine style) already belonged. But besides this there is a second and perhaps still more important motive—the writer's consciousness of being the bearer of a definitely ecclesiastical type of teaching and the claim to spiritual inspiration bound up therewith. It is to the discussion of this motive or stimulus that Windisch's exposition is directed. Holding 1 John and the Gospel to be of identical authorship, he takes 1 Jn. i. 5 as his point of departure:

> "And this is the message which we have heard from him, and announce unto you, that God is light, and in him is no darkness at all."

The words beginning "God is light" are a Logion, a Johannine Christ-word, certainly first formulated by the writer of the letter, "which is carried back to Christ Himself and is imparted as a 'word' from Him." It fully corresponds to the maxim about God as Spirit (Jn. iv. 24) which stands in the Gospel and is there directly attributed to Christ. Here we see clearly how it was possible for a Christian *didaskalos* to carry back to Christ his own beliefs and teaching-formations, and out of these to shape "Logia of the Lord; teaching of the Lord."

Windisch holds that stages in the process can be traced in the three great sayings about God in 1 Jn. iv. 16, 1 Jn. i. 5, and Jn. iv. 24. The first ("God is love"), a maxim formulated by himself, is simply inserted in the writer's account. The second ("God is light") is supplied with a framework: "This is the message which we have heard from him"; and thereby, says Windisch, "the formulation of the saying as a word of the Lord is as good as settled." In the case of the third ("God is spirit"), which of course occurs in the Gospel itself, there is only a formal variation. The saying is inserted as a word of the Lord in a discourse: "the 'teacher' has become the 'evangelist,' the witness of the evangelical preaching of the (historical) Lord." As a further example he compares 1 Jn. iii. 11 ("For this is the message which ye heard from the beginning that we should love one another") with Jn. xiii. 34 and xv. 17, in which the command is put directly into the mouth of Christ. Here the process is carried out in two steps. Windisch suggests that there is an analogy in Eph. ii. 17 ("And he came and preached peace to you that were far off, and peace to them that were nigh"). A "John," he holds, would easily have been able to create a Logion: "Behold I preach peace (or, "I came to preach peace") to you that were far off, and peace to them that were nigh." It is in accordance with this analogy that all the Gospel sayings can be understood, the sayings about God, about the Father, Father and Son, Son of Man. The astonishing thing is that even in the Gospel these Christ-words preserve the *third* person; they are really catechism-sayings, not words of Jesus. The same thing is true of the Prologue and the Johannine Baptist-testimony. The leading ideas of the Prologue are explained by the Johannine Christ Himself, sometimes with almost the same words, as in the case of Jn. i. 18 ("No man hath seen God at any time . . ." compared with vi. 46 ("Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is from God, he hath seen the Father"). The section Jn. iii. 13–21 ("And no man hath ascended into heaven . . ."), Windisch suggests, might have been able to stand just as well in the Baptist-discourse, Jn. iii. 31–6, or in the Prologue, or in the Epistle. "It is everywhere the same testimony, everywhere the same impressed τύπος διδαχῆς, everywhere even in the Christ-sayings a sermon about the Son."

Windisch next turns to the sayings in the *first* person, the direct self-testimonies of the Johannine Christ as to His Person, Mission, and Destiny. Here a threefold derivation is possible. (1) In the first place, they can have been taken from Church teaching. In this case, the peculiar feature is the transposition from the third person to the first. This is especially clear when sayings in both forms occur, as for example in 1 John (third person) and the Gospel (first person).[1] Windisch is of the opinion that in these cases the forms in the third person are primary. (2) Again, the "I-testimonies" may be derived from Church "teaching about Jesus." A saying like "I am the light" may have grown out of the testimony "He is the light." (3) It is, however, not necessary to conceive all Christ-words as secondary transformations derived from Church teaching. The Evangelist can have directly depended on prototypes which were already expressed in the first person. Such prototypes include the Synoptic "I-words" (cf. Mt. xxviii. 18–20), parallels in the Apocalypse (cf. i. 8, xxii. 16, etc.), in the Odes of Solomon, and in liturgical texts of Pagan origin, Babylonian, Greek, and Mandæan. Later apocryphal sayings have also the Johannine ring and obey the same impulse, the demand for new Christ-testimonies suitable for the new needs of the communities.

The Christ-sayings, then, consist of didactic testimonies about Jesus Christ and self-testimonies of Christ. The former mark the didactic tendency, and the latter the atmosphere of spiritual worship (*die pneumatisch-kultische Atmosphäre*), both of which are characteristic of the Fourth Gospel. Each has contributed to the evolution of the Johannine sayings. One must not forget that the Gospel and the Epistles were intended for public reading in the Christian communities. The Gospel, indeed, is a liturgical book meant for the worship of the community. The whole material is immersed in this atmosphere, and it is from this experience and interest that the Gospel has originated. But the deepest origin of the writer's creative work lies in his strongly impressed personal piety, and in an impulse arising out of this, a kind of inspiration. Before he wrote, the Evangelist lived in the most intimate communion with Christ. It is from this experience that he must have received his impulse to compose his Gospel; from this that he has derived not only his right to offer new Christ-testimonies to the community, but also the claim that his testimony must replace the older tradition. On this issue the Paraclete-sayings, and especially Jn. xvi. 12–15, are very significant. The deeper testimony Christ could not impart to His disciples because they were not able to bear it has now been revealed to the Evangelist. In imparting it in the Gospel, he has been led by the Spirit who teaches what He hears from Christ, so that the Gospel is the book of the Glorified Christ. In his writing, then, "John" has actually had the consciousness of standing in contact with the Spirit, and through Him with Christ. In this, his experience is like that of his namesake, the author of the Apocalypse; but, as compared with the latter, the Evangelist has possessed the boldness to take up his revelations of the Christ speaking to him through the Spirit into his description of the historical manifestation of Jesus. From all this we can understand the Evangelist's intention to write a normative, one can almost say a canonical book. As the Johannine Christ appears to deny all bearers of revelation before Him, so also the Evangelist denies his predecessors: he himself, and he alone, as the most intimate confidant of the (spiritual) Christ has lain in His bosom; all who have been before him are, in comparison to him, to be esteemed as pseudo-prophets.

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[1] Cf. 1 Jn. iii. 14 and Jn. v. 24; 1 Jn. iii. 16 and Jn. x. 15b, cf. 17; 1 Jn. iii. 23 and Jn. xiv. 1b, xv. 17; Jn. i. 4, 8 and Jn. xi. 25, viii. 12; 1 Jn. iii. 5 and Jn. xii. 47, viii. 46; 1 Jn. iii. 11 and Jn. xiii. 34.

In *Die Absolutheit des Johannesevangeliums*, Windisch returns to the same theme in the section in which he describes the combination of tradition and creative production carried through the whole Gospel (pp. 8–16). "John" has used traditional words of the Lord, but the majority of the words and discourses he himself has formed, and where he draws from tradition he will have recast the words into his own terminology and his Christocentric mode of thought. He is not the only early Christian writer who has felt the impulse to produce Christ-words. In a limited measure Paul has already preceded him in this (cf. 2 Cor. xii. 9, and (?) 1 Cor. xi. 23 ff). Closer to him in this respect comes the author of the Apocalypse, only that the latter has chosen for his words of the Lord the literary form of the Apocalypse. Windisch distinguishes a "productive" and a "reproductive" activity on the part of the Evangelist. He has worked up material given to him which he held as genuine tradition. On the other hand, he has produced Christ-words, not arbitrarily and fancifully, but quite in the spirit of apostolic tradition and with a view to the religious and apologetic needs of the communities. In taking over the traditional materials the Evangelist has set in motion his own theological-literary *motifs*, and where he is creative there is a foundation of given tradition (Synoptic "I-words") to be taken into account. Both activities lend to the Gospel its peculiar character. We find it difficult to present to ourselves the mind of a man who produces history tolerably freely, who invents words more or less freely, and yet wishes his narrative to be taken as historical, indeed as historically more correct than his predecessors. But the fact lies before us. Jn. xvi. 12 ff teaches us that the Evangelist traced back to the inspiration of the Spirit of Jesus his ideas about Jesus, and that he was firmly convinced that the new words blend harmoniously in the teaching of the Incarnate. Certainly for him also the revelation is grounded in history, but like the Jewish Hagiographists he demands a history suitable to his kind of faith and his dogmatic terminology.

## IV.

I have described Professor Windisch's ideas without comment, and substantially in his own words, and it now remains to ask how far they help us to understand the psychological process implied in the record of the Johannine sayings. I think even those who dissent from his conclusions will agree that a stamp of greatness lies upon his work, and that he does resolutely grapple with a problem which quite inadequately comes within the purview of those who find it enough to quote the literary methods of writers like Thucydides, Plato, and Josephus, when these writers are recording the speeches of historical personages. I will go further and say that under his guidance we are led far into the recesses of the central mystery of which I spoke at the outset. That serious difficulties remain, and doubts and questions arise during the journey, is indeed the fate of every guide. The use of the word "invent" is a case in point. In British ears the word has a cold, calculating, not to say sinister, sound; it is the kind of word we should use of the work of a literary forger. This, however, is not the sense in which Professor Windisch employs it; he uses it in an organic sense, to describe a process intensely living, the creative work of a mind which produces something "new," as distinguished from words and sayings simply handed down from the past. That this represents part of what the Evangelist has actually done, cannot, I think, be reasonably denied, but we have to take the fact in relation to his work as a whole, which cannot be adequately explained as free invention.

A more important point emerges when we consider the stages by which Professor Windisch illustrates the process by which the Evangelist has come to put sayings of Jesus in a historical framework. It will be recalled that the second of these is the passage 1 Jn. i. 5 ("God is light"), where the formulation of the saying as a word of the Lord is said to be "as good as settled" by the introductory words: "This is the message which we heard from him." The claim seems to me to be seriously in question: the words need convey no more than the suggestion that the idea that God is light represents in substance the message of Christ to the world. Be this as it may, there is certainly something very much more than "only a formal variation" in the presentation of the third saying, the statement that "God is spirit" which occurs in the Gospel as a word of Christ to the woman of Samaria (iv. 24). So far from recognising one step to another in regular sequence, the feeling of many of us is more like that of young David Balfour at the House of Shaws when the lightning revealed the gap in the staircase his uncle had sent him to climb. It is not enough to say that the "teacher" has become the "evangelist," the witness of the evangelical preaching of the (historical) Lord; this is just the process we want to understand; we cannot too readily admit that a "John" would easily have been able to create a Logion, a word of the historical Jesus, out of such an assertion as Eph. ii. 17: "And he came and preached peace. . . ." Of course, we must not forget that, like every critic, Professor Windisch cannot present his explanation in one whole, that he is under the necessity of presenting it *seriatim*, and that later he does give his account of the kind of psychological process involved. We had better come to grips with this explanation and see how far it is able to take us.

The explanation appears at its clearest when Professor Windisch comes to the direct self-testimonies of the Johannine Christ regarding His Person, Mission, and Destiny. We must, I think, dismiss the first and second of the three possible derivations he suggests, because they really explain nothing at all. To tell us that the statements in the third person found in the first Epistle are primary, and that those in the first person in the Gospel have been derived from ecclesiastical teaching or from Church teaching "about Jesus," so that "He is the light" is the root out of which "I am the light" has sprung, is merely to restate the problem: we have still to ask in what way, and with what justification, the transformation is effected. For this reason, we must allow that a much better answer is given in the third suggestion, that the Evangelist has been influenced by prototypes, Synoptic and otherwise, already cast in the first person: a saying like "Lo, I am with you alway" (Mt. xxviii. 20) is the mould into which the Evangelist pours the gleaming metal of his own Spirit-derived thought. I think we may, and must, allow the influence of such prototypes, especially when research shows that they existed, not merely in the sparing examples we can cull from the synoptists, but in cult-sayings present in such profusion in the Evangelist's environment. A man like the Evangelist cannot have been indifferent to the religious language of his day, and it must almost certainly have affected the form in which he reported sayings of Jesus. Moreover, we may not ignore the force of what Professor Windisch has to say about the needs of the community for which he wrote, its crying need for a Gospel writing suitable for purposes of public worship. The Evangelist could not have met that need by merely repeating sayings of Jesus in the form in which they appear in the works of his predecessors, even if he had wished to do so; the times cried out for something more. But, in all this, we are dealing with demands and with media whereby demands may be met, and we have still to face the question of supply. With what justification does the Evangelist use existing models, and meet the religious and intellectual wants both of himself and his age? It is, I think, the great merit of Professor Windisch's answer that he finds the deepest origin of the writer's creative work in his deep-set personal piety, his consciousness of standing in contact with the Spirit, and through the Spirit with the Exalted Christ. We may, I think, impatiently dismiss any solution of the Johannine problem that is content with anything less than this, for the note of a living communion enjoyed in a deep and abiding sense sounds in almost everything the Evangelist has written. But here we reach the essential question, to which I think Professor Windisch has given no adequate answer: How does this experience of *present* contact permit the Evangelist to put back what he now "hears" into the lips of the historical Jesus who had lived and taught at least sixty years before?

I suggest that an essential part of the answer to this inquiry is given by Professor Windisch himself in what he has to say of the impossibility of eliminating the motive of the "better tradition," and the suggestion that the Evangelist had at his disposal not only a collection of non-Synoptic "signs," but one to which perhaps also a few "testimonies"

(Logia and Discourses in the Johannine style) alread belonged. This suggestion remains undeveloped in his trea ment, and yet, I suggest, it is the one presumption on whi the literary process described is really credible. We ca understand the reluctance of Professor Windisch and other to develop the argument. A scientific investigator does n like to operate with quantities he cannot produce for inspe tion. This, of course, is the situation : we cannot produ any non-Synoptic sayings which are part of the Evangelist's traditional heritage ; they remain an assumption, a pr supposition of the inquiry. My contention, however, is tha they are a necessary presupposition, if we are to render th Evangelist's work intelligible. The problem is to understan how the Evangelist can imprison what Christ says to hi now within a historical framework. Where can we find an real analogies for such a procedure ? Certainly not in th work of the author of the Apocalypse. All that moder scholarship has to say about the spiritual and psychologica experience of the Evangelist elucidates the task to which th Apocalyptist sets himself, that of communicating by vision or oracle what Christ says *now* to people existing *now* with *present* needs and perplexities. How comes the Evangelist to possess the boldness to take up his present revelations and thrust them into an account of the historical manifestation of Jesus ? There is no parity between the two literary processes. Nor do the references to extra-Christian models, as in the Odes of Solomon and the Mandæan writings, enable us to solve the puzzle. Two factors stand out in the Johannine task which do not appear in the parallels suggested. The Johannine sayings are associated with a definite, single historical personality, an object of devotion indeed, but one whose sayings and doings were known to the writer and his circle by written and oral testimony. The other fact is that the Gospel is written with the intention of securing belief in this personality, even life through His name (Jn. xx. 31). It is just this moral and religious purpose which makes references to the methods of Greek historians and Jewish and Mandæan poets, not pointless, but quite inadequate. How can you ask for faith in One whose spoken words you "invent" under a present creative impulse ?

On these grounds, then, I claim that British scholarship gives a sounder psychological account of the Evangelist's procedure when it assumes that he begins with genuine traditional sayings of Jesus, which he casts into his own terminology and the thought-forms of his age. Once we allow this—as Professor Windisch does in part—we can accept with gratitude much that recent New Testament scholarship has to say about the Evangelist's methods. We can distinguish, with Professor Windisch, a "reproductive" and a "productive" activity, holding still more firmly to the view which he expresses when he says that, in taking over traditional materials, the Evangelist sets in motion his own theological-literary *motifs*, and that where he is creative there is a foundation of given tradition. This view will leave ample room for us to think that there are places where, in the words of Canon Sanday, "historical recollections and interpretative reflection, the fruit of thought and experience, have come down to us inextricably blended." Thus, for example, we shall cease to discuss where in the discourse of Jn. iii. the words of Jesus end and those of the Evangelist begin. In such a case the Evangelist himself could not tell us, and all that we can say is that as the discourse proceeds the "interpretative reflection" triumphs over the "historical recollections," so that at the end we hear the Evangelist more than we hear Jesus. And the same explanation avails in an intensely theological passage like Jn. v. 19–29, with its reiterated references to "the Son," and in Jn. vi. 52–58, where the stressed objective aspect of eating Christ's flesh distinguishes itself so strongly from the more spiritual conception which goes before, and from the words that follow: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing." We shall hear the Evangelist in a saying like "All that came before me are thieves and robbers," and in words like "that they should know thee the only true God, and him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ," taking leave, however, to think that in cases like these the Evangelist begins with something that Jesus said and taught. These difficulties will remain, and will be our perplexity all our days, though their number is perhaps less than we realise until we turn away from the minutiæ of criticism to the reading of what is after all the book of all books in the library of sacred devotion, the book rightly commended to us by the stern word of Origen: "No one can apprehend the meaning of it except he have lain on Jesus's breast, and received from Him Mary to be his Mother also."

VINCENT TAYLOR.

ABERDEEN.

# THE ETHIC OF MACHIAVELLI.[1]

## R. N. CAREW HUNT.

THE history of the criticism of Machiavelli's writings is, it has been said, simply the history of the various ways in which they have been misunderstood. The generation which saw the publication of the *Prince* and the *Discourses* paid, it is true, very little attention to either. It is with the second generation that the stream of hostile criticism breaks. This criticism is, at first, confined to his disparaging observations upon the Church which led to his works being placed upon the first published *Index librorum prohibitorum* of 1552. With the Massacre of St Bartholomew, his *real politik* is called in question. The Huguenots established a connection between the policy of Catharine de Medicis and the maxims of the *Prince:* the Catholics believed that the teaching of Bodin and the *Politiques* derived from the same source. By the close of the century it is scarcely possible to take up any political writing which does not contain some injurious reference to his opinions. Gentillet calls him *le plus grand menteur et imposteur qui ne fut jamais.* Zenano says that he is a monster who has issued from Hell in human form. Bozio declares that, like Circe, he offers a cup which will change men into beasts. Spontone calls him "indemoniato," and indeed it was long believed in this country that from his Christian name was coined a popular *soubriquet* for the Devil. For his evil reputation early spread here, and as the "stage villain" his Prince was to be, for half a century, a familiar property of the Elizabethan drama. Western Europe became, indeed, the victim of a veritable scare. Everywhere men affected to see the figure of the Prince—sinister and unashamed—vitiating politics and corrupting good manners.

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[1] Mayer: *Machiavellis Geschichtsauffassung und sein Begriff virtù*, 1912. Heyer: *Der Machiavellismus*, 1918. Ercole: *L'Etica di Machiavelli* (*Politica*, September 30, 1920). Meinecke: *Die Idee der Staatsräson*, 1925. Croce: *Il pensiero Italiano nel Seicento* (*Critica*, May 20, 1926). Chabod: *Del 'Principe di N. Machiavelli*, 1926. Gentile: *Studi sul Rinascimento*, Nos. VI. and VII., 1923.

Yet the spirit of Machiavelli was not to be exorcised by all the fulminations of his opponents. His doctrine represented an order of considerations and a body of precepts which were in conformity with universal practice and which were known to be so. Indeed, when we read his works, we are not conscious of any satanic quality. Rather we take away the impression of an honest observer of human affairs setting down facts so true as to be almost commonplaces. But the strictures of his critics, pointless and inept as they often were, are evidence of a genuine heart-burning. Quite rightly they regarded his doctrines as raising an ethical problem of the first importance. A new element had entered into political speculation which could neither be wholly assimilated nor expelled. Either, as Croce points out, the mediæval identity of religion and the State must be restored, but in such a manner as to embody in the synthesis Machiavelli's naturalistic doctrines; or politics conceived as *raison d'état* must be regarded as the negation and antithesis of morality; or, finally, some means must be found whereby it would be possible, while distinguishing between *raison d'état* and morality, to establish a relation between the two. The history of Machiavellian criticism is that of the successive application of these alternatives. But the sixteenth century never advanced beyond the first. The doctrine of *raison d'état* was not a bad thing in itself. But it required to be corelated with the higher interests of the Church. Such is the conclusion which Botero reaches in his *Raggione di Stato*. As for Machiavelli himself, he was without doubt an atheist, and his teaching, unless thus corrected, was immoral and pernicious. This opinion long persisted. Between Botero and Macaulay there is, in time, a wide gulf fixed. But their point of view is essentially the same. Macaulay pays a generous tribute to the patriotism and public spirit of the Florentine. But he cannot get away from his immorality. It is, he says, "a great blemish": "it considerably diminishes the pleasure which, in other respects, his works must afford to every intelligent mind." In approaching then the ethics of Machiavelli, we have to contend against the accumulated prejudice of centuries. It is only with a wider knowledge of the dominant thought-currents of his time and of the degree in which his writings represent a reaction which is, at times, wholesome, that an impartial appreciation of his position becomes possible.

Machiavelli's conception of the State starts with his idea of *virtù*. But as every act of *virtù* is an act of will, we have, as Ercole rightly insists, to carry the problem a stage further back and to consider first of all what Machiavelli understands by the Freedom of the will. Here the doctrine of the Church was that God, in endowing man with reason, had, at the same time, given him the capacity to make use of it, and hence the power to choose between good and evil. The emphasis was thus thrown upon volition as an act of choice. What mattered was the intention. For what happened as a result of his action man was not responsible, for this lay in the hands of Providence. This subjective libertarianism was held to be not inconsistent with a rigidly fatalistic objective conception of the world. The sphere of volition is separated from the sphere of external reality. The one is the subject, the other the object of human action.

Machiavelli rejects this doctrine. Volition is not simply a passive interior function, but projects itself upon the world of reality, which it has power to mould and to transform. In thus attaching to the will an autonomous value, he did indeed no more than follow the humanistic thought of the *Quattrocento* though, as Ercole points out, he is not prepared to go as far as some of his immediate predecessors. For man is not omnipotent. There is always present in human affairs that element of *fortunà* towards which Machiavelli feels a half-religious awe. For every act of the will is conditioned by the *situation of fact* as Croce calls it, or in Machiavelli's terminology, by the *occasione*, and this in its turn is conditioned by *fortunà*. *Fortunà* is thus the point of departure of all action: the will cannot create the occasion; it can only make use of it.

For Machiavelli *virtù* is then human will in action. The law of life is movement—*sono le cose umane sempre in moto*. Thus he rejects equally the fatalist Stoic conception of *virtù* as disassociated from action and the Aristotelian-Thomist conception which makes it simply a means to the attainment of a condition of εὐδαιμονία. At the same time he uses *virtù* solely in its original naturalistic sense. It is dynamic force and energy: the co-ordination of the will and the reason possessing a value in itself apart from the end which it seeks.

To will, then, is to act. Hence the close connection in Machiavelli's thought between will and power. But as we have seen, *virtù* means something more than mere volition. We have, through the exercise of the reason, to understand the *situation of fact* in all its elements—*connoscere i tempi e l'ordine delle cose e accomodarsi a quello.* So Machiavelli says that if a man could infallibly appreciate any given situation, he would be always fortunate. But that he should do so is impossible, for he cannot look into the future. He can only predict what is contained in the actual situation of fact. Thus, though Cæsar Borgia took all imaginable precautions, he could not foretell the death of his father or that he would himself fall sick at the same time. But this does not lessen his claim to *virtù.* On the other hand, there was a failure in *virtù* in allowing Julius II, whom he had offended, to become Pope, and this action was the ultimate cause of his ruin. Thus Machiavelli emphasises the rational element in *virtù.* The *situation of fact* is simple or complex in proportion to the number of alternative courses of action which it presents. Men, he says, act either by *necessità* or *elezione,* and though no situation is altogether without alternatives—a starving man may either work or steal—the more the reason is called upon to play its part, the greater the degree of *virtù.*

Yet even more than the reason Machiavelli stresses the will. We may fail through an inability to appreciate the situation; more commonly we fail through the eternal conflict between the end and the means, between the will to achieve and the resolution to use the only means which are essential to success. Thus if a man sets his mind upon obtaining dominion over the State and upon reflection decides that to attain his object he must first rid himself of a dangerous rival, he must either renounce the undertaking or, if he elects to proceed with it, he must employ the means required for its consummation. What he must *not* do is to seek the end and evade the means. For this is what Machiavelli calls the *via del mezzo,* which is altogether contemptible.

*Virtù,* then, has nothing to do with moral goodness (*bontà*). It is simply the pursuit of determinate ends by appropriate means—*riscontrare il modo di procedere coi tempi.* Whether the end is good or bad makes no difference to the *virtù* of an action; it is a purely economic quality—in itself neither moral nor immoral. *Bontà,* on the other hand, is a moral quality; it seeks the *bene comune* or the good of the *patria*—Machiavelli uses these two expressions indifferently: it is *l'animo di voler giovare non a se ma al* bene comune, *non alla propria successione ma alla* comune patria. For the State is an end in itself, and actions are good or bad only in so far as they promote or hinder its well-being. He recognises no other morality than this. Following the sixth book of Polybius' *Histories*, he holds that the moral sense only arises through the *viver comune*, which in his terminology is identified with the State. Those who found States must, he says, "assume that all men are bad and will always when they have a free hand, give rein to their evil inclinations." Nor does human nature ever change. "In all nations there prevail the same desires and passions as always have prevailed." "The world remaining continually the same has in it a constant quality of good and evil." Hence men only become moral through the laws whereby the State seeks to restrain their unsocial instincts. "Men never behave well unless compelled and whenever they are left free to act as they please everything falls into confusion." "Everyone hates to see the prosperity of another and does his best to destroy it. For so our natural instinct, by its own motion and passions, constrains us to act, if it be not held in check by the authority of the laws." Hence it follows that "just as hunger and poverty are needed to make men industrious, so laws are needed to make them good"; for "virtuous actions have their origin in right training and right training in good laws." Thus Machiavelli reaches a position which is substantially that of Hobbes. The natural man is directed solely by self-interest; morality and law are the creation of the State.

It is commonly stated that Machiavelli taught that the end justifies the means and that the State is released from the moral law. But this is to beg the whole question. What he does assert is that the good of the State *is* the moral law. He was acutely conscious of the condition into which Italy had fallen and of the need of some principle which would revive the public spirit of his countrymen. From neither religion nor from the Church did he look for any assistance. He was himself frankly a pagan. Religion was, indeed, of the utmost value, and the Church—as a function of the State—had an important part to play in forming the good citizen. But the Church of his time, so far from purifying social life, was, he believed, the principal source of its degradation. He had seen it at too close quarters to have any illusions. It would, he says, corrupt even the Swiss. From such an institution it was impossible to look for any new principle. Nor were his fears unfounded. Driven by the reforming movement to assert in the most uncompromising terms the claims of tradition and authority, the Catholic Church fell back upon a severe and rigid orthodoxy which looked with disfavour upon any re-examination of the philosophical bases of morality. Morals in the hands of the Jesuit casuists take on a legalist form which becomes, albeit unconsciously, anti-ethical. Hence Machiavelli was led to search for an ethical principle elsewhere and, as he believed, to discover it in his doctrine of *raison d'état* and of the regeneration of the State by *virtù* directed towards the common good. But though an attempt was made with some success to assimilate the maxims of his state-craft, the principle which underlay them was equally obnoxious to all parties. It divorced the idea of law from any absolute standard. It denied the existence of private morality, for morality being by definition *carità della patria*, to a man thus inspired the idea of any good apart from the State appeared meaningless and immoral. The distinction which the Law of Nature recognised between public and private morality and which led even Luther to put forward his doctrine of *Amtsmoral*, is unknown to Machiavelli. The statesman and the householder are subject to the same moral code. Only the *situation of fact* is different. With his low view of human nature it is, at first sight, a little difficult to justify the high hopes which Machiavelli founds upon *virtù*, and Heyer contends that the whole of his system is based upon a fundamental inconsistency. But Machiavelli's pessimism is, as Ercole points out, very largely no more than a reaction against the scholastic doctrine that all men are equally disposed by nature to distinguish between good and evil. He holds rather that the majority of men in any community are amoral. They may do good; but their actions have no claim to *virtù*, for they are dictated by that coincidence between personal interest and the common good which it is the art of the legislator to establish. None the less, he still believes that even in a corrupt State there will be those who, from motives of conscience, set the good of the community above personal and sectional ends. When there is no citizen who is prepared to make this sacrifice, the State dissolves into anarchy. It should be remarked that his conception of *virtù* explains the apparent inconsistency between the absolutism of the *Prince* and the republicanism of the *Discourses*, which has perplexed so many of his critics. For Machiavelli the form of State is a relative matter. Everything depends upon the degree of *virtù*, which he always thinks of in quantitative terms. Where it exists in abundance, there will be a republic; where it is scarce, a monarchy.

What gave Machiavelli's doctrine its wide and disturbing influence was, then, his new conception of man as a natural force in the union of whose will and reason lie undreamed-of possibilities. But these potentialities are only developed through the *viver comune* of the State, whose interests are the supreme law. This is not to say that Machiavelli at all fully appreciated the implications of his position. It is indeed exceedingly difficult to distinguish between the implicit and explicit elements in his thought. His rôle is that of the observer; his methods are inductive and empirical. The resentment which his State theory occasioned was, in a large degree, due to that limitation of outlook for which Campanella blames him. Machiavelli nullas scientias percurrit nisi historiam profanam nudam. His principles are stated with genius, but are confined within the narrow circle of politics and are insufficiently co-ordinated with other spheres of human activity and with the moral conscience of man. But even in the sphere of politics his ethic is obscure because, as Gentile shows, his conception of the State is obscure. He never makes clear what is the nature of this ideal State whose good is the norm of human conduct and before which the individual must make so complete a surrender. He fails to give to the State a moral value because he fails to give it objectivity. With his humanist contemporaries he sees the world as the stage upon which human personality develops to its appointed end. He shows us the workings of dominant personality upon the raw material of society. But "what good comes of it at last," what is the nature of the State thus created, is left elusive and obscure.

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LONDON.

# THE DEPARTING DOCTRINE OF THE SOUL.

## JOHN LINNELL.

The philosophical concept of Holism[1] is so simple in essence and principle, that on reflection it must seem strange that it has been left to a thinker of our own day to formulate it and to demonstrate its importance, not only to philosophy and science as separate modes of approaching reality, but as a common ground on which they may meet and harmonise. The man to whom we owe its formulation, General the Right Honourable J. C. Smuts, is by profession neither philosopher nor scientist. Nevertheless he has given to the students both of philosophy and the sciences a concept which promises in application to be fruitful of results.

It is not, however, of its application to either philosophy or science that I am about to write, but of its bearing on a belief very near to the hearts of the mass of mankind; that is the belief in the existence of a soul discrete from the matter of our bodies, the supposed vital principle which informs them with life, and without whose presence the physical being is conceived as inert—a mere aggregate of material and immobile cells.

The belief in the soul as thus discrete is of very great antiquity, being found among the most primitive societies, from whose superstitions it most probably takes its origin. Sir J. G. Frazer in his *Golden Bough* has collected a number of examples from folk-tales (many of which survive to our own day in the form of stories of fairies, giants, witches and the like) of primitive belief in what he calls the "external" soul. But, inasmuch as experience of some sort or another must necessarily precede the formulation of such beliefs, we must go further back than this, and inquire on what natural phenomena of daily life our ancestors based their speculations. This we are enabled to do by discovering with what object or objects the soul is most commonly identified in primitive societies, and further, what accidental phenomena contribute to support the notion of the soul as discrete from the physical organism.

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[1] *Holism and Evolution*, by General the Rt Hon. J. C. Smuts.

Turning, therefore, to the records of the anthropologists, we find that the soul is primarily identified with such objective phenomena as echoes, shadows, reflections and the breath. A moment's thought will suffice to make clear how these might come to be regarded by primitive man as "embodiments" of an *alter ego*. Later the soul was held to reside in a vastly greater variety of objects, but for reasons of simplicity I prefer to mention only these. From this it is but a short step to the support of a belief, once formulated and concurred in, by the phenomena of trance, unconsciousness and death as evidences of the absence of the soul, and those of clairvoyance, dreams, apparitions, wraiths, hallucinations and the like as proofs of the real existence of souls external to the body, whether that body be living or dead.

Upon these foundations rests our present belief in a soul discrete and immortal. Let us next consider briefly to what the holding of this belief has brought us.

In the course of time it would occur to the thinker that that which was capable of appearing to him (in dreams, apparitions and so on) in the shape of one whom he knew to be dead must necessarily have survived the latter's demise. He would therefore suppose this apparition to be that part of his deceased acquaintance which alone was vital to him, and even perhaps immortal; from which he would next proceed to generalise, postulating a post-mortal existence for the supposed vital principle of all men, which might or might not appear visibly before him, the apparition, presumably, being conditioned by considerations themselves post-mortal, and beyond the thinker's own comprehension or control. It is easy to see how from this might arise the custom, say, of propitiating dead enemies, and other similar practices. Then the imagination working more freely, theories became prevalent as to the nature of the life beyond the grave, which varied accordingly as the attitude toward mundane existence entertained by persons and societies.

And so it comes about that to-day many believe, whether consciously or otherwise, in the existence within themselves of a soul which informs the dull clay of their bodies, which without it would remain lifeless and inert.

Some maintain that it is in conflict with the body which, lured by the base delights of the flesh, seeks ever its own gratification and so drags the soul down into the mire. More terrible still, it seems that the latter is defiled from the outset by contact with the former, and that its very residence in an earthly setting forces upon it the need of salvation by immediate or, preferably, mediate action. To these people it seems never to occur that in the act of giving way to temptation the mind (which is commonly regarded as the conscious organ of the spirit) is fully aware of the situation, and freely reflects upon the matter before leading the obediently passive body astray; and thus they stifle the voice of conscience in much the same way as did the drunkard, when reproved by the parson for going back on his undertaking not to enter the public-house. "Well," he remarked to his aggrieved adviser, "I did just what you told me to. And when I said 'Get thee behind me, Satan,' he got behind me and pushed me in!" Nor, apparently, do they question why, if the physical world is bound to defile a soul thrust into it they know not whence, it should thus be thrust, or by whom. In answer to this, I fully suspect, they would reply, if they were orthodox Christians, by saying that entrance into the world is necessary for the soul's redemption; thus raising the still less answerable question, where, if ever, did the soul exist before partaking in this mortal life, and in what condition? In one of sin, necessitating redemption? And if so, how did it come by that condition, or who created a sinful soul? The idea of a self-contemplating Deity, or of one whose desire is to be glorified, is admittedly alien even to our human standards. More pertinent still, perhaps, is the question, when first is the soul associated with the earthly body which is to house it? At the moment of conception? At the hour of birth? Presumably at the latter time. Yet the organism lives before birth. Does it, then, partake at this time of the vital principle of the mother? We need not pursue our questioning further, since at the best it can bring us none but unacceptable responses.

We may, however, legitimately claim that, if the soul is the vital principle upon which the existence of life depends, then every living organism must be possessed of a soul of some kind; not necessarily a morally or ethically minded soul, not even reasoning—but a soul, vital and necessary to existence. The problem now before us will be to decide in what respect these souls must differ among themselves—in degree or in kind. The life about us differs greatly, from that, say, of plants, which is largely restricted, to that of man which is correspondingly mobile, unrestricted and self-determined, with the life of the animals lying in between. But the physical and biological sciences inform us that essentially these varying life-forms are one in kind, built up of electrons, atoms and molecules, and employing one kind of metabolism or another to draw their sustenance from the environment. Their life, then, differs not in kind, but in degree; and this enables us to suppose, with a reasonable degree of certainty, that their souls, if any, would be similarly conditioned—a postulate which few would sustain and incapable of conclusive proof, whichever point of view we take. We cannot argue conclusively as to the possession of immortal souls on the part of plant or animal life. And yet it would be strange indeed, in a series in all other respects so similarly constituted as are the ascendant manifestations of life, to find so marked a differentiation as the possession of separable souls by only one of the many species, even considering the superiority conceded to man in the possession of reason. On the other side, so far as we can see, no immediately useful purpose would be served by resurrecting any doctrine which granted immortality to plants and trees. I forbear to include the animal world in this argument on account of its observable capacity for pleasure, which brings it nearer to ourselves.

Let us next consider what is now almost universally regarded as an incontrovertible fact; I refer to the fact of evolution. We do not fully know as yet how it works, but this is not exceptional. The vast majority among us are equally ignorant of the workings of a dynamo or an earthquake. But for all that we do not question that the dynamo works and the earthquake occurs; and the evidence for the occurrence of evolution is so overwhelming as to leave no room for doubt, and as plainly observable as that which assures us that other and great civilisations have preceded ours in centuries past.

Now evolution postulates the gradual emergence of species from a single common origin, generally in an ascendant direction. This the Holistic theory carries further by saying that throughout the process the tendency of evolution is to the creation of *wholes* complete in themselves, at unity, and not composed of discrete units. That this view of the evolutionary process is upheld by the findings of physical science General Smuts has been able to show. He begins at the bottom of the scale by considering atomic structure, stressing the fact, as discovered by science, that matter is anything but inert and lifeless; that we have in the electrons and atoms of our modern conceptions a material which is the embodiment of energy. From this he goes on to demonstrate in a simple way the principle of Holism in action, pointing out that in the creation of wholes the identity of components is lost. Thus, in the structure of a crystal, the atoms of the component elements are not merely placed in juxtaposition, but are broken up and rearranged. It is not a case of symbiosis, but of a totally new creation, of a whole that transcends the sum of its parts. Matter, therefore, he holds, is creative—a very different point of view from that which has traditionally regarded it as not only uncreative, but even passive and inert.

The weak point in General Smuts' exposition is the point at which the theory of evolution is itself most weak, namely the impossibility with which he is faced of filling in the inevitable blank spaces in the record of matter's creative activity—a fault, of course, to be ascribed not so much to the writer as to our present lack of information on the vital processes of evolution. Such gaps are to be found, for instance, between matter uninformed with life and that in which life exists and flourishes; and again between living organisms in the plant and animal kingdoms and those which are informed with mind. But, granted the presence of such gaps, we find that "mind structures presuppose life structures, and life structures presuppose energy structures, which are themselves graded according to the various forms of physical and chemical grouping."

For purposes of present consideration we need follow General Smuts no further than to admit with him the fundamental unity of matter, life and mind, and the emergence from creative matter, acting through creative and selective evolution of life from matter and of mind from life, invariably on a Holistic basis; that is, the emergence of complete and sufficient wholes, adequately constructed to fulfil their functions *without the insertion from external and unknown sources of the vital principle or any other.* The emergence of such wholes is self-evident and hardly likely to be contested in the case of any species save that of man, whose possession of mind is regarded as so mysterious. But though the origins of life and mind are shrouded for us in mystery, we need not therefore look elsewhere than in matter for their source, nor does the mystery justify us in positing any active element more miraculous in its working than is the process of evolution. The existence of life is accepted unquestioningly by all as possible without the possession of a soul, as in the case of the animal world. Not so that of mind, however. Yet the emergence of mind from life is really no more remarkable than that of life from organic matter.

In what way soever we consider the question, the incontestable findings of science leave us clear on the main issue, that there is no valid evidence for the existence of a soul in organisms above a certain specified level, and for its absence from all below that level; and, further, that there is no necessity for postulating its existence in the light of the proven energetic structure of the matter fundamental to all life-forms. Moreover, the jettisoning of belief in such a soul finally rids us of the difficulty of supposing so striking a differentiation as the possession of a discrete soul by one species or category alone, in a series which otherwise exhibits differentiations only in degree of evolution and life. We need only to realise, as General Smuts points out, that this difference of degree which is common to all obtains as well in the region of values as in that of merely abundant vitality.

> "The structure of matter indicates [he says] that matter is also in a sense creative—creative, that is to say, not of its own stuff, but of the forms, arrangements and patterns which constitute all its value in the physical sphere. It is creative in a sense analogous to that in which we call life or mind creative of values. . . . The efficiency, beauty and utility, in short the values of matter, arise from the structures which are the outcome and the expression of its own inherent activities. In a very real sense the idea of values applies as truly and effectively in the domain of the physical as in that of the biological or the psychical. In both cases value is a quality of the forms and combinations which are brought about. Whether they are structures resulting from the activities of matter, or works of art or genius resulting from the activities of the mind, makes no real difference to the application of the ideas of creativeness and value in either case."

If, then, we are able to satisfy ourselves of the virtual impossibility of making out a case for the existence of a separate soul it devolves upon us to consider what, if any, will be the probable reaction of mankind to so radical a change of belief. The principle of belief in the soul is even now so vitally interwoven not only with personal but with social behaviour, that its departure will require considerable re-adjustment of thought.

It may be urged that to deny the existence of the soul would in the first place destroy religion, in both its personal and its social aspects. Such an argument is, of course, based on reliance upon one of the weakest and most unworthy of the motives that have come to underlie the religious life of Christian communities—the motive which leads to the practice of religion for the sake of something called the salvation of the soul; or because men expect to have to render an account hereafter of their doings on earth. I am far from suggesting that this has been and is the only motive for acting in what is called a "religious" way. Many saints, both known and unknown, throughout the ages, have so acted and suffered happily with no other conscious motive entertained than the glorification of God. They have suffered and perished in "the faith," serene, though tortured, in contemplation—of what? Of nothing, I submit, if not of a loving and merciful God to whom they resigned their lives, their happiness, their all, and to whom they expected shortly to be gathered that they might praise Him evermore. With honest and unfeigned admiration we acknowledge the motive in all its noble purity. The contemplation of the Divine, the absorption in meditation upon the unknown Principle, whose action is revealed to us in ways so manifold and in thoughts and feelings impossible of utterance—that is the essence of all religion worthy the name. But what need have we to postulate the possession of a soul in order to understand these things? What of the mind, that last emergent through life from fundamental matter; which is now a thousandfold glorified through the granting of the mystic vision and, radiant in its glorification, illumines life and matter alike?

Any creed which is largely based upon expectation of a future life, in which justice will be administered, lays itself open to deterioration through the infiltration of unworthy motives of seeking after a reward or acquiring merit; and this harmful spirit has taken hold of the great majority of Christians, with results which are much to be deplored. I refer especially to the practising of excesses, both spiritual and physical, to which men and women have resorted in the past, largely for the purpose of acquiring merit by the exaltation of the soul at the expense of the body—excesses which have been responsible, through the dishonesty towards themselves on the part of those who practised them, for an equally dishonest, cringing and irreligious attitude to the Deity whom they were supposed to honour.

No less injurious to society is the conviction of the necessity for salvation of the soul. But the effects of this conviction cover a wide ground. They have, through the instrumentality of missions, complicated the problems not only of empire but of international relations as well. They have been seen in the iniquities of the Inquisition and in the most bitter wars of history. And there is the familiar story of the harm worked on the minds of little children by elders who had their souls' welfare at heart. A child cannot reasonably conceive of God. Most frequently, in a vain endeavour, it imagines a glorified human being invested with miraculous powers. The very invisibility of God threatens to make a bogey of Him, while the miraculous powers of vision and discovery attributed to Him often make the child both furtive and untruthful.

I cannot do better than to quote the words used by Dr Havelock Ellis in his essay on *The Art of Religion.*[1] Speaking of the age of puberty, he writes:—

> "It is only too familiar a fact how, when the impulse of religion first germinates in the young soul, the ghouls of the Churches rush out of their caverns, seize on the unhappy victim of the divine effluence and proceed to assure him that his rapture is, not a natural manifestation, as free as the sunlight and as gracious as the unfolding of a rose, but the manifest sign that he has been branded by a supernatural force and fettered for ever to a dead theological creed. Too often he is thus caught by the bait of his own rapture; the hook is firmly fixed in his jaw and he is drawn whither his blind guides will; his wings droop and fall away; so far as the finer issues of life are concerned, he is done for and damned."

What beneficial results may accrue if, as seems not improbable, belief in the soul should at some future time become generally discredited?

In the first place, I submit, it will have the salutary effect of enforcing intellectual and moral honesty.

But we may note that certainty will be replaced, not by any opposite certainty, but by a brave uncertainty, than which no better incentive is known for bringing out in us all that is finest—courage, the spirit of adventure, the instinct of curiosity (father of all invention and discovery), and a great sense of fellowship, of mutual support in the dark. We shall say of the prospect of an after-life, "I do not know. It is beyond me." More positively, we shall be free to live to the utmost the life of the present on which our whole energy will be centred, as upon all that is certainly ours, thus best fulfilling the injunction of Jesus to "take no thought for the morrow," to waste no time in vain speculation, in fond and unprofitable imaginings. But, devoting ourselves to present issues, we shall find less opportunity for brooding over and lamenting our often imaginary wrongs, and the possibility of redress always in favour of our miserable selves. And, in performing our allotted task, in fulfilling our being to the utmost, who knows but that we may find upon earth the happiness now looked for on high?

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[1] *The Dance of Life*, by Havelock Ellis.

Meanwhile we must by no means ignore the application of our disbelief in the all-important realm of ideals. What, if anything, is to take the place of the one-time ideal of personal survival and salvation? Already a number of competitors are in the field, most of them unsatisfactory, and some so easily attainable as soon to lose their glamour; while two, perhaps the most important, are no sooner seemingly realised than they flit ahead of us once more. I refer especially to those two prominent ideals of our day, personal comfort and happiness. To-day the unreflecting masses, to so many among whom comfort is new and happiness rare if ever attained, invariably fail to perceive the ultimate lack of satisfaction in any realised ideal which cannot be or is not shared, and that personal happiness and comfort can only finally be assured through the medium of the super-personal. Moreover, to a large extent they fail to see that all the excesses of indulgence now so rampant are the seeds of anything but satisfaction, either in their own generation or in the days of those to come. If for no other reason than this, mankind will long continue to suffer as it has in the past, until at length the value of such ideals is far more generally called in question. In our own day we are witnessing the beginnings of dissatisfaction with the ideal of competitive supremacy; and in course of time an educated and enlightened opinion will turn against the selfish ideals of purely personal well-being pursued regardless of the common good.

Here we may reckon with one of the strongest instincts he is known to possess; I mean the instinct of parenthood.

It is but a short step, seemingly, from pursuing the welfare of our own generation to the will to ensure the well-being of the next. No higher ideal could be found, I suggest, than that which seeks the welfare of generations unborn, nor any more truly altruistic. They will be our representatives long after we are turned to clay, and, in the absence of belief in the certainty of our own survival, nothing could be more natural than that our thoughts should turn with affection toward those who will perpetuate our likeness. In them lies our only certain future, springing as they do from the germ-plasm which is so essentially a part of ourselves. It is in the possibility of the birth of such an ideal as this that lies to-day the greatest hope of mankind upon earth.

To any person who will take the trouble to have recourse to General Smuts' book, it will become immediately apparent that evolution in the Holistic sense by no means stops short at the creation of mind. In the first place, let us not forget that mind itself is still evolving, and that, as General Smuts points out, by the side of matter and organic life, which in many respects have reached so high a pitch of perfection, mind has run but a fraction of its course. And it is through the activities of mind that there have been evolved those perfect wholes known to us by the name of ideals, to the realisation of which, however, the wayward mind has never yet attained. Moreover, the Holistic principle will be found at work in those other evolving organisms which consist of aggregates of evolutionary units, namely, human societies. Those who are prepared to study General Smuts' book at first hand will be able to find there sufficient evidence to convince them of the truth of his contention, with respect to the physical world at least. In the social sphere a glance through history will suffice to demonstrate the action of the principle, in the gradual welding together of tribes, even of discrete stocks and races, to form the nations we know to-day; while sufficient evidence meets us daily of the continued activity of the process in the first few steps now being taken with a view to what may in time become a world-wide federation of peoples.

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# THE UNITED CHURCH OF CANADA—PRESENT CONDITIONS.

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ARE there theological as well as other kinds of psychological complexes, using that term in its larger sense of a quality of mind or attitude arising from the presence of certain underlying, perhaps unconscious, factors in the mental make-up of the individual or the organisation? Do types of religious tradition and thought tend to produce anything of this kind as clearly marked as in other spheres of experience? Thus far in the investigations and discussions of the newer psychology apparently no question of this probability or possibility has been raised, and yet it might be that a fuller knowledge and clearer understanding in this direction would clear up some difficulties—remove some misunderstandings. The suspicion that some such connection exists has been suggested by certain clearly marked characteristics that are beginning to manifest themselves as a result of the coming together of the three denominations in the United Church of Canada, causing on one hand something of heart-burning, on the other of misgiving.

Congregationalism as a distinctive polity has never been able to establish itself strongly and successfully in Canadian ecclesiastical life. Not nearly so much so as in the United States, or in the older English-speaking countries. Here and there, especially in the larger centres, influential individual churches have been doing a splendid service, but the denomination as a whole has not had as commanding a position, or carried on as extensive a work, as the others. Consequently it is not to be wondered at that in the combination of forces there should be with them something of the consciousness of a less influential relationship to the movement, or, as psychologists would say, a trace of an inferiority complex. Such an admission would not carry with it, and would not arouse in them, any undesirable or unnecessary feeling.

With Presbyterianism and Methodism the case was wholly different. Numerically, and every other way, both were strong connectional institutions, active and aggressive, with the keenest possible rivalry between them, so much so, that the elimination of an unworthy and burdensome spirit of competition was, undoubtedly, one of the chief factors in bringing about the union. With such an equality of achievement and influence, such a conviction as to sameness of importance and standing, it was a natural and, perhaps, a justifiable expectation that in coming together the combination of qualities, and the distinctive theological and experiential contribution of each, would be so nicely balanced and so perfectly fused that one would not be so prominent, or so aggressively in evidence, as to hinder and discourage the other. It was the dream and the hope that out of the combination would come the best of both, and a still higher spiritual idealism than would have been possible for either by itself. Perhaps this was too optimistic. At any rate, it is admitted by every careful and sympathetic observer that thus far, even with all the warm and enthusiastic impulses usually characterising beginning days, there is very little indication of even an approximate realisation of these expectations.

Methodism, to use a common expression, was born in a revival. Its ideal, its emphasis, its message was the possession of a conscious spiritual experience by every individual Christian. As Harnack puts it in another connection, their Gospel had only one aim: the finding of the living God; the finding of Him by every individual as his God; and the finding of Him as the source of strength, and joy, and peace. It was not concerned very much about social or political influence or prestige. In fact it rather prided itself that the weapons of its warfare were spiritual and not carnal. It was essentially and practically democratic in spirit, although in some cases it seems to have shown in its constitution tendencies towards aristocratic impulses. But certainly in its actual working out it was a movement belonging to, and appealing mostly to, the common people. This, at least, was largely the history and status of Methodism in Canada. So much was this so, that in comparison with some of the older and more socially prominent bodies there was an inclination to look upon it, and even to speak of it, as of somewhat lower standing. Resented, of course, and repudiated by the Methodists themselves, but nevertheless exerting a subtle and sensitising influence on their own inner consciousness and in their relationships with others.

Strange to say, this undue exaltation of the mystical and emotional in religious experience added to rather than decreased the feeling of inferiority among those who were not quite so demonstrative. For, while there may be a general acceptance of Matthew Arnold's dictum that religion is morality touched with emotion there is always a tendency among the stronger and more thoughtful to be suspicious of any marked manifestations of this kind. Almost involuntarily they think of that kind of thing as indicative of a lesser and weaker personality. Perhaps because of the undesirable excesses that too often are to be found with that type of religious profession. Perhaps also that the ethical is not always equally in evidence where the emotional is made prominent. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the more superficial and less stable are more easily appealed to and take more readily to this particular form. They understand it better and attach themselves to it because it brings a real and legitimate relief from the terrible monotony and drabness of their lives. And so, whether arising from the actual or the imaginary, perhaps for the most part unconsciously, these and other influences seemed to put Canadian Methodism in the position where the sensitiveness and the suspiciousness that usually accompany these inferior complexes could be easily aroused and work untold mischief unless thoroughly understood and provision made to guard against them.

Turning aside for a moment, in this brief analysis will be found in part an explanation of the Methodist attitude towards the church union movement while that movement was in progress. It will be remembered that the negotiations between the contracting parties were drawn out to an almost interminable degree, largely because of a strong and formidable opposition within the Presbyterian ranks. During that long and trying period Methodism never uttered a word by way of impatience or reproach. Its leaders had all they could do to restrain the more impulsive and aggressive, not only because they were feeling keenly and resented the invidious position in which they were being placed, but also because their own work was suffering seriously by reason of the in-action and delay. Some were charging them as a denomination with a lack of proper self-respect and pride, while others were wholehearted in their commendation of the splendid exhibition of Christian humility and patience. Still there were neither remonstrance nor threat. Indeed, it was jocularly said that if it had shown more of a fighting spirit the insurgents might have given in and joined the main body to fight it. When at last the consummation came, although it went in superior in every way, there was still the same humblemindedness and unobtrusiveness, not a word of boasting, not an assertion of rights. Was all this of Christian perfection and grace? If not in the higher ranks, might it not be that this same complex begotten of beginnings and subsequent general status and operating more or less unconsciously, perhaps, in the constituency as a whole, made possible all this docility and restraint, and submission to leaders?

With Presbyterianism, on the other hand, there was no such tractableness and no such question could ever have arisen. It was vastly different in both heredity and spirit. It had everything to give it, and it actually had, a superiority complex. It had behind it an impressive and inspiring background of history and tradition. It numbered among its ancestry many of the great and noble of the earth, lawmakers and law administrators and governors, leaders in every department of thought and life. It had fought for its principles and policies, it had suffered and bled on their behalf, its early beginnings were glorified by martyrdoms. Altogether it had a record and an achievement that would go far towards justifying a feeling of confidence and strength, perhaps one might almost say, of justifying a certain amount of denominational pride. And in addition to all this the ethical ideal or type of spiritual life and experience, stressed and prevailing generally among the Reformed and Calvinistic communions, is much more steadfast and confident, and much more likely to be of the influential and dominating attitude, than the emotional and mystical type—a characteristic continuing and prevailing even down to this day.

Then again, strange also as it may seem, the Calvinistic theology, quite contrary to what we might expect, tends to develop something of this strong, self-conscious, and self-confident spirit. Henry Ward Beecher said that it made one magnificent Christian character at the expense of nineteen others—one of his exaggerations. Based for the most part on the Augustinian conception the total depravity and helplessness of human nature, it might be thought with good reason that under such a belittling and discouraging influence those affected by it would be handicapped and hindered in all their future course. In its doctrine of election, however, all this was offset and overcome. The conviction of being directly and definitely chosen of God brought with it a strength and inspiration that seemed to take away almost completely any self-depreciation or weakness that might come from this basal theology. Macaulay, in his essay on Milton, has given us the classic picture of the Puritan and Calvinist—on the one hand, full of penitence and self-abasement before his God; on the other, consciously confident and superior, as the chosen of Heaven.

So here we have these two widely differing strains—differing temperaments and types—coming together to form the major part of the constituency of the United Church of Canada. Two splendid streams of spiritual idealism and power, with just enough of the independence of Congregationalism to save them from a stagnant dogmatism and keep the waters fresh and healthful and wholesome. The inspiration of the clearer vision and greater possibilities of service made possible by this uniting of forces, reviving and restoring the old-time fervour and fire of Methodism. The ethical emphasis and institutional and individual loyalty and devotion of Presbyterianism, stiffening and strengthening the moral fibre, and making for greater steadiness and progress than ever, will add a needed and vital element to the contributions of the other two. Truly an inspiring outlook, rich with possibility and promise. No wonder that Christian people of all classes and creeds were so interested and so anxious about the outcome.

But what about the outcome? Will the consummation so devoutly to be wished be realised? Perhaps not perfectly, and certainly not at once, but approximately enough to show that at least things are shaping in the right direction. With wisdom and tact on the part of the leaders, and patience and restraint on the part of the people, there are no valid reasons why there should be failure. But these human movements, so promising in their earlier enthusiasms, have an unhappy knack of disappointing their well-wishers and supporters and developing some unexpected weakness, some little rift within the lute, that while it may not be able to make the music altogether mute, tends to rob it of a good deal of its strength and harmony. Whether it be over-sensitiveness on their part, or a tendency to see the darker and less hopeful side of things, there are thoughtful men and women, admirers and adherents of the union, who think they see the beginning of a little cloud upon the horizon which, if allowed to spread might easily develop into something more serious still. Naturally they are anxious that, in a quiet and sympathetic way, the danger should be pointed out, and, if possible, averted.

With all the best intentions in the world, and with a strong and sincere desire on the part of both leaders and people to carry out faithfully and loyally the undertakings and obligations entered into in connection with the union, Presbyterianism, for the most part unconsciously to itself, is yet hindering more than it is aware the promise and progress of the United Church. Here, again, too often the case in such matters, its strength is its weakness. Because of its strong commanding position, its aggressive, confident spirit begotten of its past history and traditions, and its conference methods of dealing with its church affairs, it naturally carried a good deal of this superiority complex into the new relationship. And this superiority complex is a very good thing, especially when it enables individuals and institutions to overcome and rise above the subtle and sapping weaknesses and discouragements incidental to human nature and human undertaking. But it has its limitations even when unconsciously and innocently exercised. And when it excites unnecessary suspicions and raises hindering prejudices between those who should be acting together in the closest co-operation of Christian fellowship and service, then it has reached the point where it should be considered and restrained.

In a mingling of ideals and interests such as this union of the Canadian churches actually is, and especially where it touches the deepest sentiments and attachments of life as religion always does, there is sure to be a good deal of half-hearted and looking-for-excuse kind of adherence; there is always enough of that looking-back-longingly attitude to make it easy to find fault and finally to drop out of line, if not to develop an active opposition. When we add to that the sensitiveness and fearfulness of the little bit of inferiority complex indicated as already existing in the Methodist mind making it peculiarly susceptible to what it might consider symptoms of neglect or slight coming from this aggressive, dominating characteristic of Presbyterianism, then there is a situation that requires careful handling. There may not be very much outward manifestation of dissatisfaction or actual insurgency, but there will be what is infinitely worse—that lack of interest and spirit of indifference that are absolutely fatal to any real influence or progress. Already from almost every direction are coming reports and evidences of the spread of this poison of standoffishness and indifferentism with all their pernicious and paralysing results.

In addition to this, and perhaps most to be deplored by thoughtful Christian people, would be the possibility and the danger that in this slackening of Methodist interest, this weakening of Methodist enthusiasm and support, there would not be for the newly launched enterprise that special spiritual idealism, that special experiential contribution, which would come from Methodism, and which must come undiluted and unhindered if there is to be a strong and satisfactory outcome as a result of the amalgamation. As we have seen already, there is a promise in the proper and perfect fusion of these various denominational elements—the ethical stability and institutional cohesiveness and loyalty of Presbyterianism; the fire and fervour of Methodist individual spiritual experience and Christian consciousness; and the sense of Congregational independence and freedom—that is simply wonderful, fraught with the most momentous consequences, not only for Christian work in Canada, but for Protestant Christianity as a whole. It would be a tragedy if through carelessness, or ignorance, or prejudice, anything should be done, or left undone, that would endanger the most perfect possible consummation of such a prophetic and inspiring union.

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# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

### By Professor G. DAWES HICKS, F.B.A.

The death of Lord Haldane on August 19, in his seventy-third year, has removed from our midst a philosophic thinker of wide learning and speculative power. In the pages of *Nature* for September 15 I have tried to give some account of his work in philosophy. Educated at Edinburgh under Campbell Fraser, and at Göttingen under Lotze, he commenced his career as a philosophical student; and, although he was destined to become famous both as a lawyer and as a statesman, he was never untrue to his first love. His first appearance in print was as joint author with his brother, Dr J. S. Haldane, of an essay in the volume published in 1883 in memory of T. H. Green, and in that essay he outlined the Hegelian position, to which to the end of his life he steadily adhered. In conjunction with his friend Mr J. Kemp, he translated Schopenhauer's chief work into English—a laborious undertaking, executed with singular care and exactitude. He was Gifford Lecturer in St Andrews in 1902–1904; and the two volumes, entitled *The Pathway to Reality*, containing the substance of his lectures, were published in 1903 and 1904. They are perhaps the best popular exposition of Hegelianism in the English language, and they are written with a persuasiveness that beguiles even if it does not convince. An interval then ensued, during which the author was engaged in onerous functions of public service; but on his release from the office of Lord Chancellor in 1915 he set about writing the book on *The Reign of Relativity*, which, when it appeared in 1921, rapidly went through several editions. It was a comprehensive survey of the whole field of philosophy in the light of what modern science has been doing, and an attempt to sustain the position that the ultimate reality is Mind or Knowledge. There followed in 1922 *The Philosophy of Humanism*, and in 1926 *Human Experience: A Study of its Structure*. A succession of volumes such as these was an extraordinary achievement for a man engulfed in legal and parliamentary affairs, especially in view of the fact that he was a frequent contributor to *Mind*, the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, and other journals. Lord Haldane's genial presence will be sadly missed in the haunts where philosophers congregate. He took part in many notable discussions; and, in listening to him, his hearers always felt that the issue with which he was dealing was for him a very living one.—Another heavy loss has to be recorded, that of Professor John Burnet, who died on May 26. Professor Burnet held the chair of Greek at St Andrews for over thirty years, from 1892 until a short time before his death. He was a sound and reliable scholar and a man of immense erudition. His book on *Early Greek Philosophy*, first published in 1892, when the author was only twenty-nine years of age, may not unfairly be said to have furnished the starting-point for most of the recent research upon the schools of Greece and to have given new life to the study of the ancient thinkers. Two subsequent editions were issued, in 1908 and in 1920, and in each case the volume had to be partially re-written in the light of new discoveries. He published an edition of Aristotle's *Ethics* in 1900, interesting on account of the many novel interpretations suggested both in the Introduction and in the Notes. But it is as a Platonic scholar that Burnet's name will go down to posterity. His great edition of the Dialogues, *Platonis Opera*, 1899–1907, will long remain the standard text. In 1911 he published an annotated edition of the *Phaedo;* and in 1924, as complementary to it, a similar edition of the *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, and *Crito*. Both these were conceived, he tells us, as part of a larger enterprise, that of replacing Socrates in the historical setting to which he really belongs. Nor must one omit to mention the volume on *Greek Philosophy from Thales to Plato*, published in 1914. Half of it is concerned with the Platonic Dialogues, and the treatment of them is wonderfully fresh and original. We can ill afford to lose a scholar of the brilliance and distinction of John Burnet.

The study of Plato seems to be increasing among us. Apart from Professor Taylor's massive Commentary on the *Timaeus*, which I have dealt with elsewhere, several Platonic studies have appeared during the last few months. *The Phaedo of Plato*, translated by the Hon. Patrick Duncan (Oxford University Press, 1928, 6*s.* net), follows Burnet very closely, and is an elegant rendering of the text. At the close of the volume, Mr Duncan has added some short essays on the theory of Ideas in the *Phaedo* and on Socrates and the doctrine of immortality. Miss Dorothy Tarrant's edition of the *Hippias Major*, with Introductory Essay and Commentary (Cambridge: University Press, 1928, 12*s.* 6*d.* net) is a thoroughly scholarly piece of work, and will meet a distinct need. Miss Tarrant finds in the *Hippias Major* an exercise upon various logico-metaphysical terms of the *Phaedo*. Accordingly, she regards it as having been written later than the *Phaedo*, but earlier than the *Theaetetus*, not, however, by Plato himself, but by a young student of the Academy. In her interesting discussion of the chronological order of the Dialogues, she follows in the main, though with certain reservations, Jackson's arrangement, and has evidently been greatly influenced by his view of the development of Plato's thought. In an elaborate work on

*Plato's Theory of Ethics* (London: Kegan Paul, 1928, 21*s.* net), Professor R. C. Lodge, of the University of Manitoba, tries to determine by an empirical study of the Dialogues (*a*) the moral criterion in Platonism, (*b*) the scales of goods discussed by Plato, and (*c*) the Platonic conception of the Highest Good. As a result of his investigation he reaches the conclusions (*a*) that the general criterion of good and evil advocated in the Dialogues is the conception of an ideally perfect life, (*b*) that the representatives of philosophic insight in the Dialogues tend to re-interpret the various value-scales discussed until they coincide, in principle and in detail, with the demands of the ideal criterion, and (*c*) that, according to Plato, the highest good for the universe consists in the ideal functioning of the whole so as to realise the maximum of value-potentiality inherent in its elements, and that the highest good for the individual consists in so living as to constitute a consciously organic portion of this whole, and, in thus living, to realise his own truest well-being. The investigation is carried out in a most painstaking manner, and evidently by one who loves Plato. The chief misgiving one feels is in regard to the method adopted. Can Platonic theory really be handled successfully without taking into account the development of Plato's thought and the chronological order of the Dialogues?

Professor H. J. Paton's volume, *The Good Will: A Study in the Coherence Theory of Goodness* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1927, 16*s.* net), is an extremely valuable and suggestive contribution to ethical philosophy, abounding in original ideas, and written in a way which makes it enjoyable reading. Professor Paton proceeds on the principle that the so-called tertiary qualities, or values, depend for their reality on the activity of minds, whether in creation or co-operation. There are two main characteristics of the ethical theory he is concerned to maintain. The one is that goodness belongs to things, not in themselves, but as objects of some kind of willing, and is apprehended not merely as an intellectual matter, but through the presence of a particular kind of will. The other is that to be good is to will, or to be willed, coherently, and that different kinds of goodness depend upon the different kinds of coherence and the different ways of willing or of being willed. Even instinctive action has, it is contended, a certain rationality and regularity, so that there is from the first a kind of coherence in our actions, and this would be manifest to an external spectator. As we develop, and as our consciousness extends beyond the moment, we recognise the continuity of the situations and of our responses; and as we know more coherently what we will, our will itself becomes more coherent. It becomes a "policy"; and our desires and acts are coherent in so far as they are not disconnected impulses but "fit in with" a reflective "policy." Willing is good in so far as it is the manifestation of a coherent policy, and especially of a coherent policy of life. But moral goodness develops in society. My social actions and those of others are good to me in so far as they cohere with and enrich my individual policy of life. And my whole life is good in so far as it coheres with and enriches the co-operative activity of the whole society of which I am only a part. A thoughtful little Introduction to Ethical Philosophy has just appeared from the pen of Mr E. F. Carritt, entitled *The Theory of Morals* (Oxford University Press, 1928, 4*s*. 6*d*. net). The author considers in turn most of the historical theories of the moral end, and his criticism of them is invariably fresh and stimulating. Of ethical writers he thinks that Kant and Butler come nearest to the truth, though he has also learned much, he tells us, from Lotze and Martineau. It seems to him we must say that there are right acts for a rational being to perform, whether this rational being knows what they all are or not, but that he cannot be blamed for not doing them if he cannot know them. Freedom of moral choice is, it is urged, the only hypothesis which offers even a hint at a possible solution of the problem of evil. Mention should be made of two able and closely reasoned articles by Mr W. D. Lamont on "The Notion of Duty" (*Mind*, April and July 1928). The writer's contention is that the distinction between morality and immorality is impossible and unintelligible on the theories of Moore, Green, Bradley and Bosanquet. If the notion of duty has any significance, if there is any sense in distinguishing between moral and immoral action, then it is implied that there is such a thing as a legislative will, in Kant's sense. If you have done what *your* law ordains, you have done your moral duty. I have also to note two other interesting ethical articles—the one on "Clarke's Ethical Philosophy," by the late Professor Ernest Albee (*Phil. R.*, July 1928), a careful treatment of the work of a perhaps unduly neglected thinker, and the other "Sur les limites de l'interprétation sociologique de la morale," by G. Mauchaussat (*R. de Mét. et de Morale*, July–September 1928), who finds the limits in question where the thinking subject affirms himself as face to face with the "things" of which he assumes the existence and which are known to him through means of science.

Naturally, Mr Bertrand Russell's two recent books are exciting a good deal of criticism. Professor H. A. Prichard writes (*Mind*, July 1928) on "Mr Russell's Outline of Philosophy," and deals specifically with Russell's view of perception and of the nature of the physical world. He points out that, according to Russell, a perception looked at from within is the genus of which colours, sounds, tastes, etc., are the species. But, he objects, colours or sounds are what we see or hear, and not our seeing or hearing something. So, too, Russell's description of perception regarded from without must be erroneous, for a physical process in our brain cannot *be* a perception, but at best only what we perceive. And if the two accounts of perception are considered in combination, it will be seen that Russell is virtually maintaining that a certain process in our brain and what he calls a percept, *e.g.* a patch of colour, or a sound, are one and the same thing. Yet these can no more be identical than can the end of a line and an emotion, and neither can possibly *be* a perception, as distinct from something we perceive. In the April number of *Mind*, Mr M. H. A. Newman acutely criticises "Mr Russell's Causal Theory of Perception." The argument is too technical to allow of being epitomised. The view Mr Newman puts forward is that the theory in question requires modification if it is to be capable of sustaining the theory of the material world that Russell wishes to derive from it. A most useful and timely piece of work comes to us from America, namely, a monograph by Dr Marvin Farber, on "Phenomenology as a Method and as a Philosophical Discipline" (*University of Buffalo Studies*, Vol. VI., June 1928). In this little work an attempt is made to present the main principles of Husserl's philosophy in an English dress. It is far from being an easy task, for Husserl and his followers have introduced a whole galaxy of new technical terms, for many of which it is well-nigh hopeless to look for English equivalents. But students of Husserl's writings will certainly find Dr Farber's monograph helpful. That there is much in Husserl's epistemological analysis with which English thinkers will have to reckon I am convinced, although I confess to feeling somewhat discouraged after reading Dr Farber's account of the phenomenological description of perception with its mysterious notion of the "polarity of the object." In reference to the problem of perception, mention should be made of Professor C. A. Strong's article (*Mind*, April 1928), "On the Relation of Appearances to Real Things." A large part of the article is concerned with the question how there is such a thing as non-veridical perception, or as non-veridical elements in perception. The paper on "Cook Wilson's View of Judgment," by Mr Richard Robinson (*Mind*, July 1928), will certainly assist materially in understanding Cook Wilson's standpoint in the lectures on Logic recently published.

Ueberweg's great *Geschichte der Philosophie* has now reached a twelfth edition and has expanded into five large volumes. The fifth volume, *Die Philosophie des Auslandes vom Beginn des 19 Jahrhunderts bis auf die Gegenwart*, under the editorship of Professor Oesterreich, of Tübingen (Berlin: Mittler, 1928, 25*s*. net), lies before us. It contains an exhaustive account of recent philosophical developments in European countries outside of Germany and also of those in America, together with the complete bibliographies which have always been a distinctive feature of Ueberweg. In almost all cases national contributors have been secured. Professor T. Ruyssen deals with French Philosophy, Professor Credaro with Italian, while the *Darstellung* of English Philosophy, the longest in the book, is by the present writer. Particularly interesting are the contributions which describe the directions of philosophic thought in the Scandinavian countries—Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Altogether, the work is quite unique in its way, and contains information that is not to be got elsewhere. The editor has written an Introduction in which he seeks to connect the different trends of thought described with those that have evinced themselves in Germany itself. With Professor Cell's account of American Philosophy may be advantageously compared Professor J. H. Muirhead's article, "How Hegel came to America" (*Phil. R.*, May 1928). What he says about Henry C. Brockmeyer, the American "discoverer" of Hegel, and W. T.

Harris, editor of the famous *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (the first of its kind in the Anglo-Saxon world), is well worth reading.

Not students of science alone, but students of philosophy no less, will be grateful to Dr J. H. Jeans for his extraordinarily fascinating and attractive volume, *Astronomy and Cosmogony* (Cambridge University Press, 1928, 31*s.* 6*d.* net), in which he attempts to portray not only the present position of astronomical science, but the conclusions of astronomers in regard to the physical condition of stellar matter, the structure of the stars, the origin of their variation, and the course of their evolution. The greatest pains have been taken to use the simplest language consistent with scientific accuracy; and, although the inclusion of a certain amount of mathematical analysis was inevitable, every effort has been made to render the results intelligible to readers with no mathematical knowledge. It is certainly an amazing story that Dr Jeans has to unfold—to speak of "the fairy-tales of science" scarcely does it justice. It is with reference to radiation that scientific theory has recently undergone some of its most startling transformations, and in regard to which it is probably destined in the near future to undergo many more. It now seems to be made out that all radiation carries mass with it, so that the emission of radiation necessarily diminishes the mass of a star. The sun, for instance, loses 250 million tons of mass every minute, and there is no known source of replenishment which can supply new mass to it at even a small fraction of this rate. And yet, Dr Jeans informs us, the sun possesses enough mass to continue to radiate at its present rate for 15 million million years. A star starts on its life with a huge store of mass, the greater part of which is destined to be transformed into radiation. Only one way is known to physics in which such enormous amounts of mass can be stored, and that is in the form of protons and electrons which are combined into atoms; and radiation must be provided by the annihilation of these atoms. Future radiation is stored in the form of electron and protons in the star, and the process of liberation of energy must consist of an annihilation of matter, electrons and protons neutralising one another and setting free radiation of mass equivalent to that of the annihilated matter. Atoms which are completely broken up into their constituent electrons and protons seem, however, to be immune from annihilation.—Another charming and delightful volume on the history of science is that by Dr Charles Singer, *From Magic to Science: Essays on the Scientific Twilight* (London: Ernest Benn, 1928, 25*s.* net). Starting with an account of science under the Roman Empire, Dr Singer traces the collapse of ancient science into the swamp of magic and the first attempts at recovery from that hideous slough. The book is intensely interesting from the first page to the last, and readers will look forward with eagerness to the sequel which the author promises, dealing with the later medieval period.

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# REVIEWS.

*A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus.* By A. E. Taylor, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, Fellow of the British Academy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928.—Pp. xvi + 700.—42*s*. net.

At last English scholarship has produced a really worthy treatment of Plato's great dialogue. Hitherto English students have been primarily dependent on the annotated edition of Archer-Hind, published in 1888. Useful and interesting though in many respects that edition is, it cannot be pronounced satisfactory. The text is far from trustworthy, for the editor was unacquainted with the readings of an exceptionally important manuscript; and the exegesis was marred by the attempt to force upon Plato an idealistic metaphysic of an essentially modern type. There has been, it is true, the learned work of T. H. Martin to fall back upon, *Études sur le Timée de Platon*, but this dates from 1841, prior to the rise of the more critical study of Greek science and philosophy, which begins with the writings of Zeller. A new exposition of the thought of the *Timaeus* has been, therefore, long overdue, and lovers of Plato everywhere will hardly know how to express their gratitude to the author of the splendid volume now before us for the service he has done them. Of all Plato's dialogues no other makes so many demands upon an expositor. And Professor Taylor has brought to the task a number of qualifications such as probably he alone of living writers possesses in combination—the erudition of an accomplished classical scholar, a profound knowledge of the history of ancient, mediæval and modern philosophy, the critical discernment of a philosophic thinker who has wide acquaintance with modern physical science and the development of scientific theories. The result is a work the composition of which may be truly said to be an intellectual feat in which extraordinary width of learning and laborious industry are united with complete mastery over the material and singular acuteness in getting at the meaning of difficult passages. Nothing could be happier, for instance, than the frequent attempts that are made to illustrate the thought of the dialogue by reference to the views of Whitehead, Eddington, Alexander, and other present-day philosophers and scientists. Students, too, will be greatly helped by having the utterances of Timaeus on scientific questions carefully and systematically compared with Aristotle's treatment of the same problems.

In dealing with a volume so comprehensive, of which the Notes alone, apart from the Prolegomena and Appendices, occupy over 600 closely printed pages, a reviewer with limited space at his disposal may well find embarrassment. I shall confine myself to two main objects—in the first place, to calling attention to some few of the numerous instances where Professor Taylor's treatment seems to me particularly fresh and stimulating, and, in the second place, to indicating certain matters upon which, as it seems to me, his exposition is open to well-founded criticism.

(1) After having set forth in previous dialogues his conception of the realm of ultimate being, Plato makes it his aim in the *Timaeus* to furnish an account of the nature and genesis of the phenomenal world. The discourse of Timaeus covers, indeed, the entire field of natural knowledge from astronomy to pathology and psychophysics. Professor Taylor is clearly justified in laying stress upon the fact that both at the outset and at frequent turning-points of the narrative the hypothetical character of the cosmology delineated is strongly emphasised. While in metaphysics and mathematics there can be finality, in natural science we have no right to expect more than εἰκότες λόγοι, "likely stories," understanding thereby not baseless fictions but the nearest approximations which can provisionally be made to exact truth. In pure mathematics exactitude is possible, because the mathematician is concerned with objects in which there is no change, and with reference to which time has not to be taken into account. But in regard to things that are incessantly undergoing variation, that are perpetually "turning out" to be more or less than we had supposed them to be, it is necessary to be constantly revising any results we may have reached. That is to say, natural science is "progressive" in a way in which neither mathematics nor metaphysics can be. As in many other connections, Plato, so Professor Taylor urges, compares favourably here with Aristotle. Whereas Timaeus is made repeatedly to remind us that his doctrines are tentative, Aristotle never doubted that the mythology of *de Caelo* was exact science and the last word of astronomy. In short, Plato grasped as Aristotle did not the function of scientific hypothesis, that it was, namely, in the language of the Academy, σῴζειν τὰ φαινόμενα, to "save appearances," so that wherever in the record of familar "appearances" errors are detected, the hypothesis by which they have been explained requires to be modified.

Timaeus starts, then, from the metaphysical distinction between ὄντα, in the proper sense of the word, ὄντως ὄντα, and γιγνόμενα. The former class includes the εἴδη and mathematical entities; the latter class the αἰσθητά, the so-called "things" of the physical world. The former are apprehended by νόησις μετὰ λόγου, thought conjoined with an account of its object; the latter by belief or judgment accompanied by or founded upon sensation, δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως. The former are timeless essences; the latter are "events," phases of what Whitehead calls the "passage of nature." Obviously, the fundamental problem confronting Plato all through was to determine the relation between these two realms, to show if he could that the second was a necessary consequence of the first. Professor Taylor is in accord with most Platonic scholars of the present day in rejecting the view of Jackson and Archer-Hind that the εἴδη were conceived as fixed ways of thinking on the part of an Infinite Mind. But he goes further, and maintains that in regard to the phenomenal world the *Timaeus* is wholly free from the doctrine designated by Whitehead as that of the "bifurcation of nature." He holds, and in this respect differs from the majority of commentators (Martin, for example), that throughout the dialogue the αἰσθητικὰ παθήματα (understanding by the adjective not "sentient" but "connected with αἴσθησις") are treated as παθήματα of the "things" of which we commonly predicate them, and that neither our bodies nor our minds are supposed to play any part in making these qualities, but that they only mediate our awareness of them. Indeed, he thinks that, had the question been put to him, Timaeus would have been obliged to say that even a soul without a body would, or at least might, be aware of sense-data. For Plato, accordingly, the business of natural science was not to get behind a veil of sensible qualities; it was rather to furnish a rational account of the system of *sensibilia* and to determine the lines of interconnection between them.

Whether or no it is intended in the *Timaeus* to inculcate the doctrine that the world had a beginning, is γεννητός, as Aristotle put it, was a hotly disputed question even among the ancient interpreters. Aristotle did take the account of creation literally, and as such criticised it severely; Xenocrates, the second head of the Academy after Plato, insisted, on the other hand, that the representation of time and of the οὐρανός as having had a beginning was simply a device διδασκαλίας χάριν, for convenience of exposition, just as a geometer speaks of drawing a line though he knows that he can neither make nor unmake a line in the mathematical sense. Professor Taylor shows, I think, conclusively that Xenocrates in this respect was right, that the coming into being of the ὀυρανός must not be understood as a temporal act, but that the story of its creation was a way of conveying the truth that the perceptible world is not self-subsisting or self-explanatory, that it is dependent on a ground other than itself. Seeing it is said that χρόνος μετ' οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν (38 b 6), the view is excluded of there ever having been a time when the world of generation did not exist, of there ever having been an empty time when nothing was happening. The language which seems to imply a primitive state of chaos can, therefore, be only allegorical. So, too, when time is spoken of, in the famous metaphor, as a "moving image of eternity," εἰκὼν κινητὸς αἰῶνος (37 d 5), the point of the metaphor is the positive resemblance between time and eternity; the one is a real "likeness," a true "perspective," of the other. The eternal, that which is never "in the making," can be strictly called ἀΐδιος, everlasting; but that which, although always "in the making," endures through *all* time is an approximation to the everlasting. For while, indeed, a thing of passage, the phenomenal world never passes *away*, and the formal laws of its structure remain the same throughout. Or, to use Professor Taylor's apt illustration, just as, on the Pythagorean theory of number, the integers might be thought of as "shadows" or "projections" or "perspectives" of the unit, so time may be thought of as a "shadow" or "projection" or "perspective" of eternity.

In his interpretation of the difficult passage where Necessity is introduced as accessory to νοῦς in the generation of the universe (47 e–48 e), Professor Taylor follows in large measure the admirable treatment of Baeumker. He urges, as Baeumker did, that the term ἀνάγκη must neither be taken to represent anything inherently lawless and irrational (since we repeatedly hear of νοῦς persuading ἀνάγκη), nor be supposed to mean "scientific necessity" or the "reign of law" in the modern sense (since ἀνάγκη is expressly called the πλανωμένη ἀιτία, the rambling or aimless cause). Rather is ἀνάγκη to be conceived as the personification of that which subserves νοῦς, of that which, if left to itself, as it never is, would be, not indeed "bad," but indifferent to the worth of its products. What are put down to it are specifically those "conjunctions" for which we can see no justification in the form of a valuable result and which we have simply to accept as mere "brute facts" or "ultimate collocations." True, if there could be complete knowledge this contingent element would vanish from our account of the world. But the world is an ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον, and therefore never complete, so that there can be no complete knowledge of it.

Again, in respect to the issue whether Plato intended to identify body with *res extensa*, our author appeals to Baeumker, who in this context he believes has said the last word. What Timaeus calls the receptacle (ὑποδοχή) or matrix (ἐκμαγεῖον) or nurse (τιθήνη) of all becoming is space conceived *more geometrico*. And the "passage of nature" is thought of as consisting of sensible events that exhibit specific types or patterns taking place in or over volumes. The types of the events, the ἐίδη or παραδείγματα, do not, of course, "occur," but instances of them do, and these instances, the actual events, are the μιμήματα of the different types. That *in which* the occurrences go on, the volume they fill, is extension itself, the ὑποδοχή, and it remains permanent throughout change. The nouns of common speech ought not to be mistaken for names of anything substantial or permanent; they are really names of groups of sensible qualities, which "come round" over and over again in the passage of nature and are "alike." Aristotle asserts that Plato in the *Timaeus* identified ὕλη with χώρα, space. But in truth "matter" plays no part at all in this cosmology; the ὑποδοχή is not thought of as a "stuff" or "substrate." It is that *in which* passage is "situated"; like the εἶδος, it does not itself "pass," but, unlike the εἶδος, it functions not as the type of sensible events, but as that which provides them with their "situations" (ἕδραν). In short, an account of the sensible world cannot be given in terms of less than three factors, παραδείγματα, ὑποδοχή, μιμήματα, just as Whitehead's account of it requires the three factors which he calls "objects," "space-time," "events."

(2) The central thesis which colours the whole of Professor Taylor's exegesis is certain to give rise to much discussion. His contention is that it is a mistake to regard the *Timaeus* as a presentation of distinctively Platonic doctrine, that it is in fact an attempt to portray the scientific views of a fifth-century Pythagorean, from some of which at least Plato himself would have dissented. Although written after 360 B.C., when Plato was between the ages of sixty-five and eighty, Professor Taylor would date the scene of the dialogue in or about the year 421 B.C., when Socrates would have been just on fifty and Plato a small child. Timaeus, who at that time would have been from seventy to seventy-five years of age, is taken to be propounding the position of a Pythagorean profoundly influenced by Empedoclean biology. The evidence which is adduced in favour of this hypothesis is cumulative in character; it is made up of numerous strands which are unfolded one after another as the Commentary proceeds.

It is certainly all to the good that the hypothesis in question should be worked out in the thorough manner in which it has now been done. Here I can only indicate very briefly some of the reasons on account of which I still feel unconvinced. (*a*) I think the evidence adduced is considerably weakened by the frequent admissions which have to be made that on many vital points Timaeus is obviously deviating from recognised Pythagorean doctrine (see *e.g.* pp. 100, 102, 222, 246, 313, 520). It appears to me that while maintaining that Plato was endeavouring to give an historically correct picture of the science of Italy and Sicily in the last third of the fifth century, Professor Taylor is not seldom to be found arguing as though the science of Timaeus were that of a Pythagorean living at the time when the dialogue was written. After all, it has to be allowed that the science in question is extraordinarily "eclectic" in character (p. 222), and that on several important matters the discourse does represent the opinion of Plato himself (*e.g.* p. 445). (*b*) Can we really imagine Plato, in his maturity, devoting an immense amount of labour to depicting the cosmogony of a man whose views may have been a little antiquated even for a fifth-century Pythagorean (p. 395), and which "had already ceased to be the 'most likely account' before the dialogue was written" (p. 396)? What conceivable motive could he have had for doing so? It has to be remembered that the assumed fifty years' interval was a period of striking development in this as in other branches of culture. Why should Plato have been so careful, in writing a great work on natural science, to have excluded every new idea that had been propounded during his own lifetime? The entire contention respecting the tentativeness of scientific hypothesis would seem in that case to lose its point. It has point if it relates to explanations that appeared to Plato himself to be the "most probable"; but if Plato is merely putting it into the mouth of an elderly man speaking fifty years previously, many of whose theories had long since been superseded, it wears an altogether different aspect. Moreover, one may well doubt its appropriativeness if ascribed to a Pythagorean of that date. (*c*) I cannot see that Professor Taylor accounts in the least degree for the fact that the ancient writers concur in referring to the *Timaeus* as expressive of the views of Plato. Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus all knew Plato personally; and, if the *Timaeus* was not intended by its author to expound his own views, they must assuredly have been aware of the fact. Is it likely that they would have kept a fact of that sort secret and even have used language that was clearly calculated to mislead? To refer to our mode of quoting Shakespeare as a parallel is surely inept. When we quote the reflections of Hamlet as Shakespeare's (p. 12) there is no danger of our misleading anybody; but if we quoted the reflections of Hylas as Berkeley's or those of Demea as Hume's there certainly would be.

I had hoped my allotted space would have held out to enable me to take note of some other crucial points. I should have liked, for instance, to indicate why I doubt whether the picture of the δημιουργός can be rightly interpreted in the theistic fashion upon which Professor Taylor is so decided. I should have liked to explain why it seems to me he attaches exaggerated importance to the tenth book of the *Laws* as containing the essence of Platonism. I should have liked to call in question the interpretation (p. 324) of the εἰσιόντα and ἐξιόντα (50 c 1) as just what have all along been termed μιμήματα or γιγνόμενα (cf. the translation of these phrases on p. 321). I should have liked again to appeal to *Met.* 1078 b, in view of Professor Taylor's unqualified statement that Aristotle "never refers to any change in the teaching of Plato" (p. 29) with respect to the theory of Ideas. And, once more, I should have liked to ask whether, even admitting that references in the dialogue to Democritus have often been too hastily assumed, it is really credible, as our author appears to think it is, that Plato had no knowledge whatever of Democritus or of his writings.

But, although probably no other student of the *Timaeus* will be prepared to accept the whole of Professor Taylor's exegesis, all will agree in welcoming this masterly contribution of his to Platonic literature. For many years to come it will be *the* standard commentary, and it will undoubtedly yield suggestions for various new lines of research. A word of recognition is due to the printers. I have discovered but few errata, and these trifling ones, in what must have been an extremely difficult work to set up in type. And may I express the hope that the English translation of the dialogue which I understand Professor Taylor has made may soon see the light of day? It would add greatly to the value of what he has already given us.

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*The Correspondence of Spinoza.* Translated and Edited, with Introduction and Annotations. By A. Wolf, Professor in the University of London.—London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1928.—Pp. 502.—15*s*.

THE *Ethics* of Spinoza is one of the great books of the seventeenth century. It claims to make the true way of life for man as plain as a proposition in geometry, and by the same rigorous method. It thus presents a forbidding aspect to the reader, who finds himself compelled to keep steadily on the track of the argument, and is seldom allowed to loiter by the way or to stray into delightful regions off the road. It is a route march rather than a companionable ramble to which he is called. And although it is possible to dip into the book, and to gather a rich harvest, the impression is liable to remain that this is not a book one can read from cover to cover. Hence its full flavour, which depends on the combination of a sense for what is important in life with a superb trust in the power of human reason to enable us to gain it, is easy to miss. You must not only grasp Spinoza's conclusions, you must see them in the light of his reasons, and above all, you must remember that this book is Spinoza's search for eternal life undertaken in all the practical seriousness of Bunyan's Christian, if you are to understand what the *Ethics* is about. "Qui apprend les Eléments de la géométrie," says Delbos, "peut n'avoir cure de la personnalité d'Euclide. Mais qui lit et veut comprendre cette géométrie très particulière qu'est *l'Éthique* ne saurait guère se dispenser de savoir ce que fut Spinoza."

For in truth, man's reason, which when applied to abstract matters takes on the colourlessness of geometry, becomes, when applied to the real, to the God in whom all things live and move and have their being, rich and palpitating with life. To describe it in its highest form Spinoza uses the term "intellectual love"; its closest parallel is the concept of philosophia—love of wisdom—of Plato. For Spinoza, as for Plato, it was the beacon light to guide his path. He left all else to follow it. Hence his life was long, full, and happy, though he was an outcast from the Jews, execrated by most Christians, lived in comparative poverty, and died at the age of forty-four. That he could easily have attained honour and position is clear from his life. That he felt that it would not profit him to gain these things and lose his own soul is equally clear. Unless you feel this throughout the *Ethics*, you are missing the spirit of the book.

Hence the value of the *Letters*. They bring out in the clearest manner the forces, friendly and adverse, playing round Spinoza. They show him choosing to live his own life, desiring friendly intercourse with men, kindly and courteous, patient and anxious to help those who were searching, as he was, for the Way, the Truth, and the Life. He is never malicious, and is rarely moved to anger. When he is, it is on behalf of the Truth. "His correspondence," said Goethe—Professor Wolf quotes the remark in his translation of the *Letters*—"is the most interesting book one can read in the world of uprightness and of humanity."

The *Letters* are a great help to the understanding of the *Ethics* in another way. They enable one to take its positions on the flank. For many of them show the important positions enunciated in the *Ethics* being attacked by his correspondents and cleared from misunderstanding by Spinoza. Thus they serve much the same purpose as the objections and replies that Descartes published along with his *Meditations*. Hitherto they have been available in English only in selection. Professor Wolf has now presented a complete translation, made from the recent definitive text of the Heidelberg edition. Though he has sometimes sacrificed elegance and English idiom, he has done his work with meticulous accuracy, with full understanding and love. But he has given us much more than a translation. The Introduction and Notes are packed with just the information the reader will desire to have regarding the persons with whom Spinoza was in correspondence, the scientific and philosophic matters treated in the letters, the text of the letters. The whole is well indexed. The task required a combination of qualities which few men possess, an amount of labour few would be ready to give. If there are touches of asperity here and there in the Introduction that we would have wished to see softened, they too are in the interest of truth. For the work as a whole we have nothing but admiration and gratitude.

The book is beautifully printed and pleasant to handle. There are several portraits, and a facsimile of one of Spinoza's letters. On the cover is an impression of Spinoza's seal, an oval ring containing a rose, the initials B.D.S., and the word *caute* (beware), presumably a pun on the word Spinoza. But Spinoza was only full of thorns if you did violence to reason ; his symbol was the rose.

L. J. RUSSELL.

THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM.

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*The Philosophical Bases of Education.* By R. R. Rusk.—London : University of London Press, 1928.—Pp. 205.—5*s.*

A TEACHER who for one reason or another is led to discuss the principles of the task on which he is engaged is apt to find himself driven upon fundamental issues. What criteria ought to govern the selection of subjects to be taught in schools and colleges ? Should the courses be based on social needs, on the intrinsic value of the subjects, or on the capacities of the pupils ? A schoolmaster cannot persist far in any discussion of his work without becoming aware not only of dissolving social and scientific situations which press for recognition from the schools, but also of authoritative, though rival, interpretations of human nature. There is no more vital introduction to philosophy, perhaps, than a course of general teaching in an upper form.

The teacher who desires from time to time to back away from his daily practice and straighten out, in reflection, some of its implications, will turn to Mr Rusk's book with interest. The book moves rapidly over an enormous field. Mr Rusk takes Naturalism and

Idealism as the two effective philosophical schools, but he regards Pragmatism as a distinct intermediate system combining the methods of Naturalism with idealistic conclusions. Naturalism is summarily defined as the position adopted by those who approach philosophy from the scientific standpoint. This means, however, the biological standpoint; for physics has become etherialised. The author prefers a number of charges against Naturalism which are recapitulated in these terms: "Naturalism, we may conclude, looks to the past for the cause and explanation of human activity, is content to take things as it finds them and to make the best of them, emphasises individual assertion as against social co-operation, makes for a stereotyped instead of a progressive conception of society. In Education it fails to develop a respect for conscience and to encourage responsibility for social well-being; it regards man's highest aspirations as illusions; and it subverts the confidence that arises from the feelings that man in his noblest efforts is co-operating with the Divine" (p. 64). These are comprehensive indictments; but Mr Rusk has hardly given himself time to prove them convincingly against the authors whom he cites. Spencer is chosen as typical of the naturalistic position in moral education; but not all of the criticisms levelled against him seem in place. And when Mr Rusk passes to Professor Nunn's celebrated little book on Education, he is obliged to concede that the imputation of explaining human beings in terms of the past is here inappropriate. He contents himself with denying categorically what Professor Nunn argues with some care, that creative activity can be attributed to organisms lower than human. Nor can the charge of exclusive individualism be justly aimed at this type of Naturalism. Mr Rusk is on surer ground in detecting a fatalistic tendency in the procedure and conclusions of mental testing. In this view he echoes Professor Bagley.

Modern education is dominantly pragmatic, and a critical consideration of its philosophy of knowledge and conduct would be extremely valuable. The vast influence of Professor Dewey on the schools of America merits a much more careful examination of his writings on Education than they appear to have received. Mr Rusk, after a series of quotations from James and Mr Schiller on various aspects of pragmatism, discusses in a few pages the bearing of the creed on educational practice. He finds that it supplies valuable incentives to learning, and approves of its protest against that academic type of instruction which in schools and colleges continue to corrupt the mind. The pragmatic belief is discovered, however, to fail in provoking either disinterested morality or a love of knowledge for its own sake. And the "project" method of teaching produces a narrow utilitarianism. These criticisms seem to be directed more to applications or misapplications of the theory than to the theory itself. No one, for example, has insisted more strongly than Professor Dewey upon the danger of subordination to preconceived purpose or upon the duty of appreciation of experiences having intrinsic value.

For Mr Rusk the only satisfactory basis of education is Idealism, and in Chapter V he describes its main tenets. Idealism is asserted to provide an adequate account both of the environment and of the endowment of man. The distinctive quality of man's environment is not the natural world, but the cultural tradition. And this tradition is not passively received; it must be grasped by personal effort, and in it the creative powers of mind are educated. These creative powers issue in Religion, Morality, Art and Knowledge. On the other hand, Idealism rejects the final adequacy of any statistical or biological analysis of human nature. For human nature responds to a Universe of ideal values, and this sensitiveness brings with it incessant personal conflict and progress.

Such are some of the principles upon which Mr Rusk desires that Education should be practised. And some such idealism must indeed inspire every teacher who, in spite of the routine, remains educationally alive. What may be legitimately questioned is whether the leaders either of pragmatism or of evolutionary naturalism can be found, upon proper examination, to deny these principles.

The book closes with a rapid historical review of idealism in Education.

M. H. Carré.

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*Ways Towards the Spiritual Life*. Addresses to the Students of Carmarthen College. By G. Dawes Hicks, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., F.B.A., Professor of Philosophy in University College, London.—London: The Lindsey Press, 1928.—Pp. xii + 176.—5*s*. 6*d*. net.

## I.

I have visited the college in which these addresses were delivered. I knew and esteemed Principal Evans, to whom the volume is dedicated, and I have been closely associated with the author on the Board of Philosophical Studies of London University. It is not, however, for these reasons only that I have read these pages with deep interest and high appreciation. For twenty-five years I have heard such closing addresses at a theological college by a succession of men, distinguished in many ways, as scholars, theologians, preachers, pastors; and I must confess that they have not all been on so sustained a high level of thought, feeling, and expression. It must have been a severe ordeal for a quarter of a century to prepare such addresses, and it is a worthy achievement to have made them what they are. The broad outlook of the man of culture, the keen insight of the philosophical thinker, the intense fervour of the Christian believer, the kindly feeling of the elder brother towards his younger brothers are in these addresses blended. There is a wide variety of themes, but all are treated with thorough competence. If the practical details of the ministerial life are not handled, what is even more valuable, the purpose and the spirit, the opportunity and the obligation, the peril and the glory of the life and work of the Christian minister are faithfully, courageously, and persuasively presented. Knowing as I do the strength and the weakness of the churches and their ministers in Wales, I value these addresses the more as supplying just what the hearers most needed. It may be that the distinctive merit of the Carmarthen College, as theologically unfettered, is over-emphasised, as in other colleges, with a denominational connection, liberty of individual thought and sincerity of personal conviction are recognised and encouraged. The author's own theological position, with which I cannot always find myself in agreement, is never obtruded, and, when stated, is presented with considerate courtesy. Each address offers valuable considerations and counsels, and it is not necessary that I should inflict on the readers my own personal preferences. The tribute in the last address to Principal Evans brings the series to a fitting close. I can most heartily commend this volume, glad that the importunity of friends has secured its appearance.

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## II.

The addresses gathered together in this volume must have served a real purpose in their delivery; they will serve a much wider purpose in their present form. It would be well if all ministers of religion pondered the words of ripe wisdom and sound exposition that characterise these pronouncements, and it would be well also if those who attend the ministry of preaching would read them and receive their teaching: the one class in order to know what their calling entails, the other so as to make such a scheme as is insisted upon possible. The addresses were delivered to students about to enter the work of the active ministry, and the high importance and seriousness of their vocation is throughout insisted upon. In these days when Christian ministers are devoting themselves to many tasks, and when there is, even amongst them, a tendency to despise theology, once regarded as "queen of the sciences," and to be impatient with all that involves close and patient study and intimate questioning of intellect and heart, and when ministers court popularity from the most unthinking part of the community, these words of Professor Hicks have especial value.

Although nearly thirty years have gone since the first address printed here was delivered, while the last was given little more than a year ago, there is a wonderful harmony of purpose running through them all. And even if "certain trends of thought tend to recur," there is little repetition of phrasing. There is a "war" address which, unlike many fulminations of that period, is well worth reading to-day. Its message is permanent. With respect to the mission of Christianity there is no uncertainty. The function of the Christian teacher is "to lead ordinary men and women so to believe in God, that they may gauge to some extent the infinite possibilities of human nature." While faithfulness to the teaching of Confucius counts in God's sight, yet "we cannot but acknowledge the one overtowering personality that for two thousand years has been the inspiration of all that is best and purest in the civilisation to which we belong." In the address entitled "Modernism in Theology" some pregnant things are said about Christology. That essential Christianity is not the sacramental system which emerged from the early struggle with paganism is emphatically maintained. The vocation of the Christian minister—a "dedicated life"—is a recurring theme. There is a protest against the idea that a minister should attempt everything, even "to vie with the performances of the music-hall." Nor is he to gain ease by espousing "pet dogmas or sectarian proclivities." Amidst the stress and strain of to-day the minister's privilege is to provide an atmosphere of confidence and peace. "It will be your high vocation not to appear in the pulpit week after week with a hastily concocted piece of talk, but to help those to whom you will minister to enter into the spiritual inheritance which is theirs, and to take their share in doing Christ's work and in doing it in Christ's own way." "Of all men, the Christian minister must be no cynic, no pessimist, no creed-bound pedant. He must be a free-man of Christ, an unconquerable optimist, a great believer in great things." The advantages of a sound classical education are upheld.

The intellectual honesty as well as the moral passion informing these addresses will appeal to those called to leadership as the authentic utterances of a teacher of teachers alone can appeal. What Longfellow said of William E. Channing springs to mind in perusing this volume :—

"The pages of thy book I read,
And as I closed each one,
My heart, responding, ever said,
'Servant of God! Well done!'."

The many pertinent literary allusions and quotations bring added light to suggestive thought and clear expression of it. Such a collection of wise counsel has seldom been placed at the disposal of students.

J. C. Mantripp.

London.

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*The Book of Isaiah.* By George Adam Smith, Kt., D.D., LL.D., etc. —London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1927. In two volumes. Vol. I., pp. xx. + 476; Vol. II., pp. xx. + 518.—New and Revised Edition.—10*s.* 6*d.* net each.

The *Book of Isaiah,* by Sir George Adam Smith, has been for nearly forty years in the hands of the public, and in the course of time many new editions have been issued; for the purposes of comparison we have had a copy of Vol. I., published in 1896, and of Vol. II., the ninth edition published in 1895, and it has been a most interesting study to note the changes necessitated to bring this edition into line with the most advanced scholarship of the present day.

The book itself is too well known and valued to make any criticism of it in a general way needful; what we propose to do here is merely to call the reader's attention to some passages where the author has found views formerly expressed to need revision or modification. A large number of scholars have been working on Isaiah since the first edition was published; of these the author gives a complete list, and of their conclusions or suggestions he makes full use, although in many instances he abides in the end by his own former view.

The first improvement we would note, however, is the addition of nearly all the prophecies in a revised translation, arranged in lines exhibiting the characteristics of Hebrew poetry, instead of some only being included in the text as heretofore, and in this connection we note also that the name "Yahweh" has been employed everywhere in place of the barbarous "Jehovah," or "the Lord."

In some forty cases new notes have been added in the two volumes, and many alterations have been made in the text or new paragraphs inserted. As examples we may take a selection made at random. In Isaiah i. 18, the author adheres to the emendation made by Cheyne of "Come, let us bring our reasoning to a close," in place of "Let us reason together," saying that "the latter gives no meaning." In ii. 2–5, he says, "the passage is quite possibly quoted from an earlier prophet"; iv. 2–6, is "by many now denied to be Isaiah's," and so on. On p. 43 some statements on the land question are modified. To come to wider issues: At the close of the chapter on the Messiah (ix. 1–7) four new pages are added, in which the author says, "I have left the above chapter standing substantially as it stood in the first edition . . . but subsequent criticism has disputed the Isaian authorship of the passage and it is right that, though I have not changed my belief, I should give some account of such criticism," and he adds: "Upon a careful survey of all the arguments I see no reason to doubt that the Messianic passages are Isaiah's." This is characteristic, and the reader will be inclined to agree with Sir G. A. Smith rather than with the too meticulous critics. Two interesting instances occur in notes in which the author adheres to illustrations which he had given, and which were criticised by the late Mr R. H. Hutton in the *Spectator*; the first is on p. 85, where Isaiah is compared with the Italian patriot, Mazzini, the second on pp. 165–6, where he is compared with Cromwell, and in each case the comparison is justified and upheld.

As regards Chapters xiii., xiv., xxiv.–xxvii., xxxiv., and xxxv., the hesitation of previous editions has disappeared, and it is admitted that none of these prophecies is by Isaiah himself, or of his age.

In the second volume, dealing with Isaiah xl.–lxvi., larger questions arise, for the criticism has been more severe, but on the whole the author maintains the position taken up in earlier editions. The prophecies in these twenty-seven chapters belong to the time of the Exile and later, and are for the most part a unity; that is, although they proceed from more than one writer, these belong to the school of

Isaiah and are imbued with his spirit; the picture of the Suffering Servant, for example, is not alien from that of the victorious King in the first part, but is a legitimate derivative from it adapted to the circumstances of the nation at the time, and in the later chapters we see the King appearing again; it is through suffering and dying that the Messiah becomes the King and attains His glory. The whole discussion as to the dates to be assigned to Chapters xl.–lxvi. has been re-written, and especially has the question as to the unity of Chapters xl.–lv. been subjected to revision, and the former division at the end of Chapter xlix. has been rejected.

The insertion of the words "except the Christian" on p. 142 makes the meaning more explicit, and the passage from p. 147 to the end of the chapter is all new. In the next chapter the four points of a true religion are re-arranged and enlarged upon, and a good deal is re-written.

The thirteenth chapter, on Isaiah xlviii., is practically re-written, for in deference to the criticisms of Duhm and his successors down to Box, the idea of the literary unity of Isaiah xlviii. is surrendered, and the new translation marks off the later additions from those parts of the prophecy which belong to II. Isaiah. For the disputed verse 16 "the best solution is Duhm's."

Book III., on the Servant of the Lord, remains substantially as in former editions, and the views expressed by the author are only modified in so far as verbal criticisms necessitate it; the great passage in Isaiah lii. 13–liii., discussed with all the light which the most advanced criticism can throw upon it, remains a prophetic picture of the sufferings and death of Christ, in which, however, the details must not be stressed. There are very few changes in Book IV.; here and there passages are re-written or re-arranged and notes added, relating to the elucidation of the text.

We are grateful for this new edition, which gives us in permanent form the matured results of the prolonged studies of this great scholar, and while it is not to be expected that his conclusions will meet with universal acceptance, all will agree that they are the fruit of patient labour, and that nothing is here put forward without the most careful consideration. We welcome the book, and wish for it a new period of usefulness for many years to come.

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*Old Testament Essays*. By R. H. Kennett, D.D., Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Cambridge.—Cambridge: University Press, 1928.—Pp. x + 270.—12*s*. 6*d*. net.

"The essays contained in this volume," says Dr Kennett, "which have been composed independently at various dates during the past seven years, are here collected in the hope that they may serve to some extent to illustrate the development of the religion of Israel.

In general," he continues, "I have found no reason to modify that theory of the origin of the Old Testament which I set forth in the article 'Israel' in Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, and I have therefore aimed here merely at showing in further detail a number of facts which, at least in my judgment, fit in with, and confirm, that theory."

Dr Kennett's theory, first put forward in an article in *The Journal of Theological Studies* in 1906, and further developed in the article referred to by himself in Hastings' Dictionary, is succinctly stated in the seventh essay in this volume, "On the Origin and Development of the Messianic Hope." It is this: "I regard the Jahwistic document of the Pentateuch (J) as compiled in Judah by the Hebronite party shortly after Josiah's closing of the local sanctuaries. No one can doubt that it contains much that is very ancient, but a date between 621 and 604 B.C. is probably the time of its compilation. The Elohistic document (E) was apparently drawn up for the somewhat mixed population in the province of Samaria between 670 or thereabouts and the end of the seventh century. The work of compilation may have been going on at the same time as the compilation of J. The redaction of J and E into JE is probably to be assigned to the years immediately following the abolition of the kingdom of Judah in 586 B.C. and the Book of Deuteronomy (D), law, introduction and appendices, to a somewhat later period in the same century, probably between 550 and 520 B.C. The Law of Holiness (H) in its original form belongs apparently to the school of Ezekiel shortly after 573 B.C. The first draft of the Priestly Code (P) may probably be dated between 520 and 445 B.C., and its publication combined with the other documents of the Pentateuch in 443 B.C., though it subsequently received some additions."

With Dr Kennett's judgment as to the dates to be assigned to the book of Isaiah, the books of Chronicles (including the books of Ezra and Nehemiah; for these all originally formed one book), Daniel and the Psalms few will be found to-day to disagree—to the Psalms we shall return later—but with regard to the documents of the Pentateuch it will be admitted that his views need very strong arguments indeed to make them acceptable or in any degree tenable. They run counter, as will have been observed, to all the hitherto accepted views of the "assured results" of the Higher Criticism, that is, in regard to the dates to which the various documents are to be assigned; in other respects there is much to be said for his view as to the course of Israel's development—but he himself holds that his dates are essential to his scheme. In a word, Dr Kennett is a more radical critic in this respect than any German; he practically reduces the religion of Israel as expressed in writing to exilic, post-exilic and, largely, to Maccabean times. His arguments were clearly expressed in the article "Israel" in Hastings' Dictionary, and readers of the essays contained in this book will be able to judge how much he has reinforced them.

Nevertheless, it is hard to conceive that all through the period of the monarchy, whether in Israel or Judah, there was no written Code of Laws, no history, no poetry. Further, we know that many written books are referred to in the literature as it has come down to us; for example, we find mention of the book of Jasher, the book of the Wars of the Lord, the book of Nathan the prophet, of Gad the Seer and others; then there is the fact that the books of Amos, of Hosea, and the authentic writings of Isaiah all belong to dates anterior to those assigned to J and E—to say nothing of JE—in Dr Kennett's scheme; and further, if Exodus xxxiv. (J) contains the earliest Decalogue, Exodus xx. (E) the second, and Deuteronomy v. the third, surely more time must be supposed to have elapsed between the promulgation and reception of each of them than is allowed for in that scheme if we are to account for the undoubted development from J and E to D. If, again, Deuteronomy was not published till 550 B.C., on what, we may ask, was Josiah's Reformation founded? It could not have been that the king and his councillors suddenly bethought themselves that it would tend to the strengthening of the kingdom of Judah to centralise the sanctuary by arbitrarily closing all the country shrines and transferring their ministrants to become discontented underlings of the priests at Jerusalem *proprio motu* and without any sanction that could be appealed to. It does certainly seem more concordant with historic probability to regard the Book of Torah found by Hilkiah in the temple, as stated in the Second Book of Kings, as being at least the central portion of our Deuteronomy —chapters xii. to xxvi. and xxviii.—and to suppose that the book was the work of pious men during the reign of the persecuting king Manasseh. And finally, it is surely too much to ask us to think of such a document as J undoubtedly is as being the one spoken of by Jeremiah when he said that a "false pen of scribes hath wrought falsely," though it is possible that it may represent the views of the non-reforming party who resented the closing of the high places (Jer. viii. 8, pp. 8 and 80). If J were indeed this lying document denounced by the prophet, would it have been incorporated with E and published so soon afterwards as 586 B.C., and become later an integral part of the finished Pentateuch published in 433 B.C.?

Thus there are many questions to be answered before we can accept Dr Kennett's rendering of the development of the religion of Israel, at least up to the end of the seventh century. With the essay on Ezekiel and the relationship shown between the views of that prophet and the Law of Holiness on the one hand and the Priestly Code on the other we entirely agree.

If the dates assigned to J, E, and D be not insisted upon Dr Kennett's system will still hang together, and the importance he attaches to the Maccabean Age and its contribution to the constitution of Israel as a Church and no longer a Nation is not in any way invalidated.

The essays on Ezekiel, on the Priesthood, on the Altar Fire, on the Day of Atonement, and indeed all, are in their various ways most truly illuminating and instructive, but here and there one comes across statements difficult of acceptance. For example, it is hard to believe that the Aaronic priesthood and Aaron himself had their origin in the calf worship of Bethel, or that the story of Nadab and Abihu is due to the jealousy of the Zadokite priests at Jerusalem who resented the attempt of dispossessed priests from the country to offer (unhallowed) fire before the Lord. The suggestion that the fire from heaven which consumed Elijah's sacrifice on Mount Carmel, and by which the ever-burning fire on the altar was originally kindled was due to the action of the sun's rays through burning glasses upon naphtha, as described in 2 Maccabees i. 19–36, seems to us particularly acute. Dr Kennett notes from Frazer that this appears also to have been the custom of the Peruvian priesthood. How true it is that what is not understood the multitude take for a miracle! *Omne ignotum pro miraculo.*

In the essay on the Psalms Dr Kennett states his view, which he repeats in that on the Messianic Hope, that the whole Psalter belongs to the Maccabean Age, and that the three main divisions of which it consists, viz., Books I., II. and III., and IV. and V., were first Synagogue collections before the whole became the Temple Hymn-book. This again is drastic; we remember the diffidence with which Dr Cheyne suggested in his Bampton Lectures on the *Origin of the Psalter* (1889) the possible Maccabean age of any of the Psalms; but the arguments put forward by Dr Kennett are in line with the results of all recent investigation and are cogent and we think conclusive. No less than 100 pages are devoted to the Psalms, and this forms a little treatise in itself; first there is the able and convincing Introduction, which is followed by a short commentary on each Psalm, and the way in which each Psalm is fitted into its Maccabean frame is masterly.

Here we will pause. We have felt it impossible not to criticise, but Dr Kennett will not object, for his purpose and ours is the attainment of the truth so far as is possible, and at least to gain a consistent and coherent idea of the order of events in the development of the religion of Israel. We have ventured to criticise somewhat drastically because Dr Kennett's views as to the dates of the documents composing the Pentateuch (let us note here that he never speaks of the Hexateuch) are being accepted in some quarters as though completely proved, and are being taught as though already established. This is the case, for example, in a book published in 1927, entitled *A Modern Handbook to the Old Testament*, by Mr R. B. Henderson, which is an able exposition of the Master's views, but gives no hint that some of the conclusions are not yet (at least) admitted by other scholars.

In conclusion, we would thank Dr Kennett most heartily for this valuable contribution to the better understanding of the Old Testament; whether his views as a whole will win final acceptance is a question which the future alone can decide. Meanwhile, they are worthy of careful study; they throw light on many an obscure passage; they will maintain, nay, rather they will enhance, the already great reputation of their learned author.

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*Buddhism in Pre-Christian Britain.* By Donald A. Mackenzie.—London: Blackie & Son, 1928.—Pp. xx + 178.—10*s*. 6*d*. net.

CÆSAR is our most reliable witness from without as to what the Ancient Druids believed and taught. He clearly states that they employed the belief in the transmigration of the soul to inculcate courage into the minds of the fighting Celts. This doctrine Celtic scholars trace to the Goidels of Ireland, and the similarity between it and what was taught by the Pythagoreans had led writers in early times to infer that the Pythagoreans had borrowed it from the Celts. Modern writers are more favourable to the view that the Celts had been influenced by the Pythagoreans. Mr Mackenzie, however, concludes that the Celts were indebted to Buddhist missionaries rather than to the Pythagoreans for their theory of transmigration, because of the greater affinity between Celtic ideas and Indian thought. He pleads that greater weight should be attached to the statements of Clement and of Origen that Hindu influence had reached the Celts, especially the Druids.

There are two books of outstanding merit in the English language dealing with the religion of the Ancient Celts, namely the *Hibbert Lectures* by Sir John Rhys, and *The Religion of the Ancient Celts* by J. A. Macculloch. In neither of these is to be found anything beyond a passing reference to similarity between certain Celtic notions and Hinduism, but the possibility of the latter having influenced the former is not denied. The authors referred to did not feel that the evidence available justified the assertion of direct influence. But new evidence has come to light since in the discovery of the Silver Bowl at Gunderstrup in Jutland, and Mr Mackenzie is confident that this bowl reflects Buddhist influence.

He re-examines the whole field of Celtic religion and finds his conclusions confirmed from much of the other evidence. He further compares Buddhist influence in early Britain with the modifications traced to it in the religious ideas of the Far East and of the pre-Columbian America, and he is thereby strengthened in his conviction that Buddhism at one time had exerted almost a world-wide influence.

All this is very interesting, and the author's researches and wide knowledge compel attention and respect, but we must confess that he seems to us to claim too much for Buddhism, so far as early Britain is concerned. With regard to the prominent place occupied by magic in the religion of pre-Christian Britain, the words of Sir J. Morris Jones (*Taliesin*, 1918) carry weight: "Belief in shape-shifting or transformations is universal among primitive races. It is not a doctrine, but an expression of the natural working of the primitive mind. It has not spread, like a rumour, from race to race, but has sprung up spontaneously everywhere." Belief in transmigration, however, does not appear to have been so general, and if Buddhist teaching influenced the views of the Druids, that influence was not strong enough to infuse the ethical purpose of transmigration so evident in the Hindu doctrine of the Kharma into the Druidical belief. The ancient Celt appears to have linked the divine with magical power rather than with moral excellence.

The Dragon myth is very old, and is neither Celtic nor Hindu in origin, and the similarity between the Celtic form of the myth and that of countries influenced by Buddhism is no proof that the Celts adopted it from India, but it may point to a common origin. The same remark is applicable to the Celtic Elysium. When dealing with Cernunnos, portrayed on the Gunderstrup Bowl, Mr Mackenzie seems to be on firmer ground. He rejects Sir John Rhys' theory that the squatting god Cernunnos is the guardian of the nether world and of the metallic treasures of the earth, and also the view that the Celts' habit of squatting when resting has been reproduced in the figure of their chief god. The squatting deity, he states, was unknown in Europe, but is common among peoples influenced by Buddhism. The symbolic figures surrounding Cernunnos on the Bowl point in the same direction. It must be allowed that the author is justified in claiming that Buddhist influence is discernible in the Gunderstrup Cernunnos.

There is much valuable information in the book, and if its conclusions cannot all be accepted, it is a work of research which must be taken into account by future investigators.

M. B. OWEN.

CARMARTHEN.

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*Art and the Reformation.* By G. G. Coulton, M.A., D.Litt., Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge.—Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1928. —Pp. xxii + 662.—25*s*. net.

DR COULTON'S industry is remarkable. How he accomplishes all his work is a standing wonder even to those who are not themselves lazy. The mere fact of writing is in itself no small task: he adds to this scholarship of the highest level. Dr Coulton has now broken new ground, and yet—as in everything else he writes—there is the same underlying motive: the defence of the Protestant faith against Roman and Anglo-Catholic attacks. In this interesting volume he deals with the charge often made that Protestantism is destructive of art. As the book was lying on my library table awaiting my return from a visit to Liverpool Cathedral, I felt that whatever may have been the truth in the past, the glorious fabric at Liverpool was a sufficient disproof to-day. We are in this matter suffering from an inferiority complex (to adopt modern jargon), the result of the appalling architecture—or rather lack of architecture—in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with their whitewash and pseudogothic. Only slowly is Protestantism realising a new and better spirit. As is invariable with all Dr Coulton's works, the book is packed with scholarship and with all sorts of information not easy to obtain elsewhere. The chapters on "Architectural Finance" and on the "Wander Years of the Masons with their Signs," may be given as instances; and in Appendix XI we have a number of building accounts of great value. From Appendix IV it would appear that in the fourteenth century the price of a chancel in a country church varied from £10 to £17; a new vicarage cost £13 6*s.* 8*d.* The great marble piers of Westminster Abbey cost £40 apiece, and those supporting the central tower £60 each. But the book is full of details of this sort. To those who think that standardisation is an American invention, Chapter XXIV, with its proof of mediæval standardisation, *e.g.* at Avignon, may be commended. It would appear that in King's College Chapel, Cambridge, statuary was provided at 5*s.* per foot! The work is beautifully printed and abounds in illustrations.

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*Realism.* By S. L. Hasan, D.Phil., LL.B., Professor of Philosophy, Aligarh University. With a Foreword by Professor J. A. Smith. —Cambridge: University Press, 1928.—Pp. xvi + 333.—16*s.* net.

Realism is conceived by Dr Hasan as the doctrine that there is an external world, and that in perception its existence and nature are revealed directly. In this book he undertakes a critical survey of the origin and development of the doctrine in its chief representatives.

In the Introduction the author gives some account of his own view of realism, and of the nature of perception. Philosophy, according to him, deals exclusively with the beliefs of the scientist, the artist, the moralist, of the religious consciousness, and of the "common consciousness." "Its business is to take them as they are offered to it, to describe them exactly, to analyse them, and to grasp them, *i.e.* to comprehend them into a harmonious whole of concepts" (p. 2), but not to question them. Among these beliefs is the "instinctive" belief in realism. Its validity must, therefore, be accepted, with the truth of all that it "involves." And indeed, according to the writer, it involves a good deal—that things, for instance, have both primary and secondary qualities (p. 5), that only "normal" sensa are real (p. 6), and that the "thing or object is the subject of all the predicates that science discovers" (p. 7). And Dr Hasan tries to show that modern realists, in their struggle with the subjectivism that originated with Descartes, are tending to accept these views. Their one difficulty is "the relativity of sensa" (that, namely, of determining which of the sensa "are real" where they vary relative to the distance of the observer from the object). Their "stumbling block" is the causal theory of perception, which is derived from the category of substance and mode. Mind is conceived as a substance, and the sensum as a modification of it caused by another substance, the object. Dr Hasan's own theory of perception is framed on Lamarckian lines. The real is "force, energy, activity," with potentialities that it "yearns to realise." Sensa and thought are "realisations of the original potentialities of the real" (p. 18). "Sense organs are not causes, but are, on the contrary, effects of sense. They are modifications wrought in the organism as by-products by the power of sense-perception in the process of its realisation" (p. 20).

These views form the basis of Dr Hasan's criticism of the realists in the exposition that follows. There are short sections on Descartes, Locke, Reid and Hamilton, who, in the first era of the struggle with subjectivism, maintained the existence of a material world. In the second era, Schuppe, Mach and Avenarius maintain the directness of perception; but the other aspect of realism, *i.e.* the independence of objects, "does not attain its full expression in them." On the other hand, Meinong, Stout and the Critical Realists succeed in establishing the existence of external objects, but remain representationists. Dr Hasan has a capacity for stating a theory shortly, and his accounts of the philosophers mentioned are adequate, except in the case of the Critical Realists. It is, of course, particularly difficult to do justice to that group of thinkers in eight pages. But the writer does not take into consideration their doctrine that we refer an essence to an object *in reacting to it.*

The remaining two-thirds of the book are devoted entirely to present-day realists; that is to say, to those who maintain *both* the independence of objects and the directness of perception. Their problem is to determine the relation of sensum to object and the claims of sense and thought respectively. These are (*a*) the rationalistic realists, Cook Wilson, Prichard and Joseph; (*b*) the empirical realists, Alexander, E. B. Holt and Bertrand Russell; and (*c*), in a class by himself as harmonising the claims of object and sensum to reality, G. E. Moore. Space does not permit of comment on all these sections, so I confine myself to those on Russell and Moore.

The author finds that Russell's thought in *Our Knowledge of the External World* is "involved in a contradiction" (p. 209). On the one hand, sensa are what is directly perceived; "perspectives" are private worlds; and a system of perspectives is substituted for the physical world. On the other hand, sensa are effects of physical causes; a perspective is an aspect of the universe, a "cross-section of it in which all its constituents are represented by an effect" (p. 212), and the world is constructed out of cross-sections, as a house is constructed of bricks. I cannot find reason to think that Russell means by "perspective" anything other than *visual field;* or that he *intends* to use "construction" in a sense other than his own technical one, derivative from the notion of an incomplete symbol. However that may be, Dr Hasan tends, I think, to slur over the differences between a causal theory and phenomenalism. Dealing with the nature of the object (p. 202), he says in a footnote that Broad's position in *Scientific Thought* is "essentially identical" with Russell's second to the existence of a universal law which exercises paramount control. This law, it is alleged, is the biological law of life, which operates on all living things, the law that organisms are born to flourish and die.

Draper [1] arranged the intellectual history of Europe in accordance with physiological principles. His claim was that just as the individual grows from childhood to youth, passes on to manhood and old age, and finally disappears, so each civilisation has always gone through, and must always go through, the Ages of Credulity, Inquiry, Faith, Reason, and Decrepitude. Herr Oswald Spengler introduces the same idea into his cultural morphology, and maintains that culture is an organism.

> "To birth [he says] belongs death, to youth age, to life generally its form and allotted span."

This outcome, that is, the final death of every culture, is

> "obligatory and insusceptible of modification. . . . He who does not understand that our choice is between willing this and willing nothing at all, between cleaving to this destiny or despairing of the future, . . . must forego all desire to comprehend history, to live through history, or to make history." [2]

The conclusion is attractive, because it easily fits the evidence. If the argument were to be applied in physiological detail, then it would be stated that the cell wears out, that continued breeding leads to weakness and so a society is doomed to die by biological necessity. But a society is a collection of beings, each the product of a separate stirp. Even if the cell becomes so weak as to be virtually extinct, it would affect only one single stirp, and not the whole of society, which is capable of being continually and inexhaustibly replenished. The culture of a society is given to it by a minority of its individuals, influencing one another and following one another. As long as such a minority of individuals is produced, and the general tone of the society remains healthy, so long does a culture continue. Weighty as the evidence seems to be, therefore, the conclusion that a culture is an organism, obeying the same necessity as the individual life, is an assumption which detailed application fails to endorse.

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[1] J. W. Draper, *The Intellectual Development of Europe*, 2 vols.

[2] Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*. Trans. C. F. Atkinson, 38–40.

In truth it is scientifically inadmissible; for it is founded upon a confusion in the use of words. We have grown so accustomed to the conception of a universe controlled by immutable laws that the meaning of the terms which we employ is obscured by their familiarity. We say, for instance, that the law of gravitation *makes* bodies attract one another, and *makes* the apple fall to the ground. The abstract name by which we know the operation is conceived as a force in itself. But the word "gravitation" is in reality only a concept. By its means we formulate in words the attraction which one body has for another.[1] The reason why the apple falls to the ground is not the law of gravitation, but because such behaviour is a constituent part of nature. Men have studied that constitution, and have observed that such behaviour is inevitable. That is, it is a law that it should so happen.

The historical fact that every society has in the past lost its energy, and that no one can point to one which has been consistently energetic over an extended period of time, has caused us to apply a biological law to its explanation. The process has been assisted by the use of biological metaphor. (Every one talks of the "death" of a culture.) But the biological law was only formulated after examination of the composition and behaviour of organisms. It simply means that it is part of the natural constitution of organisms that one day they must die. And it is a confused thought which applies it to anything which cannot first be demonstrated to be of the same natural composition.

That there are laws which govern human affairs goes without saying. For that only means that their constitution can be reduced to accepted formulæ. If we were to discard biological metaphor, and instead of the birth (or death) of a culture, we talked of the manifestation (or loss) of social energy, then social science would no longer be misled by the terms which it employs. For the laws which operate upon a social group do not govern the length of its creative existence, but simply the quality and quantity of the individuals which compose it.

Our knowledge of human affairs is in almost the same condition now as the knowledge which the fifteenth century possessed of the physical universe. We are as ignorant of the real nature of social phenomena as they were of cosmic event. The succession of societies manifesting great social energy and then falling away into unrelieved lethargy, the repetition in each one of them of the same situations, dealt with in the same way, these are not to be interpreted as even pointing to the idea of birth, life and death. At some periods of their existence some societies have happened to organise themselves in accordance with the laws which are always operating upon collections of human individuals. This was quite by chance, in the sense that such organisation was not conscious. During those periods great social energy was manifested. The result was what we call civilisation, and it has always been fortuitous. When the society departed from such organisation, the immutable operation of the laws ordained that their vigour must wane. Their energy then faded away, and the culture "died."

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[1] Compare C. Lloyd Morgan, *Instinct and Experience*, pp. 118–119.

History does not repeat itself. Like results ensue from like causes. A complete organisation in accordance with those laws has never yet been effected. If it were, there is no reason why a culture should not proceed without interruption to its (unknown and mysterious) destination.

This said, the immediate problem with which we started becomes part of a wider issue. There is not, never has been, and cannot be, a marriage problem—as such; or a sex problem—as such. The present relations between the sexes in all sections of the white civilisation, and the opinions which are extant concerning them, do not reflect a condition which has been brought about by any untoward circumstance. Nor are they to be praised as an enlightened method of regulating marriage. They are the product of a natural evolution, the inevitable recourse of a society in the grip of forces which are always acting upon it. Should these forces never be controlled then it would seem that nothing could be done to prevent the further repetition of what has gone before.

In every group, there are some men who are in advance of others, and so take to themselves the rôle of prophet. There are others, their temperament moulded by a different environment, who are nervous of abrupt departure from tradition. But all men in some measure reflect the tone of the historical episode in which they have to live their lives.[1] Their opinions are coloured by that same destiny which seems to direct the general life of a civilisation. To rely upon opinion, therefore, to afford a solution to a problem in social evolution is like relying on the vehicle in which one is seated to save one from a fall over a cliff. The vehicle itself is controlled by those same forces which act upon its occupants. For intelligent consideration of human affairs, opinion alone is without value—for what is it but the preservation of standards drilled into youth, or a reaction against the restraints of childhood, or the outcome of chance association, books, experience, precept and example? If it is only opinion on which we have to rely, then, with the vision before us of the sufferings of previous societies, it were better to close our eyes and let the inevitable happen.

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[1] This obvious cultural fact needs no endorsement, but it has received corroboration from the analytical point of view in a recent publication by Dr Triant Burrow, *The Social Basis of Consciousness*.

Thinkers who take the organic view of cultural history see this clearly, and bear the awful knowledge of eventual doom with a sturdy stoicism. For such is the nature of the stoic, to bow down before the storm. These laudable and learned citizens face their trials with a noble fortitude and view the coming decay with an enviable complacence. But such resignation is not of necessity the only behaviour. The nature of the problem has been mistaken. The real question is not the cure of any immediate or temporary difficulty. It is this: can we, by formulating the laws governing the quality and quantity of individuals composing a social group, recreate our society in accordance with these laws, and so arrest the action of those disintegrating forces which, judging from analogy with other cultures, would appear to be at work amongst us? Can we hasten the evolutionary process by making our culture conscious instead of fortuitous?

For this purpose opinion is useless. For it is subject to the time in which it is expressed. The task is one which will be performed only through the genius of a creative anthropology.

J. D. UNWIN.

WITHERSFIELD, SUFFOLK.

# SCHLEIERMACHER'S CATECHISM FOR NOBLE WOMEN.

## JOSEPH KING.

THE end of the eighteenth century saw not only the French Revolution shaking the old order in France to its very foundations, but also a spiritual and national movement in Germany growing up with less violent though equally deep manifestations. The foundations of spiritual and cultural greatness in modern Germany were being laid. One sign of the times was the publication in Berlin of *The Athenæum* from 1798 onwards by the brothers Schlegel. In the prefatory memorandum to their famous periodical they wrote that they would not keep back what they held to be true and vital, nor be content with any half-statement of the full truth. *The Athenæum* promised :

> " articles, letters, conversations, rhapsodic expositions, aphoristic fragments, general enquiries and particular opinions, theoretical and historical treatment, a review of the many-sided activities of our nation and our epoch with glances at other countries and at history, especially at the ancient classical past."

Students of German philosophy and literature continue to refer to *The Athenæum*. No portions of its volumes are more significant and stimulating than the Fragments, in which appear literary and philosophic criticisms, while politics and religion are touched on ; they were contributed by various pens, and were printed without indication of the authorship of any particular paragraph. Though the Fragments were chiefly written by the brothers Schlegel, various colleagues and friends contributed ; among these was Friedrich Schleiermacher. Subsequent research has established the authorship of most of the Fragments.

It is quite clear that the remarkable Fragment which gives a new ideal for womanhood is from Schleiermacher's pen. It is to be found in W. Dilthey, *Denkmale der inneren Entwicklung Schleiermachers:* Berlin, 1870, s. 83 f. It has lately been re-issued as a brochure in Germany, and an English translation seems worth attempting.

## A Reasonable Catechism (in Outline) for Noble Women.

## The Ten Commandments.

### I.

Thou shalt have no Lover beside him; but thou mayst be a Friend, without sporting the Colours of Love, without Coquetry or Adoration.

### II.

Thou shalt make unto thee no Ideal, neither of an Angel in Heaven, nor of a Hero in Poetry or Romance; but thou shalt love a Man, as he is. For Nature, thy Mistress, is a jealous Divinity, who visiteth the Follies of the Maiden on the Woman to the third and fourth decade of her emotional life.

### III.

Thou shalt not misuse even the smallest of the holy Things of Love; for that Woman will lose her delicate Feeling who desecrates her Grace and yields herself up in return for Presents and Gifts, or merely that she may become the Mother of Children in Peace and Quiet.

### IV.

See that thou observe the Sabbath of thy Heart to keep it holy; and when they constrain thee, then make thyself free or perish.

### V.

Honour the Individuality and Waywardness of thy Children, so that it may be well with them and they may live strong upon the Earth.

### VI.

Thou shalt not of set Purpose bring Life into Being.

### VII.

Thou shalt not enter into Wedlock, if it is inevitable that its Tie will be broken.

### VIII.

Thou shalt not wish to be loved, where thou dost not love.

### IX.

Thou shalt not bear False Witness for Men; thou shalt not make their Brutality seem fair by any Words or Acts.

### X.

Thou shalt covet what Men have in Education, Art Intellect and Honour.

## THE CREED.

### I.

I believe in the eternal Humanity, which was before it ever took on the Veil of Male and Female.

### II.

I believe that I live neither to obey nor to dissipate myself, but to be and to grow; and I believe in the Power of the Will and of Education to bring me nearer to the Eternal, to redeem me from the Fetters of Evil Education and to make me independent of the Limitations of Sex.

### III.

I believe in Enthusiasm and Virtue, in the Nobility of Art, in the Delight of Learning, which Men enjoy, in Loving my Country, in past Greatness and in future Nobility.

This Catechism for Noble Women is to be explained and understood by the circumstances of Schleiermacher's life in Berlin when he wrote it. A young unmarried man of thirty, studious, spiritual, welcome in society and responsive to the Zeitgeist, his duties as chaplain of a hospital allowed him time for friendships and literary work. He formed a deep friendship with Friedrich Schlegel, who as leader of the Romantic Movement stimulated his readiness for new experiences and adventure. With Romanticism went an insistence on individual development and independence. An ideal romanticism runs through the whole of this Catechism.

Further light is thrown on it by Schleiermacher's close relations with Henriette Herz, who was then about twenty-three years of age, and had already been eight years married to Dr Marcus Herz, the eminent surgeon of Berlin, who was fifteen years older than his wife. There was no child to cement the rather unequal marriage. Herz was narrow in mind, uninteresting in himself and uninterested in the world around him, showing no need of recreation or social amenities. Henriette was of striking personal beauty, of marked intellectual gifts, fond of, and always welcome in, society; she had command of eight languages, and studied Sanskrit and Turkish; her learning, distinguished bearing and dignity procured for her in Berlin circles the name of the Tragic Muse. Schleiermacher became her admirer and constant companion. She returned the devoted friendship which he offered. Their close relations, though maintained on high Platonic lines, gave rise to gossip and scandal, satire and suspicions. Probably this romantic episode is behind the "Fragment" of "The Reasonable Catechism (in Outline) for Noble Women."

A catechism is a formula of instructions, usually but not originally nor of necessity by way of set questions and answers, but essentially intended for the imparting of knowledge in religion or law to students and disciples. Schleiermacher uses the form of a catechism for his instruction. He appears to bear in mind Luther's Catechismus Major and his Catechismus Minor. These works have been fundamental in the religious instruction of Protestant Germany, and both contain the Ten Commandments and the Apostles' Creed. Their method of handling systematic instruction takes first the Law, *i.e.*, the Decalogue, and then the Gospel, as stated in the Creed. In Luther's Catechisms these are followed by sections giving teaching on private worship (prayer) and public worship (the sacraments). The same line of treatment is taken by Calvin in his *Institutes*. This explains why it is a natural and regular proceeding for the Catechism for Noble Women to fall into the form chosen, even to parody the wording of the Decalogue and to imitate the phrasing of the Apostles' Creed.

The contents and doctrine of this Catechism mark the rise of a fuller, freer life opening before women. In Germany, and generally throughout Christendom, the conception of a woman's capabilities and character was in 1798 what it had been for generations and what in wide circles it was to remain for more than another century. It expected in women no independence or originality outside the home and its immediate social circle. It has needed the forces of democracy, modern industry and commerce, science, education and working upon all these, the upeaval of the Great War, to compel men to admit women to he Universities, to the franchise, to membership of the earned professions, and to the practical equality of the sexes ow generally accepted. When this change was initiated or esired, it followed that the social and moral code tacitly ssumed for women would need revision. The German oman was not expected to go beyond the range of the our K.'s: Küche, Kinder, Kleider und Kirche. Schleier-acher, foreseeing a new and more elevated position for omen than his times were accustomed to recognise, con-eived that woman should become intellectually, actively nd spiritually the equal comrade and partner of man.

Western civilisation owes much to Germany, much that ay have proved dangerous if not disastrous; but much so that has advanced civilisation. Among the men who Germany served their country, their epoch and Europe ust be reckoned that famous band who lived through the miliation, destruction and misery of the Napoleonic wars nd founded on its ruins a new German patriotism and culture. o this company belong Tieck and the Schlegels, who trans-ted Shakespeare and made his plays as great a possession r the German nation as for English-speaking peoples. ugust and Friedrich Schlegel were also the critical leaders the German dramatic movement and the first to bring astern literature before Western thinkers. Fichte, Stein nd Scharnhorst built up a new national organisation and dministration. Arndt and Dahl were the inspirers of the outh movement, and moulded the German students of eir day into a powerful element of the nation, which e students have ever since constituted. In some ways e most remarkable of this company was Friedrich Daniel rnst Schleiermacher, who was born in 1768. He was irty years of age when he wrote this Catechism. His ecognised position and his studies in philopsohy, especially Spinoza and Plato, helped to enlarge and strengthen his ind and vision. In 1799 appeared his famous work, *Reden ber die Religion* (Addresses on Religion). Of this work, hich must have been in progress of composition when the Catechism for Noble Women" appeared, it has been said hat no book of this period, after Kant's *Critique of Pure eason* and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*, has had such a lasting ffect. It foreshadows the religious problems which are hiefly discussed to-day, and certainly deals with them in a ay approached by no other book of that time. Schleier-acher had grand ideas of the union of the Protestant Confession, of a more liberal and extensive constitution of the Church, of the rights and significance of science and of the individual religious soul. He was one of the founders of the University of Berlin in 1810, became then one of its Professors, and so continued until his death in 1834. His personal influence among scholars, students and the people both as preacher, as professor, and as liberal politician was wide and lasting. Theologians must regard him as one of the greatest systematic religious teachers since the Reformation. His three great works, *Reden über die Religion*, *Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre* and *Der Christliche Glaube*, are to-day influencing indirectly the faith and preaching of many who perhaps hardly know his name. His famous sermons on "The Christian Home" are still read. In them are passages which re-echo the teaching of his Catechismus which was published twenty years before the sermons were delivered. What such a man as Schleiermacher had to say on the moral code which would bring women to nobility of life must be worth recording.

JOSEPH KING.

HASLEMERE.

# PREHISTORIC RELIGION.

CARL CLEMEN,

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TEXT-BOOKS of the history of religions do not treat of prehistoric man. Indeed, had he existed in tertiary times, we should know nothing of his religion, and even about the oldest man of quaternary times we cannot say anything in this respect. That is only possible from the Mousterien period, which lasted perhaps from 350 to 250,000 before Christ. The whole palæolithic period was followed by the neolithic about 5000; the neolithic by the copper-and-bronze period from about 3000, and this by the iron period from about 1500 B.C.

The culture of the neolithic, the copper-and-bronze and the older iron or Hallstatt period was partly to be found among nations about which we have other information than that afforded by their remains; and the whole culture of the later iron or La Tène period was introduced into Europe by the Celts; so far the religion of these periods is treated in the above-mentioned text-books. But the earlier periods also, which we cannot connect with any definite nation, had certain religious opinions and usages. What we know about them I shall try to expound on the following pages.

In the first place, prehistoric religion consisted in *worship of the dead* (if we may employ this expression in a quite general sense). As early as in the palæolithic period the dead were *buried*, for sometimes they have been discovered in a hollow, excavated expressly for this purpose. Here and there they are also covered with stones, or their arms and legs lie so close to the body that they must have been tied to it, as is the fashion even now among some primitive peoples. In other cases still the bones are coloured red in consequence of the corpse being covered with a red fluid or powder; moreover, flint tools or trinkets have been found with the dead, who therefore must certainly have been buried.

These last-mentioned traits prove further that in the palæolithic period the dead were considered to live on *bodily*—apparently because man could not imagine bodiless existence. This belief is at the bottom of many other customs and expressions which still survive among primitive and cultured peoples. Only gradually did man come to understand that the body does not live on, and only later did he try to distinguish from it a spiritual principle, a *soul*, which, however, at first he could scarcely conceive of as incorporeal. This was the reason why man in the neolithic period often chiselled a round or oval hole into one of the transverse slabs of a stone grave: through it the soul was to be enabled to leave the grave, though perhaps only for a time. Likewise the cremation of the corpses, which began in the neolithic period and became usual in the Bronze Age, was of course only compatible with the belief in a life after death if this was no more considered as attached to the body.

A *worship* of the dead is proved by any evidence which shows that people were afraid of them and anxious to keep them from doing mischief. For only in this way can the custom of covering the corpses with stones or tying down arms and legs be explained, or the burial of the dead in pitchers, or the mutilation of the corpses, which happened sometimes in the Bronze Age and is still usual with some primitive peoples. In the same way many other customs, which until now we find even among civilised nations, had originally the same idea of keeping the dead, to whom people formerly attributed not only *natural* but even *supernatural* force, at a safe distance.

The red painting of the corpses which is found among primitives, and still survives among civilised peoples, sometimes putting dead persons in a red coffin or burying them in red clothes, was probably intended to confer on them only the *natural* forces which were considered to live in the blood, of which the red fluid or powder was certainly a symbol. In the same way the intention of burying the dead near the fire-place and providing them with food and drink even after the burial was to warm and to feed them. At the burial itself, moreover, the dead are supplied with tools and trinkets, in the neolithic period even with men and women, who were perhaps buried living or were killed at the grave of their master or husband, the belief being that the dead would want them in the other world. But the worn condition of the ground in front of some tombs seems to show further that a *real worship* was offered at least to *some* dead persons, and that they were considered as *supernatural beings.*

Moreover, only by this supposition of real worship addressed to the dead can some other customs, which we already find in the Stone Age, be understood. It is doubtless true that the single human bones which we have discovered and which perhaps had been worn by living persons, cannot even then have been considered as containing *supernatural* forces. The same holds good of the skulls which were adapted as drinking vessels, or the scalps which were cut off as early as in the neolithic period: they were perhaps, if at all, only intended to communicate the *natural* forces of the dead man. But a different impression results when at the same time we find in some parts of France that pieces of such skulls were worn which apparently had been trepanned during their owners' life-time. How such an operation could be performed by neolithic man—it is sometimes performed by existing primitives—does not concern us. Even the question why the skull of a living man was opened—doubtless for allowing a bad spirit living in it to get out—is here irrelevant. At any rate people must have believed that he who was delivered from his suffering by such an operation would not only himself be safe from that particular evil in the future, but would even guard others from it after his death by that piece of his skull which had been trepanned. This means that supernatural forces were attributed to the bones.

By these considerations we are led from the worship of the dead in prehistoric times to the simultaneous *magical rites*; for the essence of magic is that one believes it possible to procure for oneself or for others the help of forces beyond the range of experience, but as safely as if acting within it. If these forces are *natural*, the rites do not belong to religion, which has reference only to those rites by which *supernatural* or *superhuman* forces are to be transferred. But whether people in prehistoric times believed in their ability to do this in other ways than those just described, we do not know; for though in the Stone Age cannibalism was doubtless common, it is still a moot point whether people wished, by means of it, to appropriate the *supernatural* forces of the dead. In the same way it is uncertain if the peculiar tattooing of certain neolithic idols, which will be discussed below, had a *magical* significance; though doubtless this was the case with the mark of T form which, at the same time in some parts of France, was burned into the head of women so deeply that their skulls have still a corresponding scar. A similar stigmatisation occurs also among ancient and modern primitives. What purpose it must have had originally we shall see below.

Here it must again be left as an open question whether trinkets buried with the dead, and formerly of course worn by the living, were originally talismans. Later on that was, and, often enough, is so; for in this way, to some extent at least, is to be explained why these trinkets, which as a matter of fact were really not ornaments, were worn on the hands and feet (the organs through which a man chiefly came into connection with hurtful influences) or on the openings of the head, on the ears, but also on the nose and the mouth (the openings through which these powers could enter into the body). Later on supernatural forces were ascribed even to the material from which the prehistoric trinkets are made, to the teeth of animals and to the rare stones which already occur in the palæolithic period, to the gold which appears in the neolithic age, to the corals which we meet with first in the Hallstatt period. Certainly the manifold objects from the mineral, vegetable and animal kingdoms which in the bronze age were buried with the dead in vessels or bags and were of course worn by the living, had a magical significance; for otherwise these finds cannot be explained at all. Likewise the small hatchets of stone or bronze which in the younger stone and bronze age were buried with the dead were unfit for practical use and served therefore as amulets, just as the small bronze figures of bulls which have been discovered in France and Poland. That they were intended to transfer only the *natural* forces of these animals to the persons wearing them is improbable.

The existence of a belief in the *transfer of supernatural forces by contact* in prehistoric times is confirmed by the fact that as early as the palæolithic period a still less natural form of magic occurs. The opinion, frequent among primitive and even civilised nations, that a picture can take the place of the object it represents, was, as we shall see, already at the bottom of the above-mentioned stigmatisation. Many primitives, moreover, believe that by delineating an animal they can call it into existence or at least make themselves master of it. In this way therefore the life-like pictures of animals found in palæolithic caves must be interpreted; sometimes the delineated animals have even the head of an arrow or of a spear in their bodies, or by the side of them men are represented who are about to kill, or human hands about to seize them. Now all this may well show, as I have said before, that prehistoric man may have known a *more natural form of magic*, and besides, that he perhaps believed it possible not only to call animals into being or to make himself master of them, but also divine beings as well.

In periods later than the neolithic, hollows in the form of cups are often enough to be found in rocks. These are sometimes of a natural but oftener of an artificial origin. To receive offerings can of course only have been their purpose when they are on a *horizontal* surface; but oftener they are on a *vertical* one. These hollows, together with the complete or semi-circles, spirals, etc., which are also found on these rocks, must therefore have had another significance. These markings have been explained in very different ways, but the most probable explanation is that originally they were pictures of the sun, like the spoked wheel which appears sometimes beside them. I do not want to affirm that the spoked wheel had that significance from the beginning; like other implements to be mentioned below, it may have been considered as endowed with supernatural forces itself, because it proved a more useful instrument than those who first invented it had expected; later on, and not only in historic times, it may have been interpreted as a picture of the sun indeed. Since the Bronze Age the spoked wheel appears also as an ornament on needles and knives, and from it probably originated the simple and gammate cross, which therefore would also be a symbol of the sun.

All this does not yet prove that the sun was considered as a *divine being*; like the animals, it might have been delineated as a celestial body in order that it might give more light and warmth, or that it might act in another peculiar but natural way. We shall see, however, that at least from the Bronze Age onward the sun was certainly worshipped, and even at this point we can conclude that it was considered as a divine being from the fact that those probable pictures of it are found on graves. In that position they certainly had a magical significance, *i.e.*, were to confer on the dead not the *natural forces* of the *celestial body* but the *supernatural ones* of a *divine being*.

Beside the spoked wheel on the monument of Kivik in Sweden, probably belonging to the Bronze Age, the moon is represented, which therefore seems also to have been considered then as a divine being. Together with it and some other objects not comprehensible, two helved axes are to be seen on that monument; in them, too, supernatural forces must have been found which were to be transferred to the dead by representing these things on their grave. So, too, the stone or bronze axes, which have been found, but are too big or too brittle for use, must have been fetishes, worshipped for a similar reason as the spoked wheel: the axe, the main tool of prehistoric man, served him better than he had expected, and therefore it was considered divine. Finally that mark of T form on the skulls of women found in France can now be interpreted as a picture of the axe as well.

Furthermore, from the neolithic period onward, trees were worshipped. In the Skjelmoor, in Jutland, a trunk has been found which stood inverted on a heap of stones and was surrounded by vessels and potsherds probably originating from a sacrifice. Such a trunk would hardly have been worshipped if living trees had not been considered as divine beings beforehand. That the same probably holds good of animals we have seen above.

The sun seems to have been the object of a real cult as early as the neolithic period, if we may assume that Stonehenge, a hoof-shaped circle of big stones, opened to that point in the sky where the sun rises at the summer solstice, was a sun sanctuary. But this is only a conjecture. A proper worship of the sun, however, can with certainty be proved by the vehicle found near Trundholm, in Seeland, on which is to be seen a golden disk drawn by a horse. As it is represented as standing on a vehicle, it must (in a larger scale of course and probably at fixed times) have been driven from place to place in order to procure the blessing of the sun on the visited regions. The copying of this vehicle was doubtless a consecrated gift to the solar deity which was to make it possible for him to complete every day his apparent course in the sky; such consecrations occur also at a later age. Even in the Bronze and Hallstatt Ages there were many other vehicles which cannot be described here in detail, but have to be explained in the same way. This applies also to the large bronze bowl discovered near Lavindsgaard, in Finland, containing again smaller bowls adorned with concentric circles *au repoussé*, and to the hundred little golden ships decorated with the solar disk which were found near Nors, in Jutland.

Whether palæolithic man believed in *divinities of human shape* we cannot decide. For the figures in relief or sculpture which belong to this period, and in most cases represent very stout women, may signify *human beings* who formerly had been actually buried with the dead. On the other hand, the neolithic figures discovered in Malta and the small figures of the Bronze Age may designate dead persons, especially those figures which represent sleeping women. On the other hand, the neolithic monuments representing women, and found in French graves which contain *some* dead persons, *men as well as women*, can only stand for divinities. The four horizontal lines which some of these sculptures have below the eyes probably represent a tattooing, as it must then have been usual among men. But that of course does not preclude the possibility that by these sculptures a divinity, a divinity of the dead or a divinity of life, is represented. Likewise the figures found in almost every house in Jablonica, in Servia, and in Thessaly can only stand for divinities. This applies also to the figures of a man discovered in the Broddenbjärg-Moor in Jutland and in Alt-Frisack in Brandenburg.

*How* all these divinities were worshipped we cannot say exactly. A gift consecrated to the sun has been spoken of; perhaps even the round cakes of resin, which have been preserved from the Bronze Age, served the same purpose. Above all, however, the deposit finds (*Depotfunde*), as they are called, were not treasures hidden in the ground for fear of robbers, but gifts which in this way were sacrificed, first perhaps to the infernal divinities, later on to the others as well. Probably other objects, together with prayers, were offered to them; but that cannot be proved.

In many respects prehistoric religion is still obscure and probably will remain so for ever. Nevertheless we know more of it than at first sight was to be expected and more than is commonly supposed. We can therefore pursue the history of religion much further back than the usual text-books do. In particular, the belief in a life after death and in superhuman forces of the dead existed as early as in the palæolithic period, as well as the belief in a transfer of such forces to others. In the later Stone and Bronze Ages still other supernatural beings were supposed, about the worship of which something could be said. It is true that in these ages Europe may have been influenced by other countries, the culture of which had developed more quickly; but these *historical* religions are outside our present discussion.

CARL CLEMEN.

BONN.

# DR ALBERT SCHWEITZER AS THEOLOGIAN.

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DR SCHWEITZER has embodied his historical examination of the origins of Christianity in four publications: *The Problem of the Last Supper* (1901),[1] *A Sketch of the Life of Jesus* (1901),[2] *The Quest for the Historical Jesus* (1906) and *Paul and his Interpreters* (1911). The starting-point of the whole inquiry is the Last Supper. How are we to explain the fact—that is how he puts the problem—that the Lord's Supper was regularly celebrated by the apostles and the first Christians without any command to that effect being given by Jesus? It is admitted and well known that the two oldest witnesses, Matthew and Mark, do not relate that Jesus bade the apostles repeat the ceremony.

This difficulty had already been felt by Schleiermacher, but Dr Schweitzer formulates it with the utmost possible clearness. How could it come about, he asks, that the apostles repeated something which was essentially incapable of being repeated, since the whole meaning of the rite lay in the fact that it was Jesus himself who spoke and acted? Thereupon he sets the problem in a wholly new light by emphasising the fact that the celebration of the Supper by subsequent generations of Christians was, so far as our information goes, a joyous ceremony. Now this joyous ceremony is made particularly remarkable by the fact that it takes no account whatever of the so-called words of institution, but directs the thoughts of worshippers to the Second Coming of Christ, as is clearly to be gathered from the passages about it in St Paul's epistles, and from the eucharistic prayers in the *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (the Didache), that oldest of all witnesses to the character of Christian worship.

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[1] Out of print and never translated into English.

[2] An English translation has been published in the U.S.A.

Therefore, so Dr Schweitzer concludes, the ceremony of the Lord's Supper must have come into being in the early Christian community of itself without any command from Jesus for its repetition, as a result of some inner necessity, because the first Christians thereby solemnly testified to their expectation of the speedy coming of Jesus in his Messianic glory. That which determined them to repeat the last meal which Jesus took with his apostles was the word spoken by him as the concluding word of the ceremony: "I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine till I shall drink it new with you in the kingdom of my Father," that is, till you are assembled with me in glory at the Messianic feast. The meaning of the Supper which Jesus celebrated with the disciples was somehow or other for the first Christians that he thereby sanctified them in preparation for taking part in the coming Messianic feast. The meaning of the Supper which they celebrated together was for the first Christians that by partaking of the holy food they were sanctified together, as a body, for taking part in the Messianic feast at the Second Coming of the Lord, which was soon to take place.

The meaning of the Supper, therefore, for Jesus and in the primitive community, is closely connected with their expectation of the world's coming to an end.

Yet this meaning and this character of the Supper is by no means intelligible when seen through the interpretation of the life and preaching of the historical Jesus, which is universally accepted as finally established; the two are quite irreconcilable. Thus Dr Schweitzer is driven from his study of the Supper to an inquiry into the life of Jesus and the teaching of St Paul as being the first manifestations of primitive Christian thought. His design of writing the history of the development of the Lord's Supper, and of Baptism, has not been carried out, because of the preliminary studies which had to be made first.

So in the *Sketch of the Life of Jesus* he proceeds to show—to the indignation of the whole theological world—that the usual historical interpretation, which is given and accepted as finally established, explains neither the course of events in the life of Jesus nor his teaching about the Kingdom of God and himself. The view of it which was current at the end of the last century, developed by inquirers like Keim, Schenkel, Hausrath, H. J. Holtzmann, and Beyschlag, is as follows: Jesus at his baptism had a visionary experience which revealed to him the fact that he was the Messiah. Thereupon he began to preach the Kingdom of God as something which was to be established by the growth of a new disposition in mankind, and which from small beginnings would grow and develop continuously. Of himself and his Messianic dignity he spoke little. He wanted the people to arrive of themselves, through the spiritualised conception of the Kingdom to which he was leading them, at a spiritualised conception of the Messiah, and then to recognise in him a Messiah who was different from the one which everybody expected. During the early period of his activity the idea that he must suffer an atoning death never occurred to him. The preaching of his message was at first successful, but the opposition of the lawyers and Pharisees to this new gospel grew gradually stronger and stronger, because Jesus set too little value on observance of the numerous prescriptions of the Law. It reached at last such a height that he had to take refuge in a heathen land, the parts about Tyre and Sidon. There, in solitude, he at last realised that, in order to remain true to his cause and himself, he must face death, and when he had familiarised himself with this idea, he revealed to his disciples that he believed himself to be Messiah, and, in the same breath, that he was going up to Jerusalem to suffer and to die. During their journey through Galilee to Jerusalem there was a revival of popular enthusiasm for the prophet, who had emerged from his concealment and who now, with increasing plainness, announced himself to be Messiah. His success culminated in a Messianic entry into Jerusalem, but when the lawyers and Pharisees laid hands on this Messiah of theirs, and forced from the Roman authorities the confirmation of their own death-sentence, the populace, disenchanted, dropped their hero, who came to a painful end on the cross.

The destruction of this thoroughly sympathetic and apparently so intelligible picture of Jesus is the work of Dr Schweitzer, and he destroys it, though with a heavy heart, because it is historically untenable. It is so, first and foremost, because of the explanation given in it of the connection between the various events of the life of Jesus. The assumption of a period of success and a period of failure is not justified by the narratives. From the first day of his public activity to the last, Jesus is the object of the enthusiastic homage of his followers. If he goes for a time to a heathen district, it is not because he has to save himself from the plots of his enemies. He "disappears" in order to be alone, and as soon as ever he reappears he is again surrounded by enthusiastic crowds. Escorted and protected by them, he enters Jerusalem. If he dies, it is because he provokes the lawyers and Pharisees into killing him, and knowingly and willingly puts himself in their hands.

But why did Jesus withdraw himself from the crowds in the very middle of his successful preaching, to come forward again with his resolution to meet death, and to bring that death upon himself in Jerusalem? What is the connection between this resolution to seek death and his conception of the Kingdom of God? And how is it bound up with his conviction that he is the Messiah?

That he ventures to put all these questions with an almost brutal directness, and to wave aside all the results of inquiry which have been offered as giving the solution of the problem —there is to be found the significance of Schweitzer the historian. Seldom has a historical problem which had occupied inquirers for centuries been put forward again in such a new light.

And what is his solution? It rests essentially on one single axiom. If there are passages, says Dr Schweitzer, in which Jesus speaks of a glorious supernatural Kingdom which after the speedily expected consummation of the age is to unite believers, whether living or dead, in a purified bodily existence, then not only the world-view held by Jesus, but the whole of his thinking and acting, must have been determined by that expectation, and by that alone. If anyone expects the end of this world to come in the immediate future, he can find no room in his mind for other theories and speculations; he will be full of, and controlled by, that idea.

Eschatology, therefore—*i.e.* the doctrine of the Last Things—is the key to the understanding of the public activities of Jesus, and his resolution to face death. Of sayings of Jesus in which he proclaims the Kingdom of God as the glorious Messianic kingdom, which will be manifested at the rapidly approaching consummation of the age, there are plenty. Never did Jesus teach that the Kingdom of God was something which he was founding by raising mankind to a new and better disposition, and which from small beginnings would continually grow and expand. The Kingdom was for him just what his hearers understood it to be on the strength of the conceptions of it which were current among the pious representatives of later Judaism. The only new element in his preaching was his declaration: The consummation of this age which has been expected for so long is now at hand. It will come in your lifetime. You yourselves will see the Messiah, the Son of Man, as Daniel calls him, coming on the clouds of heaven. The last occasion on which Jesus testified to this was when, before his judges, he acknowledged himself to be the Messiah: "From henceforth ye shall see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of power and coming in the clouds of heaven" (Matt. xxvi. 64).

When the Kingdom comes, all men who are then alive (so he taught) will be changed into superterrestrial beings, while the dead will rise from their graves to share in that same supernatural existence. Now this supernatural existence is an element common to the late Jewish apocalypses and to the teaching of both Jesus and St Paul, and in it lies the explanation of how Jesus is to obtain his future position as Messiah. He is not Messiah now, but, filled with an exalted ethical self-consciousness, he holds himself to be the man who, when that transformation takes place which all believers are to experience on the establishment of the Kingdom of God, will then be revealed as the Son of Man, who appears for judgment on the clouds of heaven. He therefore has no need to speak of his office as Messiah, or to bring his hearers to a belief in that dignity. They will recognise him as the Son of Man when the Kingdom dawns upon them, and they are changed to beings like the angels. Till then he is only an undistinguished descendant of King David, living in the natural world, but preaching with glowing words the nearness of the Kingdom, and entreating all believers to make themselves, by a change of heart, worthy of their reversionary right to a share in it.

But what was the reason of his retirement northwards, and of his resolution to face death? The fact that the Kingdom did not appear, as he expected! The key to the life of Jesus is contained in the tenth chapter of St Matthew in the directions given to the Twelve when he sent them two and two through Judæa, bidding them with all possible speed announce the immediate coming of the Kingdom and the appearance of the Son of Man. Ere they could finish their journey, he assured them, everything he had mentioned would take place. "Verily I say unto you, ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come" (Matt. x. 23). Jesus therefore does not expect to have them coming back at all! He will first see them again as transformed beings in the Kingdom of God, when they, to their surprise, will suddenly find that their Master is the Son of Man!

Upon the assurance of the immediate nearness of the Kingdom there follow in this missionary address impressive warnings to the Twelve as to how they are to behave under the persecutions which will fall upon them during their hasty course through Judæa, as a part of the universal upheaval which will then begin. How to deal with these prophecies of persecution no historian of the life of Jesus before Schweitzer had any idea! It had to be assumed that they were not genuine! But the fact is that Jesus, since his ideas are just those held by believers in the conceptions of the future offered by later Judaism, cannot possibly speak of the immediate coming of the Kingdom of God without exhorting his hearers to endurance under cruel persecution. It was taught by late Judaism, as we learn from contemporary apocalypses and from the Revelation of St John, that before the Messianic Kingdom actually appeared the Satanic world-power would burst out in raging attacks on God's elect. These happenings were designated the birth-pangs of "Messiah," and the believers who did not endure to the end through persecution and suffering would forfeit their election privileges.

The tenth chapter of St Matthew, which has hitherto been treated with so little consideration, is therefore the key to the life of Jesus, because it represents him as promising the immediate coming of the pre-Messianic distress and of the Son of Man, the two events being closely connected, and also contains the announcement that he does not expect to see the Twelve again during the continuance of the present "age." He bids them a mysterious "Farewell till we meet again in the presence of the Son of Man!"

But what he expected and promised did not happen. The distress did not begin, the Son of Man did not appear, and the Twelve returned to him without a hair of their heads being damaged. What could that mean?

In order to consider how he must deal with this overwhelming fact of the non-appearance of the Kingdom, Jesus withdrew into solitude, away from the crowds which surrounded him and which were filled with excited expectation of the coming of the Kingdom. It is in the prophet Isaiah that he finds the explanation, for he applies to himself the words about the Servant of Jehovah who bears the sorrows and the sins of others (Isa. liii.). These words, according to the most probable explanation, were spoken originally of the people of Israel, who were to suffer at the hands of the nations of heathendom in order that the latter might come to the knowledge of the true God, and then, when Israel had been glorified by Jehovah, acknowledge that people as their saviour.

That he would have to suffer had been the firm conviction of Jesus from the very first. He expected that amid the pre-Messianic distress he would be hit harder than anyone, and he urgently warned his disciples and all other believers against failing to recognise him under his shameful humiliations.

But now in place of this idea of suffering *with* others comes the idea of suffering *for* others. That the omnipotence of God, in defiance of all human expectations of a period of pre-Messianic distress, can, if He will, allow the Kingdom to appear without it, is a possibility which is included in the beliefs of Jesus about the Kingdom. Evidence of this is to be found in the last petition of the Lord's Prayer: "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." The temptation here spoken of is not the psychological temptation of the human heart to evil, but the terrible collective temptation which awaits all believers amid the pre-Messianic distress, when they will be delivered into the hands of the Satanic world-power, that they may "make their calling and election sure." Believers are to pray in the same breath that the Kingdom may come and that they may be exempt from the trial of the pre-Messianic distress.

The fact that neither the distress nor the Kingdom came when he expected them immediately, means to Jesus that the last petition of the Lord's Prayer has been heard and granted for believers. He alone, as the Son of Man who is to come, will suffer and die and make atonement for them, so that they may not need to be purified by the distress, or be exposed to the risk of not enduring to the end. That is the meaning of his saying that he is not come to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life as a ransom for many (Mark x. 45). The "many" are the believers, for whom by his sufferings and death he purchases exemption from the sufferings of the pre-Messianic distress which they are otherwise destined to undergo. Jesus thus interprets his death as being an atoning one, which is to benefit all those who are around him. That God allows him thus to take their place is a mercy which He grants to His elect.

In this way, then, Jesus has it in his power to bring about the pre-Messianic distress and, at the close of it, the coming of the Kingdom. He has no longer to wait; he has to act; and the moment he brings the suffering and death upon himself from the powers which are hostile to him and the believers the events of the Last Days will begin duly to take place.

Therefore he starts for Jerusalem, to die there, and he confides this secret to the Twelve, so that they may be under no misapprehension about it, although to the very last he cherishes the hope that God, in his goodness and might, will spare him too the threatened sufferings. In Gethsemane he prays for this, but leaves the whole matter to God. Since, however, some of his disciples have ventured to boast that they can drink of the cup that he is to drink of, in order that they may be given the highest positions of honour in his Kingdom (Matt. xx. 20–24), he is uncertain whether they too have not to suffer and die with him. He therefore entreats them in Gethsemane to watch and pray that they may not have to go through the distress. This "that ye enter not into temptation" (Matt. xxvi. 41) is the same thing as the "Lead us not into temptation" of the Lord's Prayer. Then at last, when he sees the traitor approaching, he knows what his Father's decision has been.

In the *Quest for the Historical Jesus* this conception of Schweitzer's stands in strong contrast with all the inquiries of his predecessors. He shows how the development of the problem through generations of inquirers has been steadily working up to the alternative: Are the eschatological passages genuine or not? If they are, the whole of the life and activities of Jesus must be explained by means of them. If they are not, then how much of the whole Gospel text is genuine?

The earliest and most important attempts at an eschatological explanation of the life of Jesus are those of Hermann S. Reimarus, F. W. Ghillany, and Johannes Weiss. These, however, reached no satisfactory conclusion because they were not consistent enough, and because they failed to see the significance of the missionary directions in Matt. x.

The attempt to set aside altogether the eschatological passages was made by Ch. Hermann Weisse, Volkmar, Colani, and William Wrede, but it leads to a remarkable result. The explanation that in the early days of Christianity there had sprung up a belief in an approaching consummation of the age and the establishment of a supernatural Kingdom of God, and that the Gospels straightaway put declarations to this effect into the mouth of Jesus himself, was favourably received. But it suggests the question "Was that later generation satisfied with putting into the mouth of Jesus words about the consummation of the age only? May not his declaration that he was Messiah have the same origin?" The eschatological and the Messianic are really so essentially connected that they cannot be separated. From this balance of probabilities Wrede draws the conclusion that Jesus never believed himself to be Messiah, but was only made to do so by later tradition; the historical Jesus was, in fact, nothing more than a Jewish teacher. But if one accepts as correct such a thorough-going transformation of the tradition about Jesus, how is it possible to prove that in the whole of the narratives there is anything historical at all? Thus Arthur Drews and the other opponents of the historical character of Jesus have only come to a logical conclusion when they say that with the denial that Jesus expected a consummation of the age his personality loses its historical character, and he is no longer to be found at all in the period in which the Gospel writers place him.

This, then, is the alternative: Either Jesus is to be interpreted by means of his sayings about the consummation of the age and the supernatural Kingdom of God, or he melts into a misty figure of which even the historical character is questionable. The strength of Dr Schweitzer's position is that he can allow the tradition handed down by the two oldest Gospels to be accepted as authentic throughout.

As a piece of reasoning his *Quest for the Historical Jesus* is a real work of art. He brings order into the chaos of material, and with what life and warmth is the book written in spite of its scientific thoroughness! Reimarus, who used to be reckoned as nothing more than a mere Deistic writer, is now intelligible as a historian who was far in advance of his time. The author ventures to be very sympathetic in his treatment of Strauss, whom he places far above Renan. He was the first to point out the great significance of the noble William Wrede, who was cold-shouldered by contemporary theology, and met with this acknowledgment only as he was approaching a premature death.

Thanks to Dr Schweitzer's explanation of the secret of the life of Jesus, the personality of the latter is put before us with a marvellous realism. His Jesus is alive, because he ventures to let him be seen rooted in the current ideas of his day.

But now is there not a danger that we shall find this Jesus to be also a stranger, because he lives in a thought-world which is unfamiliar and strange to us? Is there not even a danger that he may seem to be mentally unsound?

This last question is treated and answered by Schweitzer in the thesis with which he earned his degree of Doctor of Medicine, viz. *Jesus from the Psychiatric Point of View*. In this analysis of the psychiatric writings of de Loosten, Binet-Sanglé, and Rasmüssen, who doubt the mental soundness of Jesus, he shows that the unfamiliar and strange is not to be confounded with the pathological. By his expectation of a consummation of the age and of a supernatural Messianic Kingdom Jesus shows his belief in a world-view which was put forward in the writings of the prophets and in the apocalypses of late Judaism, a belief which was shared by many of his contemporaries. For his belief that he himself would be revealed as Messiah during the general change to this condition of supernatural existence he had a foothold in his indisputable claim to belong to the family of David. The self-consciousness which allowed him to cherish this idea does indeed remain somewhat mysterious, but every great fact of self-consciousness is mysterious. To speak, however, of a pathological condition is quite unjustifiable. In no situation of his life—and this is the decisive argument—does Jesus behave as a personality in such a condition. Those who find him obsessed by the ideas of his own greatness and of being a victim of persecution are not clear about what such an obsession really means, and how it would express itself.

When the inquiry is finished, and the historian has done his work, the thinker begins to speak. This strange Jesus, says Dr Schweitzer, is the true Jesus, and therefore he has a meaning for us. It was more effort to wrestle with him than with the figure into which our modern ideas had changed him, but for that reason he is a closer and a greater figure who takes a stronger hold of us. The power of Jesus lies in this, that he does what no one has hitherto ventured to admit: he puts before us an absolute ethic. The significant thing for us is not that Jesus entertained the idea of the consummation of an age, but what he has produced from that idea. That expectation led him to the conception of an absolute ethic, one which consists in the perfecting of the personality, and that is the only real and true ethic. Even if the sources from which Jesus derived his world-view are altogether conditioned by time, yet the personality which from those sources created for itself that world-view and that ethic is powerful because it is itself not so conditioned. The absolute ethic and the idea of the Kingdom of God as the great need of the world Jesus has so thoroughly thought out and thrown into the world that he thereby really becomes the Lord before whose power we bow. Dr Schweitzer's last words are of mysticism, the mysticism which explains our innermost relation to the personality of Jesus: "As One unknown and unnamed he comes to us, as on the shore of the lake he appeared to those men who knew not who he was. He says to each of us what he said to one of them: 'But follow thou me!' and he puts before us the tasks which we are to fulfil in our day. He commands. And to those who obey him, be they learned or unlearned, he will reveal himself in all that in his company they are allowed to experience, whether of peace and consecration or of struggle and suffering, and they will learn, as a secret beyond expression, who he is. . . ." In these concluding words of *The Quest* there is thrown into the midst of modern theology and religiousness a word which is new to them: "mysticism."

The solution of all the problems of ethic and world-view is the task of mysticism, in which spiritual being meets spiritual being, and understanding completes itself in experience. The moment that Dr Schweitzer had written the last pages of *The Quest* his philosophy was already complete, and he himself gives us a hint of the fact. The first sketches of his *Philosophy of Civilisation* go back to the year 1900. *The Quest* was produced in 1906, when the author was already studying medicine in order to go, in the service of the spirit of Jesus, to work in Africa.

The question has recently been raised whether Dr Schweitzer's philosophical development has been influenced by his immersion in questions of eschatology and ethics, or whether, on the contrary, it was from the starting-point of his philosophical views that he came to his understanding of eschatology and the thought-world of Jesus. The latter is no doubt the correct view.

The fact that, after working out in such sharp outline the historical picture of Jesus, he nevertheless comes finally to regard the picture as something relative, has given rise to many misunderstandings. He is, however, far too much of a realist even to toy with the thought that exact historical knowledge is a merely secondary matter. Historical truth is to him something sacred, and all historical investigation has to go forward with uninterrupted effort in pursuit of it; his writings contain many hard words for those who in treating an historical problem fail to do so with the greatest possible courage and the most decisive resolution.

The superhistorical point of view to which Dr Schweitzer comes when he seeks to comprehend our relation to Jesus has this characteristic: it has been arrived at through history. It is by no means a matter of indifference to it whether this or that historical view is correct, but it rises above and beyond any particular conception which is recognised as the historically correct one. It is in this sense only that it is superhistorical. By means of history to become free of history—that is Dr Schweitzer's paradox. Our relation to the past is an immediate, spiritual one, and it brings us finally to a spiritual world of personalities, not merely to the contemporary material world in which those personalities were moulded. Thus the spiritual self of Jesus is unconditioned, by time, even though the visible world in which it acted was so conditioned and in so unique a way that it will ever remain something alien to all future world-views.

Dr Schweitzer's work on St Paul is not yet concluded; he has as yet published only the volume entitled *Paul and his Interpreters*. In it he puts, as in *The Quest*, the problem of an accurate historical view, and shows in it little agreement with the investigations of his predecessors. His picture of the thought-world of St Paul is yet to come. In the final chapters of the book he sketches clearly in its main outlines the doctrinal system of the apostle of the heathen.

It is interesting to note that Dr Schweitzer, as he himself remarks, is always writing the same book. *The Quest*, *Paul and his Interpreters*, and *Civilisation and Ethics* are all argumentative pictures of the same kind. The writer feels the need of comprehending his own thoughts as something objective to himself, but taking account all the time of how far the problem as he conceives it and the solution as he offers it have already been motive forces in previous investigation, and are still striving to find fit expression. This reckoning up of all that has gone before, in order to attain to clearness about his own ideas, has in each case grown to something much bigger than he expected. The huge volume of *The Quest* was originally planned to be merely a small supplement to the *Sketch of the Life of Jesus*. *Paul and his Interpreters* was to have been merely an introductory chapter to an exposition of *The Mysticism of St Paul*, but it became an independent work. In the *Philosophy of Civilisation* he intended merely to set forth his own ethical system and world-view without any comparison with similar undertakings in the past, but he was brought at last, almost against his will, to write in *Civilisation and Ethics* the tragic history of the long struggle for an ethical system and an optimistic theory of the universe which is to be seen in Western thought. The historian and the thinker are in him so closely bound up together, that he can never be the historian without being at the same time the thinker, and *vice versâ.* History provides few examples of men in whom these two dispositions are so strongly and yet so equally developed, though at the same time working in such hearty co-operation with one another.

In similar wise do the historian and the artist overlap in Dr Schweitzer. He sets before us the ideal of the organ, as he gives fresh recognition to the meaning and value of the construction and the tone of those old organs which are generally held to have been out of date for years, and describes clearly to us the progress which has been made in organ-building during the last few generations. His clear comprehension of the works of J. S. Bach he justifies by basing it on a revived knowledge of what the organs, the orchestras, and the choirs were in Bach's days. This union of the artist and the historian is putting an end to the unhappy modernising of the master's works.

To return now to St Paul. The great question is, Does St Paul think as a Jew, or do we see in him the first attempt to introduce into Christianity the ideas of a Græco-Oriental religiousness ? The apostle is an extremely puzzling phenomenon. The letters, from which we learn what his teaching was, were written two decades after the death of Jesus, yet he never goes back to the teaching of Jesus himself ; not a single saying of his does he quote. If we had to rely for our knowledge of Jesus on St Paul alone, we should know nothing of either the Sermon on the Mount or of the Lord's Prayer, nor should we know anything of the parables. The historical Jesus is for St Paul entirely hidden behind the Christ idea. But in the historical Jesus there is no trace of mysticism, any more than there is any tendency at all to it in the Jewish religion ; Jesus is in his teaching always simple and plain. These two facts suggest that there is something new and alien in the thought-world of St Paul, while the further facts that he grew up in Asia Minor and felt a mission to preach the Gospel to the Greeks suggest also that in him Christianity is trying to find itself in Greek ideas. It is, therefore, natural to try to explain St Paul and his Christ-mysticism by means of Greek thought.

As a matter of fact, F. C. Bauer, who was the first to busy himself seriously with the Pauline problem, and all inquirers who followed him down to Holtzmann, Pfleiderer, Reitzenstein, Deissmann, Harnack, and others, did either entirely, or at least to a great extent, so explain it.

Bruno Bauer and the "Dutch school"—van Manen, Steek, Pierson, Leman—took a much more radical view, and declared that the Pauline letters as a whole must be accepted as Greek compositions belonging to the first half of the second century, with which the historical Paul—if there really was one—had no connection, but this view was looked on as a curiosity of criticism which there was no need to take seriously.

Then comes Dr Schweitzer with his setting of the problem. No one is at all justified in lightly assuming that Paul, the apostle of the heathen, and his letters are an invention of the beginning of the second Christian century. Do these "reasonable inquirers" who smile at such eccentricity ever consider what they themselves are assuming to be historical when they foist Greek ideas upon St Paul? To the circle of the actually living apostles of Jesus, all of them absolutely dominated by Jewish ideas, there was admitted, they say, a Paul who taught a gospel outspokenly Greek in character. How is that conceivable? Paul was himself a Pharisee, and the whole body of Jewish teachers of the Law was shut off from all influences of the intellectual world around them. In Alexandria alone was there a body of such teachers, who wanted to introduce into Jewish theology the Greek Logos. We know of them from the works of Philo. But with them Paul has absolutely neither a thought nor a word in common! And how could the apostles of Jesus and the primitive Christian community have endured to see anyone offering Greek ideas as Christian ones!

That a Greek-thinking Paul appeared among the first Christians and was tolerated by them is therefore a statement which it is as hard to make credible as the other statement that the apostle of the heathen, Paul, is the literary creation of a later period.

Moreover, the Pauline system would not be in any way explained by the assumption of a Greek origin. His mysticism has no connection whatever with that of Greece, nor with the ideas of the Græco-Oriental mystery religions. Nor again, does he stand in any way in contact with those who in that second century undertook the Hellenising of Christianity—with a Justin Martyr, that is, or an Ignatius.

Here, then, is something which makes the problem of St Paul exactly parallel with that of the life of Jesus. So far as anyone in the case of Jesus claims that his expectation of a consummation of the age—that specifically Jewish conception—was fitted into the picture at a later period, the whole figure of Jesus melts away and loses all historical ground from beneath its feet. Similarly, as soon as the existence of Greek ideas in St Paul is assumed, he at once becomes inexplicable as a person who appeared immediately after Jesus and moves about in the primitive community; he sinks further and further into later times, till the only thing left to do is to appraise him as an invention of the second century after Christ.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that this Greek-thinking Paul lives in the most lively expectation of the consummation of the age. He is waiting with a burning eagerness for the Second Coming of Christ on the clouds of heaven. He hopes, as he confesses in 1 Thess. iv., to live to see this event, and as a transformed being to be taken up into the clouds to be with the Lord in the company of all his fellow-believers: "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed," as we read in 1 Cor. xv.

How can anyone be at home in the Jewish expectation of the consummation of the age and at the same time in Greek mysticism, which is directly antagonistic to such naïve realism? It is impossible. Paul therefore is either a Greek or a Jew. Either his mysticism is to be explained on Greek lines, and then he can have no place in the first generation of Christians, and cannot have written the many passages in which he admits a belief in the consummation of the age—or he is in his thinking a Jew, and rooted, like Jesus, in that late Jewish belief. Then he really belongs to the primitive Christian community in which the letters represent him as appearing, and is an historical character. This last solution is the only admissible one.

That means, however, that the mysticism of St Paul is to be explained by means of his expectation of the consummation of the age, and Dr Schweitzer's solution takes in fact that course. The fact that with the death and resurrection of Christ the Messianic world has already dawned upon mankind is raised by St Paul to the higher level of a mystic existence in Christ. Properly speaking—this is the thought which appears in so many passages—we are no longer natural men, but already transformed into supernatural beings, except that we still wear upon us the shell of the earthly man like a garment which is soon to be thrown away. We have died with Christ, and are also risen with him. We have become a new creation. Old things have passed away; behold, all things have become new. From this standpoint his whole system can be grasped as a unity.

Jesus and Paul, then, are both to be explained by means of Jewish thought, and thereby an entirely new conception is established of what primitive Christianity really was. Even Harnack in his big *History of Doctrine*, like F. C. Bauer before him, makes the development of Christianity into something Greek begin with St Paul, because he can explain the mysticism of St Paul in no other way. This eschatological reading of it puts the history of the beginnings of Christian doctrine on an entirely new foundation, and enables St Paul to come before us with a straightforward directness which no one had ever supposed to be possible.

Edward Reuss, the Alsatian theologian and Orientalist, who was the first to discover that the so-called Law of Moses consisted of various strata, widely differing in date, received the recognition due to him only when a Wellhausen re-handled his discovery, which was already fast falling into oblivion. Albert Schweitzer is more fortunate. His conception of the life of Jesus and of primitive Christianity was at first fiercely attacked, but has in its fundamental ideas gradually won its way through to acceptance. It has driven out of the field the modernised and feeble picture of Jesus which, till he wrote, passed for historical, and it puts in the place of the complicated Paul of modern criticism an elementary speculative thinker.

ERNST BARTHEL.

COLOGNE.

# SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

### By The Rev. JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.Litt.

There is no lack, in English, of modern books which explain what the Bible really is, as criticism views its rise and contents, but there is always room for a good monograph on this as on any subject, and, although we possess Dr A. S. Peake's and Dr Paterson Smyth's volumes, *Concerning the Bible* (Sampson Low, Marston; London), is a welcome addition. The author, Mr Conrad A. Skinner, has the gift of imparting information attractively; he has gone to the best sources for his facts, and the result is a reliable and most readable book, exactly the sort of thing to be put into the hands of those who desire to read the Bible intelligently. Some relevant illustrations are furnished, which add to the argument of the text. It is a pleasure to notice the appearance of so sensible, timely and independent an introduction. The first three parts are issued separately as a text-book for senior forms in schools, but the fourth part, on what "inspiration" really means, will be indispensable for more mature readers. How unambiguous Mr Skinner can be may be seen from a passage like this towards the close: "When you examine the books at the end of the Old Testament you find the stiffening embers of dying fires. There is no vision. There is but propagandist bias and cynical pessimism in writings like Chronicles and Ecclesiastes. They are instances of the distortion of prejudice, the curse of ennui, salutary lessons as to the grey Christless side of life." Substitute Esther for Chronicles, and this would be a truer verdict perhaps. And in Ecclesiastes there is really a keen love of life, which explains the so-called "disillusionment" of some of its paragraphs. But I quote the passage to show the freedom with which Mr Skinner faces the modern enquirer, a freedom which is combined with a distinct belief in the spiritual function and message of the literature with which he is dealing. For Mr Skinner is not one of those modern Marcionites who would depreciate or even eliminate the Old Testament from Christian teaching. Against this tendency Mr E. A. Annett enters a wise protest in *The International Journal of Missions* (April, 366–374), though he recognises the difficulty of giving instruction in the Old Testament to non-Christian children. Incidentally, the vital contribution of the Old Testament to the idea of God is estimated admirably in Dr J. K. Mozley's three lectures on *The Doctrine of God* (S.P.C.K.). He is alive to the danger of spinning religious thought in a serene indifference to the Bible.

The recent discoveries at Kish, like those at Ur, cannot yet be fully valued as an indication of primitive religion, but the Serâbît inscriptions near the Hathor temple on Mount Serâbît el-Khâdem, which has provoked so much discussion since the visit of Sir W. Flinders Petrie in 1904, are studied criticially by Father R. F. Butin in *The Harvard Theological Review* (January, pp. 9–67). After a careful examination of the famous inscription in which Grimme thought he had found the name of Moses, the writer points out that, while the name of the head stone-worker is M–SH, even if this be vocalised as Mosheh, it simply shows that it was the same name as that of the great Hebrew law-giver, for " the M–SH of the inscription antedates the Old Testament Moses by several hundred years." He thinks the inscriptions must be older than 1500 B.C., but hesitates to believe that they mark the beginning of the Semitic alphabet ; " there must have been an older stage in which the pictorial character was still clearer and stronger." There are some capital illustrations, but the writer warns us against trusting photographs too implicitly. Grimme's general views on the Semitic script are also adversely criticised by Father Schumacher in *Biblica* (pp. 111–119).

In the light of Mr Hocart's recent studies in kings as divine, though along other lines, a timely article by Mr F. W. Buckler in *The Anglican Theological Review* (pp. 238–249), opens up a subject which bears on the theological interpretation of the Bible, viz. " The Oriental Despot." The author points out that the modern Western world of democracy is unanimous in decrying and denouncing the Oriental tyrant or monarch, while at the same time "it is nominally seeking to establish on earth the Kingdom of God, which depends for its revelation on the inner meaning of Eastern kingship." He seeks, therefore, to elucidate the latter concept, making the good point that within historical times the kingship rested on the incorporation of the agents of the king within the king's person and body," the kingship being in effect corporate, not autocratic. To wear the royal robes, to pay tribute, and to attend court, sharing in the royal meal, were all outward and naïve expressions of this connection. The bearing of this on the expressions used in the New Testament is plain, believers being regarded as partaking in the life and tasks of the king to whom they owed their loyalty. It is to be hoped that the author will work out the presuppositions and inferences of his theory in print, as he seems to have done already in lectures. Mr J. O. Boyd's article on " Monarchy in Israel, The Ideal and the Actual " (*Princeton Theological Review*, pp. 41–64), handles the messianic concept alone.

Two serviceable editions of Old Testament books have appeared. One is Mr R. M. Gwynne's edition of *The Book of Amos* (Cambridge University Press), in the Revised Version series of the Cambridge

Bible for Schools, and the other is Dr A. R. S. Kennedy's edition of the Hebrew text of *The Book of Ruth* (S.P.C.K.), with a vocabulary and notes on the grammar for the benefit of students of the original.

The volume of *Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams* (New York, Jewish Institute of Religion) is naturally composed, in the main, of contributions to ancient and mediæval and modern problems of Judaism, but there are some articles of wider interest on theology, and the Old Testament receives special notice in one or two. Thus, J. Obermann (pp. 373–380) argues that Jael caught Sisera by one arm round the neck, as he drank, and battered in his head; this involves the reading of Judges v. 26 as

> " Her hand to a peg she reaches,
> And her other hand to clutch the exhausted."

Dr G. F. Moore (pp. 348–364) shows that Simon the Righteous lived about 200 B.C., while Hermann Vogelstein (pp. 416–425), in a lecture on some problems of Jewish history during the period of the second temple, argues that Christianity arose in the Hellenism which came under Jewish influence within the diaspora.[1] S. B. Maximon's article "In the Footsteps of the Rabbis" (pp. 324–341), is a valuable series of critical comments on Mr Travers Herford's recent edition of the "Pirke Aboth." In *What Remains of the Old Testament, and other Essays* (George Allen and Unwin), Mr A. K. Dallas has translated five papers by Professor Hermann Gunkel, whose work has been too long inaccessible to the general public outside Germany. The essay which comes first is a popular study for the intelligent, and the four following deal with subjects like the Psalter and the traditions about Jacob—in which, by the way, the author detects traces of the Laban tales having been added to the original nucleus. The small volume is an excellent specimen of the work for which Gunkel has been famous, the combination of acute analytic power and of religious insight, in dealing with literature and ancient religious tradition. The collection of papers printed in *Old Testament Essays* (Charles Griffin, London), which is international in range, contains another essay by

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[1] The thesis of Dr G. H. Gilbert's most readable volume on *Greek Thought in the New Testament* (Macmillan, New York) is that the authentic teaching of Jesus is already deflected by Greek thought within the New Testament literature, and that the interpretations due to Hellenism must be distinguished from the primitive historical revelation. The argument is pleasantly conducted, but some qualifications seem needful. The Sadducees can hardly be said to have "rejected all those practices, sanctioned by tradition, which isolated the Jews from other people"; and surely it is unguarded to say that the apostle Paul is linked to Greek mysticism rather than to Hebrew prophetism because "he built his doctrine of Christ upon a vision rather than upon the life and teaching of the Master." It is a sound principle that "nothing belongs integrally to the Christian faith which is not contained, at least implicitly, in the historical Jesus"; but the "historical Jesus" is not an easy or obvious starting-point from which to measure deflections, and "implicitly" covers much debatable ground.

Gunkel, who insists that the Psalter is by no means to be relegated as a whole to the post-exilic period; Professor Causse, of Strasburg, discusses the Jewish diaspora, on which he has been writing in the pages of the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, and Professor Volz breaks a lance for the theory that Moses and his work were historical. The high average of the papers is a proof of the value attaching to the Society for Old Testament Study, under whose auspices they are published.

Professor B. S. Easton's *The Gospel Before the Gospels* (Scribners) is a most useful introduction, for English-speaking people, to the "Formgeschichte" method which is now in vogue, *i.e.* to the critical method which seeks to analyse the processes through which the material of the gospel tradition passed before the evangelists worked it up into the canonical gospels. In opposition to some advocates of this method, who attribute very much of the tradition to the later tendencies of the Church, Dr Easton inclines soberly to question the hypothesis that the apostolic Church read back the greater part of its beliefs into the life of Jesus; historical criticism, he argues, will be disposed to allow more to the creative influence of Jesus Himself than is done in some contemporary quarters. The volume will open up the subject for students who cannot consult the Germans; it is not merely a survey, but an appreciation upon critical lines.

A *Festgabe* of unusual importance, such as is more common on the Continent, has been published in honour of two American professors, Dr F. C. Porter and Dr B. W. Bacon, who are retiring from their chairs in the Divinity School of Yale University. The volume, entitled *Studies in Early Christianity* (Century Co., New York), is edited by Dr S. J. Case, who himself contributes an essay on the rise of Christian messianism, which argues that the messianic interest in the synoptic gospels is due to the later theology of Peter and his friends, and that it was the rejection of this by the Jews as well as the growing needs of the Church which led to the increased importance of the religious, non-messianic message of the really historical Jesus. This essay follows another by Professor Torrey, in which he traces ably the strata of the messianic expectation in Judaism, arguing that such conceptions of the messianic hope were the common property of the Jewish nation in the days of Jesus, and warning us against turning to rabbinic writings for decisive proof that a given Old Testament passage was interpreted messianically, since by that time "the Jews had more than their fill of Messiahs." It was only "a heterogeneous and relatively insignificant minority" in the nation who did not share the messianic expectation in some form or another. The introductory essay, by Professor E. F. Scott, discusses the limitations of the historical method, which both Professor Porter and Professor Bacon have employed with such success, and yet with a sense that it is not the complete key to the problem. One of the principal defects of the method, as Dr Scott acutely points out, is that in insisting on genetic relations, "it leaves out of sight the profounder origins of religious ideas and beliefs," and that critics sometimes forget the value of research into present-day revivals and mission methods for an explication of the New Testament writings. Three essays, in German, are by Continental scholars, Von Dobschütz, Windisch, and Krüger, the last-named contributing a study of the second letter of Clement, which he regards as a Corinthian sermon composed about the middle of the second century. The majority of the essays are on Jesus and the gospels, but Mr H. J. Cadbury and Dr W. H. P. Hatch discuss Paulinism, and Professor Ropes, of Harvard, shows that the epistle to the Romans, addressed to a Gentile Christian church, betrays no trace of any controversy at Rome between Jewish and Gentile Christians, the apostle's aim here as elsewhere, except in Galatians, being to ensure that Christians retained sufficient "of the sound Jewish theology and morals on which Christianity rested." In this connection, Mr L. G. Rylands' paper in the *Nieuw Theologisch Tijdschrift* (pp. 118–139) attempts to carry forward van Manen's composite theory of the epistle's origin by contending that the oldest part of the epistle, which has "a distinctly gnostic character," and claimed to have been written by Paul, embraced only i. 6–ii. 29, vi. 1–vii. 6, viii. 1–28 and 38–39, with xii. 1–2. Later, before the end of the first century, an edition was issued which added ix–xi., and the hortatory section, and subsequently a third writer worked it over and re-published it, though even yet it did not contain xv.–xvi. ! The "Pauline Problem," which Mr H. N. Bate presents in *The Church Quarterly Review* (January, pp. 287–299), is the more living one of how the apostle's significance is to be understood, if due weight is not given to the church-life into which he entered. In some recent studies, like those by Deissmann, Glover, and even Dr Anderson Scott, Mr Bate detects a tendency to present what he thinks an incomplete sketch of the apostle's religion by thrusting "the ordered life of the Church, and its sacramental approach to God, into a shadowy background"—the answer to which, from these scholars, would probably be that this was the very background which they were endeavouring to reconstruct, without reading back into it some modern preconceptions.

The remark, above cited, by Dr Torrey, with regard to the caution required in using rabbinic evidence, is corroborated by a restrained but suggestive criticism of Dr Moore's recent work on Judaism from Professor Porter's pen in *The Journal of Religion* for January (pp. 30–62). He speaks naturally in the highest terms of the learning shown in this truly great study, but enters some important caveats. Thus, whilst the Judaism of the Mishnah and the Talmud, Dr Moore contends, is justified by the belief in Judaism as revealed religion on the basis of the Old Testament as interpreted by the rabbis, yet, as Dr Porter submits, "the Old Testament is not and was not such a book as the rabbis believed it to be ; and the Mishnah is the logical consequence of their belief, but it is not the natural and necessary consequence of the Old Testament itself, unless, indeed, we are prepared to let the scribes from Ezra's time determine for us the meaning of the Old Testament." As for the difference between the

Mishnah and the New Testament, he goes on to show, the former assumes that the Old Testament is the final product of prophecy, whereas the New Testament implies that the age of prophets had returned, and therefore marks the religion, not of a book, but of an inward, free spirit. "I may be permitted to express my own conviction that this difference goes back to Jesus and was made by him, and that Paul is fundamentally right in his understanding of what the difference was and of what it signifies." These are significant words; they make one desire more than ever that Professor Porter should now produce the volume on the Contemporary Life of the New Testament, which has for long been expected from his pen in the "International Theological Library."

In *The Expository Times* (February, pp. 198–200), Mr H. Loewe uses the controversy over the Prayer Book and Reservation to call attention to what he calls "The Sacramental Controversy before A.D. 1." This may sound a paradoxical title, since Judaism has no sacraments. But Mr Loewe directs attention to ritual minutiæ like the difference of opinion over the kindling of incense, which proves that the Jews had once the sacramental sense. The Pharisees objected to the Sadducees for kindling the incense outside the Holy of Holies, they themselves holding that the high priest should kindle it within, because the real presence of the Deity was not confined to the priest inside the shrine. This detail, Mr Loewe thinks, illustrates the principle at stake. The Pharisees represent the modern Evangelicals in their antipathy to anything which would suggest anthropomorphic views of God or lead to any suggestion of corporeal contact with the Divine presence, whereas the Sadducees' spiritual descendants are the High Churchmen.

There is comparatively little to chronicle upon the life of Jesus, but in *Theology* (February, pp. 79–88), Mr Lindsay Dewar interprets our Lord's temptations [1] as a series of temptations which came to Him in sleep, or dreams, to yield to the three primary instincts of gratifying hunger, of asserting oneself, and of flight for safety. In the dream-symbolism, he suggests, the temple-pinnacle was taken as a wing of protection, the idea being that He might, by using it, fly from the difficulties of His life; in other words, He was tempted to "live as an orthodox Jewish Messiah." Another contribution comes in connection with the end of our Lord's life on earth, for in *Biblica* (pp. 48–56, 57–77), K. Schoch and J. B. Schaumberger re-state from varying points of view, based on astronomical evidence in part, the theory which has been finding support of late, that on a reckoning of the festivals as observed by the Jews, the crucifixion of Jesus in all probability took place on April 7th in A.D. 30,[2] though the second writer leaves open the alternative of April 3rd, A.D. 33.

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[1] Dr S. McComb, in the *Modern Churchman* (pp. 602–609) treats them as due to Christ's messianic consciousness seeking to realise its true methods of service.

[2] This is the view which I took in my *Everyman's Life of Jesus*, and it is now corroborated in Mr D. R. Fotheringham's book on *The Date of Easter and other Christian Festivals* (S.P.C.K.).

So far as the apostolic age is concerned, Father Stephanus Bible restates in *Antonianum* (pp. 129–150), the older view that the Seven of Acts vi. were really the first deacons of the Church, attempting to meet the well-known objections to this theory which have been current. Dr G. H. Rendall's *The Epistle of St James and Judaic Christianity* (Cambridge University Press) is also a restatement of a view which many scholars have abandoned. Dr Rendall puts his case, however, with much freshness and force. He thinks that the probabilities point to the author having been James of Jerusalem, who wrote a pastoral address on the principles of the new faith for the benefit of those who resorted to Jerusalem in the first half of the first century, who "without committing themselves to ties of formal membership came under the influence of Christian teaching, and who, impressed by the arresting personality of James, by his kinship with Jesus, and by his accepted leadership, leaned on his utterances for directive guidance and inspiration." But, even apart from the question of authorship, readers of this volume will gain either some useful hints on the interpretation of the letter or several incisive reinforcements of arguments which have been already put forward. One may demur to the parallel between James and Latimer, and hesitate seriously before allowing that the words of this epistle were fresh in Paul's mind, when he was writing Romans, "and came glibly from his pen." Yet Dr Rendall's comments are in several places independent and stimulating; they carry on the line of English interpretation which has been honourably associated with the names of Mayor and Hort.

Dr Theodor Zahn's *Grundriss der Neutestamentliche Theologie* (Leipzig, D. Werner Scholl) starts with a sketch of the preaching of John the Baptist, in which the term "repentance" is taken to be practically equivalent to "conversion." The teaching of Jesus is followed by the general apostolic message, including the special mission-theology of the appeal to Israel as that is brought out in the epistle of James (about A.D. 50), Second Peter (A.D. 60–64), and Jude (after A.D. 70). The third chapter is devoted to the Pauline theology for Gentile Christian churches, and the fourth to the eschatological sphere of ideas. The fifth traces two special forms of theological reflection, in the epistle to the Hebrews (the epistle being taken as addressed to a Jewish Christian community), and in the Logos-doctrine of the Johannine writings. The book is based on Zahn's well-known results concerning the literary problems of the New Testament; it is compact, severely textual, and, it must be confessed, not very attractive in style, though it serves to sum up conveniently the orthodox theology for which the author has stood so long and so indefatigably. If anyone desires to see how differently Christian scholars can view the same truth or movement, it will be enough to read Zahn's brief treatise alongside of an article like that contributed by Dr Garvie to the *Congregational Quarterly* for January on "The Effect of Modern Criticism on the Faith of To-day." Another indication of how far we have travelled is furnished by Dr Paul Feine in his farewell lecture at Halle, which is reprinted in the *Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie* (pp. 595–607). His subject is, "The Main Currents of New Testament Research during the Past Fifty Years." Dr Feine is not by any means a member of the left wing, but he, like Dr Garvie, is much more flexible than Dr Zahn. Neither scholar would go so far as Mr T. Wilson in his Gunning Lectures on *St Paul and Paganism* (T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh), a book of wide reading and much ability, which restates with learning the thesis that the apostle was influenced by contemporary cults in his expression of the Christian convictions which his message embodies. Mr Wilson's book will introduce many readers to bypaths in this obscure field of research, and enable them to make up their own minds as to whether the apostle's relationship to the mystery religions was one of indebtedness, and if so, how far.

In the climbing sunrise of Christianity, as it dawned on North Africa and produced literature, Mr H. J. Baylis places *Minutius Felix* (Cambridge University Press), early, earlier even than Tertullian. The graceful dialogue of "Octavius" has long interested students of early theology, and the problem of its priority to Tertullian is still one of the debated problems of literature. Mr Baylis is not alone in holding that Minutius preceded the great African father, and in his thorough treatise he makes a good case for the high position of Minutius among the early fathers of the Latin Church. This is a notable appreciation; and, whatever we may think of the plea for the gracious rationalism of the "Octavius," it establishes the new line struck out by the writer as a Christian apologist of a more conciliatory temper than Tertullian. Another most appreciative vindication is that of *Eustathius of Antioch* (Cambridge University Press), by Mr R. V. Sellers, and students of early church history will be grateful to Mr E. C. E. Owen for his edition of *Some Authoritative Acts of the Martyrs* (Clarendon Press), as hitherto small German collections have been the only available handbooks. Mr Owen's selections are confined to trustworthy records, which are well translated, and edited with enough material to enable the reader to enter into the issues. It is, for example, a relief to find him dealing faithfully with some recent efforts to whitewash Marcus Aurelius.

A memorial double number of the *Recherches de Science Religieuse* (Paris) has been issued in honour of the late Father Grandmaison, the distinguished scholar and historian. It contains sixteen essays, mainly on historical subjects. Dr F. Cabrol, for example, opens with a paper on the Doxology in early Christian prayers, Dr Batiffol examines the origin and meaning of the term "princeps apostolorum," which he traces back to Jerome in 392, Jacques Zeiller discusses the vogue of Arianism in connection with Oriental cults like that of "summus deus" in the Roman Empire, and Gustav Bardy examines the relations of Origen to magic in Egypt. Two of the essays are upon New Testament subjects, one a study of John xii. 1–8 by A. Lemonnyer, the other a sketch of "grace" in Paul and John, by Pierre Rousillot. Lemonnyer argues that Mary overheard the prediction of Mark x. 33–

34, and showed herself "plus clairvoyant" than the disciples. He inclines to think that she was Mary Magdalene, though on this point he will not commit himself.

The "dialectic" theology of Barth and the Swiss school continues to engross attention, which is not entirely confined to the Continent. The onset made by the school upon relativity and psychological obsession in the modern historical method has prompted critics to re-examine the entire problem, in the interests of arriving at some sense of what constitutes reality or objectivity in Christianity. The need of a reaction against the tyrannous claims of psychological analysis has long been evident, and the question for Barth's critics is simply, whether his idea of revelation is tenable on philosophical and exegetical grounds. Dr Adolf Keller's article in *The Congregational Quarterly* (January) is a convenient introduction to the main elements of the controversy, but the limitations and defects of Barth's exegesis are handled with scrupulous care by Professor O. Culmann in the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses* (pp. 70–83). R. Bultmann puts his opposition to the theology sharply in the *Theologische Blätter* (March, pp. 57–67), dealing with the Barthian interpretation of the Pauline letters—for hitherto Barth has not gone beyond the epistles exegetically—and in the *Theologisches Literaturblatt* (March, pp. 105–107), Dr Doerne reviews the German edition of Haitjema's study of Barth [1] appreciatively upon the whole.

It is sad to have to chronicle the deaths of four veterans among the distinguished theologians in different fields of work, Dr Paul Sabatier, Dr F. Loofs, Dr Theodor von Haering, and Dr H. H. Wendt. English readers knew all in translations, but no version has yet appeared of Loofs' *Leitfaden*, which, especially in its later editions, is an indispensable manual for serious students of theology, and which will last long after the untranslated work of Wendt on Christian ethics has been superseded. In connection with the last-named topic, there is still space to chronicle a not unimportant sidelight upon the meaning of "Love thy neighbour" in the article which August Faust contributes to *Logos* (pp. 287–310) upon the conception of "Neighbour" in social philosophy; he brings out the lack of insight in Kant's moralising use of the New Testament phrase, pointing out that the Christian "love" sketched by the apostle Paul, for example in the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, is really absent from the Kantian scheme. The "grotesque" depreciation of Jesus as an ethical authority is one of the counts against R. Bultmann's recent study of Jesus which is made by Erich Foerster in a critique printed in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (pp. 28–50)—a critique in which the buttons are off the foils. For some time there was a danger of comparative religion being swamped in anthropology. Nowadays Christian ethics is in danger of being identified unduly with either the study of casuistry or with economics—both topics having their value, but neither being exhaustive. There is room for development along the lines which Wendt suggested in his work on the subject, particularly in the light of some modern tendencies either to remove the ethical sources of Christianity in the gospels or to undermine them by adducing behaviouristic categories which rule out anything like authoritative standards of conduct. Although it starts from a particular issue and works on lines of restricted investigation, Erdmann Schott's monograph on *Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre* (Leipzig, Deichertsche Verlagsbuchhandlung) deserves notice in this connection, as an exhaustive discussion of the moral and spiritual personality in Luther's doctrine of conversion. In an appendix the author criticises Holl's analytic view of Luther's argument on justification by faith.

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[1] In *The Journal of Theological Studies* (January, pp. 201–204), Sir Edwyn Hoskins also criticises this Dutch work.

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# REVIEWS.

*Adventure: The Faith of Science and the Science of Faith.* By Burnett H. Streeter, M.A., D.D., F.B.A.; Catherine M. Chilcott, M.A.; John Macmurray, M.C., M.A.; Alexander S. Russell, M.C., M.A., D.Sc.—Macmillan & Co., 1927.—Pp. ix + 247. 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

The papers collected in this volume were read by members of a group of Oxford thinkers at meetings held for the discussion of the relations between Science and Religion at the late Miss Dougall's house at Cumnor. They form a sequel to earlier collections of like origin, and also to Canon Streeter's recent remarkable book *Reality.* In view of the intellectual and practical needs of the present time, the writers handle their problem from a special angle, treating Religion, Morality and Science as "diverse, but intrinsically connected, adventures of the spirit of man." This restriction is bound to cause a certain difficulty; for much that is vital is touched on lightly and in ambiguous language, and in many minds the book will provoke more questions than it solves. But the loss is compensated by a gain. Philosophy has too often held aloof from all but experts; and the present endeavour to appeal to a wider audience merits appreciation rather than minute criticism. This book is itself an adventure, and one which by its freedom from prejudice and its sincerity of purpose is sure to evoke interest, especially in the younger generation, who are so keenly alive to problems of religion and morality.

Religion is the central theme of four of the six chapters; viz.: Mr Macmurray's on *Beyond Knowledge* (II.) and *The Objectivity of Religion* (V.), Dr Streeter's on *Finality in Religion* (IV.), and Miss Chilcott's on *Myth and Reality* (VI.). "Religion," Miss Chilcott tells us, "is a belief lived, *i.e.* taken up and absorbed by personality" (p. 220). It presents, as all the writers insist, a close analogy to science, in that it rests on an act of faith, is an adventure forward into the unknown from a basis of provisional hypothesis, and seeks confirmation for its beliefs by the experimental method. Thus Christianity is scientific in so far as its theological and ethical beliefs provoke to experimental activity, and that "modern experimental science is characteristically Christian in its own sphere is the intellectual life of faith" (pp. 40, 41). The difference lies in the wider range of the religious adventure, which calls into play the whole of human personality. Mr Macmurray, whose two essays are philosophically the most important in the collection, develops this position with much ability, especially with reference to the belief in the Incarnation (Essay V.). He claims that in this belief, regarded not as a dogma, but as a reasonable hypothesis, there is achieved an effective synthesis of divine transcendence and immanence, of spiritual value and historic fact, of the universality of law (the teaching of the Hebrew priesthood) and individual personality (the teaching of Hebrew prophecy). A genuinely scientific verification of this hypothesis would be forthcoming, if we could show that the personality of Jesus " stands behind the whole unitary process of reality," securing, not only a unification both of the spiritual life of the world, as manifested in art and science, philosophy and conduct, and of the course of its historical development, but also a reconciliation of the claims of spiritual values with the known facts of physical nature, including the facts of pain and evil. Further, on this hypothesis alone is religious faith furnished with an objective basis ; for religion cannot, he contends, be either departmental or subjective ; it " must compass objectivity and the universality which is the hall-mark of objectivity, or cease to be religion " (p. 215). But it remains a hypothesis to the end, being " too big for any final proof " ; a " call to faith, an adventure which by the continuity of a sæcular experiment is ever strengthening its claim to truth " (*ib.*).

It is the old story—*fides quærens intellectum.* Mr Macmurray is strong in his conviction that faith, though " the principle of life in any body of growing knowledge," must submit itself to criticism by reason, that the instinctive comprehension of its vision must find its complement in a comprehension that is rational (pp. 40, 29). He has no patience with those who appeal from reason to authority or to mystical intuition. We are not clear how far his assurance of the need for a scientific Christianity will square with Dr Streeter's view, developed more fully in *Reality*, on the difference between the religious and the scientific " representations " of the real. " Quality," writes Dr Streeter, " cannot be truly apprehended through conceptual forms, and religion, unlike science, is concerned with reality in its qualitative impingement upon man " (p. 139). It is open to question, in the light, *e.g.*, of Dr Whitehead's recent work, whether scientific thought is likely to prove so indifferent to qualitative characters as Dr Streeter supposes, and whether the presence of faith as the driving force of science and the sovereignty of the experimental method, of which we read so much in these pages, do not mitigate the purely conceptual nature of scientific constructions. For we can hardly be expected to follow Dr Russell in his extraordinary application of the term " concept " to particular things, like a table, directly observable by sense (p. 6). Where the theory of knowledge is concerned, Mr Macmurray moves with a surer step than his collaborators. But is he justified in his refusal to allow that faith is in any respect a form of knowledge ? We agree that faith, in science as in religion, implies a practical attitude of will (p. 30), and that the revelation of the mystical vision stands in need of definition and verification. Yet these obvious admissions do not exclude the attribution of theoretical value to faith. When Mr Macmurray speaks of belief as "the raw material of knowledge" (p. 34), and of rational activity as governed by deliberate ideals (p. 23), his language suggests the sounder view that reason is a wider term than reasoning, and that faith, far from falling outside the sphere of knowledge, is an integral factor in its structure. It is not easy, again, to harmonise the contrast, conceived on Kantian lines, between knowledge of what is and the expectation of what ought to be (p. 42), with the contention of Essay V. that religion claims objective truth and that God, the ideal personality, is a God who veritably exists. Mr Macmurray holds that action is not merely the originating impulse to knowledge, but lies beyond knowledge as its goal (p. 45), and appeals (p. 36) to Kant's doctrine of the primacy of the practical over the speculative reason. But for Kant practical reason is reason still, and the knowledge of faith, despite its difference from that of scientific reasoning, is knowledge of a moral order that is also real.

The ethical problem is handled by Dr Streeter in three papers, gathered together under the heading of *Moral Adventure* (Essay III.). The first of these, *In Search of a Morality*, points away from the traditional code that is based on taboos and fear to an ethical reconstruction resting, not upon certainties—"Science is averse to certainties" (p. 63)—, but upon experiment and adventure. For this enterprise inspiration is to be sought, not in Nietzsche—for the passion for power is negative apart from directive purpose—, nor in Mr Havelock Ellis—for ethics is a science and not merely an art of life conceived in the light of sex-psychology—, but in the Person of Christ. "Content is given to a summons to adventure by giving it direction. Mr Havelock Ellis does this by taking beauty as the goal; the end of the adventure is to make of life a poem or a dance. Christ does this by making its inspiring motive the love of God and man" (p. 69). The second paper, entitled *Code and Experiment*, considers the function of the existing moral code in relation to experimental reconstruction. The code forms the organising principle of a society, analogous to the body of organised knowledge that serves as a provisional basis for experiment in the sciences. The current code is "not an ideal of conduct, but merely that approximation to the ideal which it is practicable for the time being to enforce" (p. 74). For morality, as an affair of the spirit, motive is fundamental; and respect for the code is conditioned by the recognised obligation to reform it. In the third paper, on *The Ethics of Sex*, Dr Streeter applies this conception of moral duty as an adventure to a special group of problems. He is seen here at his very best. The vexed questions of sex-relationship are discussed with an openness of mind and a large tolerance that make the argument singularly persuasive. No young inquirer, beset by the practical urgency of the problems, can fail to recognise that here is one who understands his difficulties and is ready to consider any proffered solution on its real merits.

Mrs Bertrand Russell's views are set forth dispassionately as a live hypothesis, and rejected by a criticism all the more convincing because of its entire freedom from conventional prejudice. Dr Streeter is never shocked by any deviation, in theory or in practice, from the accepted code. He argues to orthodox conclusions in an unorthodox style. Above all, his idealism is tempered by a rare sanity of outlook. "Plain sense upon the marriage-question is my demand upon men and women for the stopping of many a tragedy." The words are those of Dr Middleton in *The Egoist;* and Dr Middleton, for all his learning, can hardly be reckoned among the children of light. Worldly wisdom, when it walks in blinkers, becomes futile and sententious, a proper object for Meredith's Comic Spirit. But in Dr Streeter sobriety of judgment is throughout illumined by a spiritual vision. It is this which carries conviction in his discussion of the problem. Our only doubt is whether the introduction of psychological terminology materially assists his exposition. "Self-love" is surely a simpler and more telling phrase than "the neurosis called Narcissism" (p. 61). Dr Streeter seems to take the work of recent psychologists a little too seriously, at any rate so far as its bearings on religion and ethics are concerned. Or are his excursions into this field to be written off, as Lamb said of Coleridge's metaphysics, as "only his fun"? However this may be, Dr Streeter is deeply in earnest in his assurance of the abiding vitality of the Christian ideal of marriage. What the world needs is "not a new code, but a new vision" (p. 120). And when we catch a glimpse of the new vision, we find it to be a new vision of the age-long Gospel of Christ. Dr Streeter closes his moving reference to the tragedy of the unmarried woman, debarred from satisfaction of her desire for motherhood, with an appeal to the story of the Cross. Here "is the way of high adventure," by which Christ was enabled "to effect the moral re-creation of man. . . . That pain can be made creative is the secret of Christianity. . . . One thing is sure—if we must be pierced with thorns, it is more kingly to wear them as a crown" (pp. 129, 130).

The vindication of the spirit of adventure in these essays is inspired by an honesty of thought and purpose in the writers that cannot fail to leave a deep impression on the reader. He may feel some perplexity as to the reconciliation of their view that religion is an experimental enterprise with the claim of religious knowledge to truth. The nearest approach to an answer is to be found in the two discussions (Essays IV. and V.) of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. Is it final? asks Dr Streeter; is it objective? asks Mr Macmurray; and both writers suggest affirmative answers to their questions. Dr Streeter reaches the conclusion that the message of Jesus as Son of God possesses a finality that is not simply final, "a finality more than compatible with evolution; for it sees history as a revelation of the love of God, which culminates in the Cross only because that is the initiative act of a moral re-creation, of which the full glory will not be evident till the kingdom of God shall come" (p. 174). The clue is furnished by the thought that our knowledge of God in Christ is apprehension, indeed, of certain truth, yet an apprehension which, by its failure to comprehend the full import of the reality, gives scope for an unending adventure of the spirit. The thought is left undeveloped, and is hardly consistent with some of the more pragmatist statements in these essays. We trust that the writers, if they continue their joint meetings, will grapple with the problem of the validity of religious knowledge more thoroughly than has been possible within the limits of the present volume.

W. G. DE BURGH.

UNIVERSITY OF READING.

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*The World as an Organic Whole.* By N. O. Lossky. Translated by N. A. Duddington, M.A.—Oxford: University Press.—10*s.* net.—Pp. 199.

DR LOSSKY was Professor of Philosophy at Petrograd till he was expelled by the Soviet Government. He now holds the same position at Prague. My first introduction to his writings was through the *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, which published last year an article by him on "The Limits of Evolution." This article, which contained a whole philosophy in outline, seemed to me a very notable contribution to theistic apologetics. Evolution he treats as a particular instance of change in many elements of nature that interact with one another and with the world as a whole. But the evolutionary process cannot create the conditions of its own possibility. Change cannot exist except in relation to the unchangeable. Change and the unchangeable must be connected in actual reality. Substance is timeless and therefore unchangeable. The self is a concretely-ideal entity which is super-temporal. The super-temporal agent is capable of purposive activity. There is an essential wholeness in the world, in virtue of which there is a sympathy, in the Stoic and Neoplatonic sense, between all the parts. Through interaction several agents acting together may be raised to a higher level—a view which resembles Lloyd Morgan's "emergent evolution." But the source of the world's interrelatedness can only be thought of as a principle which is super-relational and incommensurable with the world—God. For the sympathy which pervades nature cannot have been created by evolution; it is rooted in the fact that an agent is immanent in all other agents and is not shut up within itself. There are no impenetrable and windowless monads, as Leibniz believed. The existence of God is the condition of there being a system of agents immanent in and yet independent of each other. God cannot be a product of evolution. Since agents are free, there may be badly-chosen paths of evolution; there may be regress; there may be a real development in evil.

These theses are further developed in the book before us. It was natural that I should have been greatly attracted by the article in the *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, for Professor Lossky has now made it clear that his philosophy is unadulterated Neoplatonism, and that he understands Plotinus, whom he calls " one of the greatest thinkers of all time," precisely as I do, though he does not seem to have read my book. The following *résumé* will show how closely he has followed his teacher.

It is the whole that exists primarily; the elements can come into being only within the system of the whole. Unless the world is an organic whole, it is not knowable. Temporal sequence is, as such, non-temporal, and spatial interconnectedness is non-spatial. Relations are the non-spatial and non-temporal elements in a concrete whole. But since relations cannot exist apart from the elements which they relate, we must find some third principle which transcends both real and abstract ideal being—a knowing subject, which can perceive changes in time because he stands outside the time-process. Ideas are non-temporal, and therefore in ceasing to be present to our consciousness they do not recede into the past. The world as a whole, including material nature, is the work of Spirit. The conception of substance has come to the front once more, but substance regarded as a concretely ideal entity. Partial systems are subordinated to wider systems, till the all-embracing system is reached. The whole exhibits connectedness, rationality, logos.

The Absolute is the creator of a cosmic kingdom characterised by the highest unity and by perfect harmony; all its members, living the life of their one centre, live not only in and for it, but also in and for each other. (Here the influence of Plotinus is obvious.) Conflicting opposition belongs only to the finite. Lossky points out that the approach to God by immediate contemplation is essentially akin to the ontological argument. The self-evidence of the presence of God in consciousness is indeed the valid form of this argument. Plurality in the Kingdom of God (ἐκεῖ) is conditioned only by the distractions between its members. There is no mutual exclusion where each part exists for the whole and the whole for each part. It is a wholly perfect organism. " Plotinus called this highest form of being Νοῦς. We shall call it Spirit." (I hope this word, for which I pleaded, will establish itself as by far the best English equivalent.) " The space which is characteristic of the Kingdom of the Spirit has an infinite number of dimensions." " The Kingdom of the Spirit is confronted with the task of acquiring greater and greater fullness of being . . . by drawing nearer to its goal in an infinite temporal process of change." This is not Plotinian, and appears to admit space and time into the eternal world. Whether this conception belongs consistently to the philosophy seems to me rather doubtful, though Plotinus has much the same inspiring thought of never-ending progress. The soul is ἀεὶ τυγχάνουδα καὶ ἀεὶ ἐφιεμένη. Also, κακεῖ βαδιστέον τὴν ἄνω πορείαν. But he would not admit progress in the κόσμος νοητός as a whole.

The realm of Psyche (in Plotinus) he calls " the kingdom of enmity " (Bosanquet's " world of claims and counter-claims "). " Not a single material process—repulsion, movement, etc.—can be said to be purely material: every such process is either psycho-material or at any rate psychoido-material." They all depend on "the higher substantival agent which from the point of view of these entities is the supreme world-substance." "The Logos is an aspect of the Kingdom of the Spirit abiding in the midst of the realm of hostility and making its activities possible." Lossky is even not afraid to follow Plotinus in admitting the possibility of "magical influence." "The relativity of existence necessarily involves the absolute character of values." Existence is relative; values are absolute.

Those who are attracted by the Platonic tradition in its later developments will find this book extremely interesting. It is unusual to find a thinker of the first rank adopting without reservation the entire hierarchy of existences, the doctrine of sympathies, of the Absolute and of matter, as these were laid down by the great thinker of the third century. The theory of spiritual time and place deserves further consideration.

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*The Analysis of Matter*. By Bertrand Russell. International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.—London: Kegan Paul, 1927.—Pp. viii + 408.—21*s*. net.

*An Outline of Philosophy*. By Bertrand Russell.—London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1927.—Pp. vi + 317.—12*s*. 6*d*. net.

The subject-matter of these two books overlaps to a considerable extent, but there is a difference in the method of approach. The first is a discussion of "the philosophical outcome of modern physics," and its main problem is so to interpret physics and perception that the gulf between them shall be bridged. In the second book Mr Russell is primarily concerned to arrive at "a scientific view as to what constitutes knowledge." Since his conception of knowledge determines the nature of his attempt to bridge the gulf, the second treatment throws some light upon the conclusions reached by the first. In both books Mr Russell is concerned with the problem of our knowledge of the external world, and consequently with the problem of the validity of physics.

As in his *Lowell Lectures* of 1914, so now, Mr Russell is concerned to find an indubitable "hard" datum upon the basis of which the external world can be constructed. He attempts to combine Descartes' method of philosophic doubt with a behaviouristic approach to the problem of knowledge. Mr Russell's philosophical views have been developed by successive applications of Occam's razor to cut away hypothetical entities that were formerly assumed by Mr Russell to be constituents of the universe. That useful instrument is scarcely mentioned in these books, but the operation seems now to have been completed. The only hard "data" that remain are what Mr Russell now calls "percepts." In spite of all that he says about them, it is not at all easy to discover exactly what "percepts" are. Some passages suggest that "percepts" are what he formerly called "sense-data," but doubtless the change of name is significant. In the *Analysis* (p. 257) percepts are said to be "patches of colour, noises, smells, hardnesses, etc., as well as perceived spatial relations." Relations between percepts, *e.g. difference*, may be a percept. In the *Outline* what is stressed is "that percepts are what we can know with the most certainty; and that percepts contain what naïve realism thinks it knows about the world" (p. 143). A percept is discovered by what Mr Russell calls "self-observation," *i.e.* introspection. Hence, percepts are private. Yet percepts are the sole data for physics. Hence, "the facts of physics, like those of psychology, are obtained by what is really self-observation, although common sense mistakenly supposes that it is observation of external objects" (*Outline*, p. 180). Thus he agrees with the behaviourists in maintaining that all facts are known by the same method; there is no method peculiar to psychology. He differs from them, however, in holding that the method of psychology, viz. self-observation, is the method of physics. Accordingly, he is faced with the peculiarly difficult problem of getting outside the circle of his own percepts. It would seem that he must take refuge in solipsism. There is one passage (*Outline*, p. 302) where Mr Russell seems almost to admit that this conclusion is inevitable. But his robust sense of reality is too much for him; he cannot *believe* what Santayana has called a "solipsism of the present moment." Moreover, he cannot bring himself to doubt the existence of other philosophers. Consequently, trusting to the validity of induction, he enlarges his universe by the admission of (*a*) unperceived events which are such that they would be his percepts were he suitably placed to perceive them; (*b*) other percipients whose percepts have more or less resemblance to his own. He admits that these inferences are precarious, but they must be admitted *if physics is to be regarded as valid.* And physics must be regarded as valid, for if it were not we should know nothing about the external world. But, if we know nothing about the external world, we are reduced to a barren scepticism or an unbelievable solipsism. Moreover, the whole purpose of Mr Russell's inquiry is to establish a connection between physics and perception. Hence, the validity of physics appears as a datum. Mr Russell admits that all scientific knowledge rests upon induction, but he is content to leave the problem of its validity to others. He does not pause to consider whether this problem could be solved without assumptions that would destroy the validity of his own procedure. It is the acceptance of induction that makes it possible for him to maintain a causal theory of perception. He desires to make his percepts continuous with the events of the physical world. He traces the chain of events that proceed from a physical object to the brain and finds that our percepts "come at the end of a chain of physical events leading spatially from the object to the brain of the percipient." Hence, from the standpoint of physics, our percepts are in our heads. Our percepts are, however, the indubitable, "hard" data of which we are in search. Hence, what we know most certainly is an event in our brains. What we observe is not at all what we suppose it to be. The percept is not of course *perceived* in our brains; it is perceived "out there" in perceptual space. Still, it is apparently *known* to be an event in our brains, for we know what physics tells us. When, however, we ask what is it that we know by means of physics, the answer is that we know the *structure* of events. Physics can give us knowledge only of very abstract, mathematical properties. If we attempt to supplement the abstract account given by physics, we shall have to say that a physical event is qualitatively like a percept, *e.g.* a patch of red. But in dealing with physical events, Mr Russell insists that only the structural properties of events can be inferred. Hence, when we infer to unperceived physical events, we have no right to regard them as *percepts*, *i.e.* as qualitatively like a percept in our heads. Yet, unless we can so infer, we are reduced to solipsism.

The difficulty arises from Mr Russell's belief that a percept is private. Unless it were private, Mr Russell would not be convinced that it was a "hard" datum. But he is not able consistently to regard it as such. For example, in his complicated argument for "an external cause of perception," he says, "a number of people sitting near each other can all draw what they see, and can compare the resulting pictures; there will be similarities and differences" (*Analysis*, p. 207). It is difficult to see the point of this argument unless the comparison is of something public. Nor does it seem possible to maintain that *before* I have conceived the possibility of other percipients, there is anything in my "private" percepts to suggest them. Mr Russell's argument from analogy is as unconvincing as Berkeley's. The privacy of percepts, so far from being a "hard" datum, appears to be the result of a complicated inference derived from physical considerations. The difficulty of convincing the plain man that his percepts are private has some relevance. If Mr Russell were to say that the plain man's assumption is the result of language, and is, therefore, a social phenomenon which results from a crude metaphysics, he would still have to admit the fact of this social influence, and would thus be led to assume a plurality of percipients. Mr Russell seems to resemble the philosopher who "professed to be a solipsist, but was surprised that there were no others" (*Outline*, p. 302).

Moreover, Mr Russell's definition of knowledge, in Chapter VIII of the *Outline*, assumes that from the first we know external objects, that knowledge consists in reacting, more or less adequately, to a stimulus. It is his behaviouristic approach to knowledge that saves him from solipsism. Yet this account of knowledge is inconsistent with the view that what we know most certainly is a private percept, which is an event in our own heads. There is a further difficulty in Mr Russell's attempt to connect perception and physics. The connection involves causal inference. But causal connection cannot be reduced to mere structural relations. Hence, it seems that we must know directly and certainly not only the quality of percepts but also the nature of causal connectedness.

Within the limits of this short notice it is not possible to refer to the many other important topics discussed by Mr Russell in these two books. *The Analysis of Matter* contains a comprehensive and critical account of the present position of mathematical physics; there is also some important criticism of Professor Whitehead's interpretation of relativity physics. The *Outline* is intended to provide a survey of philosophical problems. Consequently, Mr Russell devotes a perfunctory chapter to ethics, although he does not regard it as properly a branch of philosophy. There is an amusing chapter on "Great Philosophies of the Past," and a concluding chapter on "Man's Place in the Universe," which allows Mr Russell scope for some moral reflections. But the central problem of both books is the problem of knowledge and the validity of physics.

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*Natur und Seele*. By Edgar Dacqué.—München und Berlin, Oldenburg.—2nd edition, 1927.

DR F. C. S. SCHILLER[1] wrote a quarter of a century ago, "new worlds may be discovered, not by physical transportation, but by psychical transformation." Is there any justification for this belief? Modern physical theory makes it not only credible, but obvious. But is there any practical evidence? In a recent number of the *Fortnightly* Mrs Rosita Forbes told of experiences in her world travels, and among them of having come across Mohammedans in Africa who had made the "spiritual pilgrimage" to Mecca. As a result of a severe discipline, she reports, they were able to leave their bodies (the body in each case remaining in a collapsed condition meanwhile), and in due course to resume them, and then to give particulars of what they had witnessed on the way to and at Mecca—particulars which were presently verified as having been true, and true only of that pilgrimage. This is, of course, but a recent case of phenomena to which there are many parallels.

In the book under review Edgar Dacqué, till recently a professor at one of the German universities, points out that no object is static, but every object is in constant change. Moreover, it is in reciprocal relation with the surrounding universe, which, of course, is also in constant change. A stone, for example, regarded as something that has become and is becoming, is integrally part of the universe. Everything is, as it were, its own epitome of the history of its reactions to the rest of the universe, and is continuing to epitomise its reactions to the rest of the universe. A crystal grows; some of the substance of its own kind outside it is in such a form that it can be attracted to it and take the form characteristic of it. Where does that form come from? Where is the pattern? If it is in "lines of force," evidently there is a prearranged harmony; there is an organisation of forces which is made manifest.

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[1] In *Personal Idealism*.

In *The Times Literary Supplement* for January 5, 1928, a reviewer wrote: "Some students are even doubting if Bacon's 'subtile perceptions' and 'universal appetites and passions of matter' are quite so ridiculous as was supposed. It may indeed be wondered whether it was sound to divest so completely of 'mind' those particles—electric or other—which are supposed to make up the perceptible universe and constitute the units of the physical sciences." Professor Julian Huxley entertains the belief that to every physical entity there is a psychic counterpart. This doctrine was put forward by Wundt in 1896, and often enough by philosophers in the past.

The doctrine that of everything that appears physically there is "laid up" a plan emerges in the history of thought in Plato. In the Hermetic writings it is written: "The forms which are seen not only in the bodies of living beings but also in those of lifeless things are incorporeal. Incorporeal things are reflected in bodies, and the intelligible kosmos is reflected in the sensible kosmos."[1] The recent development of psychology in Germany which is called "form psychology" teaches that the recognition of the similarity of forms with the same principle of structure, even forms perceived by different senses, shows that there is a symmetry or equilibrium within us answering to a symmetry or equilibrium in the physical world. Mathematical physics, as represented by Professor Eddington, reports that the external world is, at least very largely, our own creation; that it is even possible that we can experience nothing but what we have created, and that the greatest of our mental creations is the material universe itself. Professor Graham Kerr maintains[2] that the universal vision of the universe as colour is illusion, that in fact the universe is dark waves of ether. He says that we happen to have a particular type of sense-organ, the ear, tuned to catch an insignificant little proportion of the pulses of matter, and out of these we make the world of sound, whereas science shows that the universe is actually a universe of eternal silence. Which means, of course, that all the wealth of colour and sound is the product of mind. Living beings of common ancestry have common powers of "perception."

Professor Dacqué suggests that the psychical and the physical are parallel manifestations of the metaphysical. Plato, he reminds us, called the supra-sensual the world of Ideas; Kant, the world of things-in-themselves; Schopenhauer, the world of the unconscious will or desire; Hartmann, the world of the Unconscious. If evolution be a continuum, there is no break between life and "matter." At our stage in evolution mind is inalienable. Is it not inalienable from matter?

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[1] *Hermetica*, ed. W. Scott, p. 273.

[2] Presidential Address to the Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow, 1924.

In the world of living beings the argument that mind can dominate matter is surely not difficult. There is a little sea-crab that settles on brown, green and otherwise-coloured algæ. The individual crabs have the same colour as that of the alga on which they move. If they are removed, they seek algæ-threads of the same colour as that of their own body. If such crabs are brought into an aquarium in which there are algæ of only one colour, the crabs of that colour pass quickly to them; the others search, and as they cannot find algæ of their own colour, they, under pressure of necessity, settle on the algæ of the only colour there is, and in the course of a few hours they acquire the colour of the algæ. If their eye is blinded, this change does not take place. If one allows a frog egg to develop to the gastrula stage and then divides it, there develops out of each part not a half-frog, but a smaller whole frog. If a worm is cut in two, it can, out of the two separate halves, reproduce the whole.

In the study of the cell it is found that it is not physical constitution but organisation, the power to form structure, that is characteristic. Experiments have shown that the developing cells of an animal, if their conditions are changed, can change their whole function. Cells that were to have formed skin produce spinal cord; those that would have produced eyes may form mid-brain or skin or ear. The same sort of "genes" may produce entirely different results. Behind every living thing there is a plan of the whole. More than this, it is certain that there are developments of form that do not appear fully in one individual or even one generation, but only in the course of generations.

Now the sole point at which we can have experience of how forms emerge is in ourselves. Every development of human capacity is produced by desire, no matter how unconscious. This sets in motion a zone of energies. With repeated effort the powers grow or the exercised muscle develops. This is "magic," although hidden from us through familiarity. It is due to a "miracle." A miracle, says Mr Shaw, is that which creates faith. You desire. You have faith that you can do a thing when you have enough to go on to get you going in the faith that you can. You will what you thus imagine; and at last you create what you will. These processes may become unconscious, but they continue to operate. Baudouin is representative of modern psychology which teaches that changes which take place in us are due to auto-suggestion, *i.e.* to the operation of our own will or desire. A man of evil will, for example, may in the course of time acquire a facial expression of this evil will, and all fine-feeling natures that come in contact with him immediately are aware of it. As Bacon said, the power of the imaginant is first upon the body of the imaginant and then upon the spirits of men. Suggestion or hypnotism can alter the world of a man.

Now, if everything has its psychic side, the universe is an interaction, not merely of physical bodies, but also of the psychic side of these bodies. Surely there is sufficient evidence that living beings can be sensitive to the psychic side of things, and it is evident that psychic experiences may be attached to things. Power to act from the psychic side is evidently and naturally to be developed by intense and protracted discipline. In the light of all this, it may be suggested that in future, discipline of psychological powers may take the place of mere domination of nature from without. As it is possible from the psychic side to alter the physical in one's own body, and, by suggestion to another mind, to alter its physical world, so it may be that this kind of power may be extended into the world of animals, plants, and even the world that we now know as "inanimate."

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*Harriet Martineau: An Essay in Comprehension.* By Theodora Bosanquet.—London: Etchells and Macdonald, 1927.—Pp. xi + 256.—15*s*.

This is a brilliant and amusing book, one of the school of Mr Lytton Strachey, with whom, to judge by this specimen, Miss Bosanquet need have no fear to match herself. A woman, indeed, who can write sufficiently well—and Miss Bosanquet writes admirably—is really better qualified than most men to do this sort of thing, for she has a keener social sense, a sharper *flair* for personal weaknesses and oddities, and, while fully aware of the real worth and weight of her subject, can carry it more lightly and write with just the spice of malice and the laughing tone which make the picture irresistible. It is, of course, precisely the spirit in which the younger generation of to-day treat their venerable elders, and the elders, who are not also ill-tempered pessimists, must hold it on the whole to be a wholesome, though incomplete, method. It introduces us to the great of an earlier generation as being faulty, like ourselves, and often full of vanity, in any case not at all so great as they were then thought to be. In the extreme case—Mr Strachey's picture of Dr Arnold, for instance—one revolts. One feels that no one who had so much influence over his contemporaries could have been so preposterous. Miss Bosanquet's book is not a caricature of that sort; it would rather take its place beside Mr Strachey's *Florence Nightingale*, as a fair, interesting and appreciative personal portrait, but without much consideration of the wider issues or any dwelling on the extraordinary qualities of her subject, or the contributions to history which these qualities made possible. Miss Bosanquet recognises these qualities, and, quoting from Catherine Sedgwick, one of Harriet Martineau's hostesses in the United States, gives on a page in the middle of the book two of her highest merits. Her strength lay in the fact that "her spirit and influence have been in harmony with the spirit of the age—because she has gone with the current." And as part of this "going with the current," she "stands out, above all women contemporary writers, in single-minded devotion to the material and moral welfare of the labouring classes." The industry, the promptness, the memory, the keen argumentativeness, are all valuable only as means to that end, and the superficial faults, the conceit, the over-talkativeness, the imperiousness in later life about personal details, are all to be forgiven, or even admired, as incidental to the evolution of a character placed in that position and doing that unique social and philosophical work. Who thinks any worse of his grandmother or of Queen Victoria because she had strong opinions and plenty to say, or because she liked to lay down the rule about our manners or dress?

Miss Bosanquet is well aware of the comprehensive and extraordinary range of Harriet Martineau's work, and just in her estimate of her influence. It is unnecessary here to go over the general ground again, seeing that it was dealt with in an article in this review for October last year. It is better worth while to notice a few of the many contentious points which naturally arose about the career of so vigorous and opinionative a person. On the question of Harriet's relations to her mother, one is inclined to lean rather more towards the daughter than Miss Bosanquet seems to do. Harriet never failed in care, respect and affection, and the task of looking after two old ladies in London, who could not fully enter into her life, while at the same time she was carrying on a strenuous literary and social career, seemed to the present reviewer, when he first read about it, one of the most creditable and remarkable feats in a heroic life. And so, when one reads that "disease was worth more to her than health at the price of her mother's company, and disease gave her in addition a heightened consideration which she might have missed since her return from America," there is a sense of a little less than kindness in the judgment.

On the question of the breach with James, one is glad to see that Miss Bosanquet sympathises strongly with her subject. When one reads the actual words of the review which did the mischief, and remembers that it was quite voluntarily undertaken by a brother to whom she had been passionately and respectfully attached, one cannot but share her own indignation and that of her nearest friends; and the formal and inconclusive arguments by which the brother afterwards justified it seem to make the offence still worse.

On the medical controversy, one's judgment will be more balanced. There is evidently no doubt, on the one hand, that the "mesmeric" treatment had a real and lasting effect. It may well be doubted if she would have survived so long without the stimulus which it gave her. On the other hand, the medical report makes it clear that Harriet was mistaken in believing that she suffered from heart disease. The post-mortem examination revealed an abdominal tumour, which might quite well have been removed at an early stage. In these days it would have been, at once and without question. But her own diagnosis was one of the dear personal beliefs to which she clung all through the thirty years of life which succeeded her "cure."

On the whole, in spite of—or in consequence of?—her playful wit, Miss Bosanquet leaves us with a higher opinion of Miss Martineau than we had before. And is not this the chief object to be gained by any biographies worth writing? The vigorous kindness shown to individuals, besides the general sympathy with the human race, the actual help to the Carlyles, the encouragement to Browning, the care and the reciprocal devotion of relatives and all dependents, the passionate attachment of the intimate and sympathetic few—all these things are well brought out in this *Essay in Comprehension*, and the more we comprehend its subject, the more we shall wonder and respect.

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*The Story of My Life.* By Rudolph Steiner. Authorised Translation. Edited by H. Collison.—London: Anthroposophical Publishing Co., 1928.—Pp. 340.—10*s.* net.

This is a very difficult book to judge fairly, so intricate appears the combination of acuteness and vagueness, of ability and absurdity, of genuine unselfish effort and of something that comes perilously near charlatanism.

The interest for the general reader of the Hibbert will lie in Steiner's obvious and persistent desire to attain and maintain a spiritual view of the universe which shall at the same time never lose touch with the methods of science and the convictions of art. It is another question whether he really carried through his purpose, or whether he was always true to it. In the earlier part of the book, and before he begins to hint at endless quarrels and misunderstandings, he has a great deal to say which is of real interest. As a young student, largely self-taught, he was almost equally repelled by the systems which limited man to a knowledge of mere phenomena and by those which took scant account, if any, of ordinary appearance, and sought for spiritual sustenance only in something that lay beyond or behind it. Again, he was keenly aware of man's own activity in thought, and any theory that obscured this was bound to be distasteful, while on the other hand he could not be satisfied with any doctrine that did not make room for the value of impressions brought to man through his senses. Thus it was only natural that he should be strongly attracted by Goethe. For the leading characteristic of Goethe as a thinker is the search for the spiritual in and through what is offered to the senses. When Goethe conceived his "typical plant," of which all plants, past, present and possible were modifications, he believed that he had reached, through the activity of thought, to a principle which itself was active in the world beyond his thought, and which made luminous to him and to other observers the individual plants manifested to their senses. This principle is more than any one of its manifestations, but it can be recognised in them all, and when we recognise it we understand the plant in a way which is quite impossible if we look only on the separate parts as disconnected with each other and with the rest of the world. Similarly with beauty. Beauty can only be perceived by us through an activity of our own spirit, but it is more than our own spirit, and it makes itself manifest through our senses. Yet it is always more than any of its manifestations.

All this follows directly the lines struck out by Goethe and Schiller and the Hegelians, but Steiner goes on to something else. Why should it not be possible, he asks, to enter into further relations with this "something" perceived in all phenomena but more than all phenomena, relations which, after the training given by the senses, may become independent of the senses? It is impossible for the lover of religion not to sympathise with this desire, but it is ill to ignore the dangers. This way lies what Goethe would have symbolised by "magic," the attempt to reach an emotional experience regardless of conditions laid down by the nature of things. Steiner would have replied that he was not so regardless, and that all men could attain the direct experience of the spiritual world which he asserts has been his if they submitted to the appropriate discipline. The critic retorts that he does not believe this, that, in fact, he considers many of Steiner's "intuitions" about this world nothing more than fantastic vapourings; for example, the "imparting" of the supposed "fact" that "the etheric body of a man is female and the etheric body of a woman male" (p. 334). Who is to decide?

Here we come on the difficulty that dogs both the theory and the practice of mysticism. In science there is always the appeal to observation and experiment and deduction from admitted premises. Is it possible to substitute a real equivalent for these along the mystic way? To deny the possibility would be a rash counsel of despair. And those will be the last to advocate it who are rightly impressed by the accounts that poets such as Wordsworth give of their strange experiences "when the light of sense goes out," not to speak of what the religious mystics have said and countless humbler individuals have felt in their degree when they pray or look at the stars. But those who have the most reverence for the great mystics will remember what McTaggart, a man who had mystical experiences himself, wrote in one of his early books, "a mysticism that ignores the claims of the understanding is doomed." To quote another Cambridge writer, "there is only one method of knowledge, direct perception and valid inference from such perception." It would follow from this, that so long as it is impossible to show that any given "intuition" is involved in ordinary thought (as Hegel, for example, believed he could show of many), and so long as the intuition is not shared by other reasonable beings, so long a certain measure of doubt must attach to it.

It does not, however, follow that these "intuitions" are valueless. They may be of the greatest value, only he who has them should not speak of them as though they were certain in the way that sense-impressions common to all the world are certain, or as the deductions of science are certain when confirmed by observation. They may be more important for him, and he may be more than justified in staking his life on their truth, but that is not the same thing. And this is exactly what Steiner does not seem to recognise at all. He seems to think people ought to accept at their face value his statements about the unseen world simply on the faith that he is speaking the truth. But any modern prophet, if he even comes near claiming infallibility, discredits his own mission. It is not surprising that there has been controversy about Steiner, when so much in his writing is repellent. Still, all deductions made, there is real value in the way he insists on the spiritual element in ordinary knowledge and the activities of art, and also in his effort to keep the path open for further and stranger experiences that may come to human consciousness.

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LONDON.

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*Johannes und die Synoptiker*. By Professor Hans Windisch.—Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1926.—Pp. vi. + 189.

*Die Absolutheit des Johannesevangeliums*. By Professor Hans Windisch. Sonderdruck aus der *Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie*.—Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1927.—Pp. 54.

THE lucidity of the writings of Professor H. Windisch of Leiden, and the wide range of his knowledge, have frequently been acknowledged in recent years by British scholars familiar with his essay on the Lukan Tradition in the second volume of *The Beginnings of Christianity*. During the last few years his attention has been devoted to the thorny questions associated with the Fourth Gospel, and in *Johannes und die Synoptiker* he has given us a work of the greatest importance and value. Despite its great boldness of statement, the characteristic notes of the book are its constructive purpose, the objectivity of its method, and a rich suggestiveness of treatment prompting trains of fruitful reflection. It is safe to say that the relation of the Fourth Gospel to the Synoptics has nowhere else been discussed so adequately and completely.

Did the Evangelist write in complete independence of the Synoptics, or was his purpose to supplement or to elucidate them, or did he desire to supersede them by a work better suited to the special needs of his day? The answer is bound to react on our views regarding the character of the Gospel, the mind of the Evangelist, and the value of his Christology.

Professor Windisch dismisses the independence theory on the ground that the Evangelist knows and uses the Synoptics (Mark certainly, and probably Luke and Matthew as well); that he is not an eye-witness, and that, apart from a layer of good non-Synoptic tradition, his discourse- and narrative- traditions are idealised representations, prompted by quite definite theological and religious ideas. Substantially, the Gospel is a unity; there are signs of another hand in i. 15, ii. 17, v. 28f., vi. 39b, 40b, 44b, vii. 39 (?), xix. 35, xxi. 24; but in other cases the addenda are to be traced to the Evangelist himself. In a more recent essay *Die fünf johanneischen Parakletsprüche* (*Festgabe für Adolf Jülicher*, 1927), Professor Windisch has argued that xiv. 15–17, 25f. xv. 26f. xvi. 5–11, 12–15, are the Evangelist's additions to the original Farewell-discourse.

A much fuller discussion is given to the supplementary theory, current in the Church at least from the days of the Alogi. Here the relevant data are examined in great detail: (1) The Composition of the Fourth Gospel, as illustrated in iii. 24 (John not yet in prison), the journey-scheme, the account of the Supper, and the Passion; (2) the character of the "Synoptic" narratives in John; (3) the alleged allusions to Synoptic stories; (4) the omission of Synoptic narratives; (5) the bearing of the summary statements in xx. 30f. and xxi. 25 (whether the latter is by the Evangelist, or by some one who correctly divined his purpose). All these paths are held to converge on one goal—the view that the Gospel is "autonomous and sufficient," that it is intended neither to supplement the older Gospels, nor to be supplemented by them, but rather to crowd them out (*verdrängen*) and take their place in Christian usage. In *Die Absolutheit des Johannesevangeliums* these arguments are still more compactly stated, greater prominence is given to the one-Gospel principle in early Christianity, and the reader has the advantage of weighing Windisch's reply to the criticisms of Fr. Büchsel (*Zeitschr. f. syst. Theol., IV*, 2, pp. 240–265). Whatever may be the value of Professor Windisch's more positive contention, it is not too much to say that in his hands the supplementary theory has received a shattering blow from which it does not seem possible that it can ever recover.

The view that the fourth Gospel was written to elucidate the Synoptic teaching receives less attention, but is dismissed with equal decision. The theory is but a half-way house: the Fourth Gospel does not distinguish between difficult and elementary commands, and its teaching is for all. It is "a commentary without a text or a commentary which seeks to crowd out the text."

Perhaps the most important part of the discussion, certainly the most fascinating part, is the treatment of the psychological aspects of the Evangelist's procedure. The basis of his authority in the status of an Apostolic eye-witness is rejected as "impossible." In part the explanation lies in the Evangelist's possession of a better layer of non-Synoptic tradition—an intriguing statement one would like to see more fully discussed. But the more important consideration is the Evangelist's consciousness of being the bearer of a definite type of ecclesiastical teaching mediated by the Spirit. Actual steps are visible in the Johannine writings which illustrate the way in which the Evangelist places his own inspired conceptions into the lips of the historical Jesus—1 John iv. 16 (God is love), 1 John i. 5 (God is light), and John iv. 24 (God is spirit). In the last case the "teacher"

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has become the "evangelist," the witness of the preaching of the (historical) Lord. The transition to the first person is influenced by Synoptic "I-words" like Matt. xxviii. 18–20, and by parallels in the Apocalypse, and is illustrated by kindred processes in the Odes of Solomon and the Mandæan texts. Windisch rejects Bultmann's contention that the Johannine Christianity represents an earlier type than the Synoptic, and also the view of Delafosse that the Fourth Gospel is a "catholised" version of an originally Marcionite document, but he stresses the Gnostic-Marcionite tendencies in John, and the writer's intention to provide the liturgical Gospel which henceforward should serve the needs of Christian worship. The whole material is immersed in a cult atmosphere; but the deepest origin of the Evangelist's creative work is to be found in his personal piety, his consciousness of standing in contact with the Spirit and through Him with the Risen Christ. It is out of this experience that he receives his impulse to write a normative, one can almost say, a canonical book.

Professor Windisch succeeds, I think, in proving the inadequacy of existing theories regarding the relation of John to the Synoptics, and in showing that the Fourth Gospel was written with a sovereign hand to provide a Gospel-work more suited to the religious needs of the time. Whether the Evangelist wished the Church to adopt the *exclusive* use of his Gospel is more open to question, and, in the absence of derogatory references to the older Gospels (surely more than a sign of the Evangelist's good taste), may well be doubted. The more ultimate question is how far, and under what conditions, the Johannine and Synoptic teaching can be combined. It would seem that Professor Windisch expects little from such a task (cf. *Die Absol. d. J.*, pp. 45–7), and certainly the patchwork criticism of the past is not encouraging. But the question for to-day, provoked—I would suggest—by the work of Professor Windisch himself, is whether a bold adoption of the *formgeschichtliche Methode* as applied to the Synoptics may not open a way on the one side, as the criticism of the Fourth Gospel does on the other side. I would even ask if the hope is not supported by his own all too brief treatment of the Johannine Theology, and his preference for a kind of Logos-Christology rather than a purely humanitarian or a mythical estimate of the person of Jesus Christ. If the leading of John is not to be followed without "reservation," has the Synoptic representation to be taken at its face value alone? This supreme question confronts us whether we study the Synoptics or the Fourth Gospel, and the lesson of current criticism is that they are inextricably bound together.

VINCENT TAYLOR.

ABERDEEN.

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*ommon Principles in Psychology and Physiology.* By John T. MacCurdy, M.D., M.A., Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, and Lecturer in Psychopathology in the University of Cambridge.—Cambridge University Press, 1928.—Pp. xvii + 284. —15*s.* net.

N his very interesting book *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards,* rofessor de Madariaga has repeated with emphasis the popular otion that the Englishman is of all people the most tied to the con-rete, the palpable, the perceptual, and the most shy of the spiritual, he immaterial and the formal. If this be true, Dr MacCurdy must be repared for a cold welcome to his new book, for it is the whole aim of his volume to demonstrate that the course of biological development n be understood only as the expression of immaterial patterns perating in and through living structures.

After a preface in which he attempts a brief statement of the otions underlying his treatment, MacCurdy devotes about the first alf of his book to a study of "psychological patterns." He thinks wise to begin in this way because, since patterns are essentially on-mechanical in their nature and modes of operation, "we should rst study the phenomena least complicated by mechanism, that is o say, the mental." We start, in the approved modern fashion, from he instincts. These are "set behaviour patterns, modified perhaps y consciousness, but never initiated thereby," and it is at once sur-ised that the basic structure of mind is to be found in such patterns: hypothesis most difficult to understand. All patterns seem to be of he nature of responses to stimuli, but in every case stimuli may be ffective which are not in fact a part of the immediate external environment. "Image" is a term which indicates the effect of such bsent stimuli, "image function" is used when we can merely infer rom a study of behaviour that stimuli of this order are active, and he term "liminal image" is introduced apparently to indicate that owering of threshold by which it becomes possible for stimuli only partially present or even wholly absent to produce a specific esponse.

Although I have tried hard for a long time I cannot regard this erminology as anything but confusing. The same name, "image," is being used in very different senses. "Image proper" is treated, probably correctly, as a concrete, discoverable bit of conscious content; t has the status, that is, of mental structure, whatever that may mean. "Image function" is merely a descriptive behaviouristic term to indicate that in some cases conduct proceeds very much as if some stimulus or situation which is not in fact sensorially present were so present. It names nothing structural, unless tremendous assumptions are made, but merely a mode of acting. "Liminal image" is more difficult still. It may name either (*a*) the *process* by which the threshold value of a given stimulus is progressively lowered, (*b*) the process by which various different stimuli become tied ogether, so that the one may function as the other in the absence of the other. MacCurdy seems to take the second case of "limin image" as the natural termination of the first and speaks repeatedl of "zero thresholds." I cannot think that the whole range of exper mental science ever has demonstrated or ever will demonstrate a zer threshold. The gradual reduction of the threshold value of a give stimulus to a minimum seems to me a totally different process fro the acquisition by one stimulus of a functional characteristic whic originally belonged to another one. The latter case may very we occur without there being any reduction of threshold in the sense the former case. However, these difficulties apart, MacCurdy ha done a most interesting and valuable piece of work in demonstratin the occurrence of the image type of response over an enormousl wider range of biological phenomena than is usually considered i this connection.

Next MacCurdy develops his notion of "patterns." The primar stuff of mental life is images or imaginal processes—it is never qui clear which. But these are always arranged, grouped, built togeth with other images or imaginal processes. To discover how th arrangement is brought about we have to push beneath the stage association by conscious meanings, and then we find that the relatio of response to stimuli are "not controlled by consciousness, and n by efforts of adaptation to the environment, but are oriented by inn forces." Thus patterns are said to be "agencies that control th direction of a series of mental reactions," and the most fundament sort of pattern is "of an instinctive order."

There is an acute and very ancient difficulty in this. The notic of pattern as arrangement is one thing, its treatment as agency another. I am inclined to think that MacCurdy avails himself either usage according to the exigencies of his argument, and does n really reconcile the two.

The succeeding chapters in the first part are all extraordinaril interesting. They apply the fundamental notions already referre to to a number of special problems. MacCurdy shows how, in hi view, primitive mental patterns are built up; discusses the primar function of consciousness, and writes a long and most able argumen dealing with the evolution of intelligence. Appetite and interes attention, perception, meaning, recognition, voluntary recall are considered in turn. "Patterns" govern and explain each of the The critical reader may perhaps get a picture of the author as a bol adventurer opening with a skeleton key even the most firmly locke rooms of the psychological fortress. If the critic tries to use the ke for himself, maybe it will lose some of its magic. However, MacCurd undoubtedly does reveal a considerable amount of genuine treasu with the aid of his key. The last chapter of part one states the "la of patterns as deduced from psychology."

Part two is called "physiological patterns." Here MacCurd demonstrates how phenomena of precisely the same character those that he has discussed in his first part are to be found over th whole range of biological response. He uses brilliantly the eviden

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